Gary F., List: In accordance with Peirce's architectonic classification of the normative sciences, logic is not "a department of ethics," but it does depend on ethics for principles, which in turn depends on esthetics for principles. Specifically, esthetics identifies the growth of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum*, the only ideal end that is intrinsically admirable; so ethics prescribes conduct accordingly, including the use of logic to engage in methods of inquiry that are consistent with the aim of adopting only true beliefs.
CSP: I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903) As I see it, this is not so much a denial that "there are limits to knowledge and limits to inquiry" as a warning against being too quick to claim that such limits have actually been reached. It follows from Peirce's tenet that whatever is real is capable of being *represented*--i.e., serving as the dynamical object of a sign--and therefore capable of being *known*, at least in the long run of experience. CSP: On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they apply it. ... This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. (CP 5.407, 1878/1893). It seems noteworthy that Peirce *revised *the quoted sentences for inclusion in *How to Reason: A Critick of Arguments* (R 422, 1893). He evidently made a deliberate decision to *weaken *the language as originally published in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (EP 1:138-139, 1878)--"animated by a cheerful hope" replaces "fully persuaded," "each question to which they apply it" replaces "every question to which they can be applied," and "This great hope" replaces "This great law." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Nov 17, 2024 at 11:22 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, thanks for this detailed commentary on Peirce’s (equivocal) support > for the PSR. It highlights what I consider perhaps the weakest aspect of > Peircean philosophy. > > CSP was (by his account) a “scholastic realist” in logic and metaphysics, > but he also affirmed that (critical) logic is a department of ethics. And > Peirce was an ethical idealist, as far as the logic of science is > concerned. We can’t do science, he says, without maintaining that “cheerful > hope” which is its ethical ideal: we would have no *reason* to “ask any > question.” This is in effect a denial that for any species of embodied > being capable of learning by experience, there are limits to knowledge and > limits to inquiry, and honesty compels us to humbly acknowledge those > limits. > > Peirce himself acknowledges them in his comments on the “economy of > research” (in Cambridge Lecture 2, for instance). But the PSR virtually > denies them, in the same sense that classical economics denies the reality > of human nature by positing that economic decisions are made by individuals > on a basis of reason and adequate information about the consequences. > Closely related to this is the currently prevalent denial of limits to > growth, and of the ecological overshoot > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_overshoot> caused by excessive > human domination of the ecosphere (global heating being but one deadly > aspect of this overshoot). This is another symptom of the “vaulting > ambition” driving the collective behavior of humanity to self-destruction, > even as science shows us unequivocally that human activity is exceeding > planetary boundaries. > > I’m not blaming Peirce for all this, of course, just saying that his > adherence to the “Enlightenment” faith in never-ending social and > scientific “progress” — which some consider his best feature — is for me > his greatest weakness. It’s what we have to move beyond if we are to make > pragmatic 21st-century use of his deeper semeiotic insights. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } The messages cease to be messages when nobody can read them. [G. > Bateson] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> >
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