List: Yesterday I obtained via interlibrary loan through my local public library a 2014 paper by J. Caleb Clanton, "A (Partial) Peircean Defense of the Cosmological Argument: A Response to Rowe" ( https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201416112). He begins by summarizing the version of the cosmological argument that William Rowe discusses at length in chapter 2 of his book, *Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction*, which can be reformulated as follows in accordance with Peirce's careful metaphysical distinction between existence and reality.
P1. Every real being is either dependent (contingent) or self-sufficient (necessary). P2. It is impossible for every real being to be dependent (contingent). C1. Therefore, there is a real self-sufficient (necessary) being. The argumentation is deductively valid, and both premisses are derived from the PSR. P2 follows from having to account for not only each *individual* dependent being, but also the entire collection or series of such beings. Any number of dependent beings, even infinitely many, can account for each other--but not for the real fact that there are *any* dependent beings in the first place. As for P1, Rowe recalls Anselm's position that every being is explained either by another (dependent), by itself (self-sufficient), or by nothing. P1 rules out the third option, prompting Rowe to wonder, "Why, after all, should we accept the idea that every being and every positive fact must have an explanation? Why, in short, should we believe PSR?" This is where Clanton brings Peirce into the picture by quoting CP 1.139 (EP 2:49, 1898). JCC: In other words, according to Peirce, an abductive inference is justified *only if* it affords an actual explanation of the phenomenon at hand. But asserting the hypothesis that *Φ* is utterly inexplicable is to assert a would-be hypothesis that doesn't actually afford an explanation of the given phenomenon. ... If Peirce is correct that we can never justifiably reach the conclusion that *Φ* is inexplicable, then we can't ever justifiably assert that, indeed, *PSR* is false. (pp. 202-203) In Peirce's own words ... CSP: Now, my argument is that, according to the principles of logic, we never have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable or unaccountable. For such a conclusion goes beyond what can be directly observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe. But it is no explanation or account of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable or unaccountable, or to pronounce any other fact so. (CP 6.613, 1893) Clanton then goes a step farther--"If we simply suspend belief about whether *E* [the reality of dependent beings that explain each other] is explicable, then we fail to put ourselves in a position to learn the truth about *E*, and we thereby block the way of inquiry" (p. 203). This is presumably why Peirce states that "logic *requires *us to postulate of any given phenomenon, that it is capable of rational explanation," such that "the co-reality of the three universes ... *must*, accordingly, be supposed capable of rational explanation" (R 339:[293r], 1908 Aug 28, emphases added). The PSR is thus a strictly *methodological *principle of logic--*contra *Leibniz, "it does not amount to any such absolute and ineluctable necessity as attaches to the law of contradiction" (CP 6.394, 1902). Clanton acknowledges this--"In any case, we should note that this argument doesn't per se *prove* the reality of God, but merely that it's reasonable to believe that there's [a self-sufficient being] and, moreover, that it's unreasonable to assert that the existence of the universe as a whole is merely a brute fact" (p. 204). He adds in a footnote, "Peircean scholars *might* be interested to note that the conclusion of this Peircean defense of the cosmological argument is actually more robust than the conclusion that's generated by Peirce's own so-called *neglected argument*," which in Clanton's view is "merely that if someone, after musing, is caused to believe that God is real, then that particular person is warranted in believing that God is real" (ibid n. 26). Of course, it turns out that Peirce himself advocates C1 more assertively in the unpublished manuscripts that I have quoted previously than in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." Again, the only alternative that he recognizes is "that the total real is a consequence of utter nothing without substance or appearance," which "is absurd ... self-contradictory & impossible" (R 288:91[178], 1905). "The task of Cosmology is therefore to show how all phenomena were produced from a state of absolute absence of any ... But it must suppose something to be in that antecedent state, & this must be that which would Really be in any possible state of things whatever, that is, an *Ens Necessarium*" (R 339:[295r], 1908 Aug 28). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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