Gary F., Gary R., List: I heartily agree that for Peirce, there is "a spectrum of concepts of consciousness," and that his "understanding of 'consciousness' was rather nuanced." For now, I will only comment on the first couple of quotations below, which actually come from the same paragraph.
CSP: The whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling, as truly as the whole of space is made up of points or the whole of time of instants. ... To be conscious is nothing else than to feel. (CP 1.317-8, EP 2:367-8, 1905) In accordance with Peirce's "top-down" conception, the whole of space is *not *made up of points at all, and the whole of time is *not *made up of instants at all. Instead, both space and time are *continuous*, manifesting 3ns, lacking points and instants unless/until they are deliberately marked off for some purpose. In other words, the whole is real and ontologically prior to such parts, which are artificial (*entia rationis*). Hence, what I take him to be saying here is that the whole content of consciousness is *not *made up of multiple *discrete *qualities of feeling; after all, that would be manifesting 2ns, and in this context, he is talking about qualities of feeling as 1ns. Here is the rest of the paragraph, omitted above at the ellipsis. CSP: Contemplate anything by itself,--anything whatever that can be, so contemplate it. Attend to the whole and drop the parts out of attention altogether. One can approximate nearly enough to the accomplishment of that to see that the result of its perfect accomplishment would be that one would have in his consciousness at the moment nothing but a quality of feeling. This quality of feeling would in itself, as so contemplated, have no parts. It would be unlike any other such quality of feeling. In itself, it would not even resemble any other; for resemblance has its being only in comparison. It would be a pure Priman [1ns]. Since this is true of whatever we contemplate, however complex may be the object, it follows that there is nothing else in immediate consciousness. This is reminiscent of a couple of additional passages. CSP: But let us compare it [the universe] rather with a painting,--with an impressionist seashore piece,--then every Quality in a premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the painting; they are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole,--which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses. (CP 5.119, EP 2:194, 1903) The "total effect" of "an impressionist seashore piece” is the aggregate of the separate effects of the "colored particles" that comprise it. Beyond a certain viewing distance, the gaps between the latter effectively disappear, so the painting is able to represent (approximately) a hypothetical instantaneous state of a continuum--the seashore itself, where the real situation is constant motion. The parts with their "elementary Qualities" are created by the artist for the purpose of *simulating *"the intended Quality that belongs to the whole," like Cantor's "bottom-up" approach to a (psuedo-)continuum using the real numbers. CSP: In the light of the doctrine of categories I should say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their totality; and whatever does this is, in so far, esthetically good, no matter what the particular quality of the total may be. (CP 5.132, EP 2:201, 1903) The content of consciousness is a top-down "positive simple immediate quality," not a bottom-up assemblage of diverse qualities. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Dec 14, 2024 at 2:28 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary f, Jon, List, > > Thank you for your comments which suggest to me that Peirce's > understanding of 'consciousness' was rather nuanced. However, in doing a > string search of the CP I found one concept that seems to run through the > surprising -- to me -- large number of pages Peirce devoted to > consciousness, namely, that "To be conscious is nothing else than to feel." > CP 1.319 > > "The whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling, > as truly as the whole of space is made up of points or the whole of time of > instants." CP l.317. > > "Whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists . . . . > It is needless to point out that, from the very nature of an infinite > series, it cannot be a present modification of consciousness." CP 8.288 > > This is not to say that there aren't various 'intensities' of > consciousness (e.g. vivid, intense, waning, etc.), nor forms or modes of > consciousness beyond 'immediate consciousness' [which itself "takes time," > that is, there is no "instantaneous consciousness" -- see below]; that is, > there can be consciousness *of* something. As applied to 2ns it is > principally a consciousness of resistance, applied to 3ns it is principally > a consciousness of thought, of semiosis occuring. > > "It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, > feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant [rather, a > moment, for the 'instant' is a mere abstraction. GR] of time, passive > consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, > consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of > resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic > consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought." CP > 1.377 > > In several places he explicates especially the "dual" sense of > consciousness, that of the 'inner' and 'outer' worlds. > > "To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries of > non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in intensity, which > are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer world -- the world of those > causes that are exceedingly compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, > with general disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon > only slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular effort -- and > of the inner world, apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to > direct effort of various kinds with feeble reactions; the interaction of > these two worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world > upon the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer > through the operation of habits." CP 5.493 > > His comments on the relationship between consciousness and time (and > continuity, which I won't discuss here) are particularly interesting, For > example: > > "But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time [which > he elsewhere refers to as a tripartite 'moment'); for if it did not, we > could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no veracious cognition of > it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, forced to say that we > are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time." CP > 6.110 > > In another place he goes on to suggest that consciousness not only takes > time, but "relates to a process": > > "This conception of consciousness is something which takes up time.. And > if consciousness has a duration, then there is no such thing as an > instantaneous consciousness; but all consciousness relates to a process. > CP 7. > > Continuing the idea that consciousness is essentially 'feeling', Peirce > notes that even protoplasm can be said to feel, and that there can be no > mechanism to account for this, strongly suggesting that *all *living > beings feel, and so by Peirce's definition, have some degree of > consciousness. > > "But what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness > belongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is this to be > accounted for? The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. There is no > inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the laboratory, > out of its chemical elements; and if it were so made, it would present all > the characters of natural protoplasm. No doubt, then, it would feel. To > hesitate to admit this would be puerile and ultra-puerile. CP 6.264 > > Taking up consciousness in the realm of the "third Universe," Peirce > remarks in this familiar passage: > > "The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active > power to establish connections between different objects, especially > between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is > essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not > essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in > its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, > too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of > a plant. . ." CP 6.455 > > Gary f, you mentioned the lake metaphor which, it would seem to me, has > implications for memory at very least. > > "I think of consciousness as a bottomless lake, whose waters seem > transparent, yet into which we can clearly see but a little way. But in > this water there are countless objects at different depths; and certain > influences will give certain kinds of those objects an upward impulse which > may be intense enough and continue long enough to bring them into the upper > visible layer. After the impulse ceases they commence to sink downwards. CP > 7.548 > > As for consciousness and logic -- and the relationship of metaphysics to > logic, this passage is suggestive: > > "I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical > research, but shall merely say that in the opinion of several great > thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our > logic as our metaphysics. In the last lecture,* I endeavored to show how > logic furnishes us with a classification of the elements of consciousness*. > We found that all modifications of consciousness are inferences and that > all inferences are valid inferences (Emphasis added). CP 7.580 > Conclusion: In my search I didn't find any passages suggesting that > inanimate objects -- like rocks -- have consciousness, nor that God has > consciousness in the sense discussed above. My own tentative guesses > regarding this are that Peirce might say that inanimate objects lack > consciousness but that in consideration of objective idealism that they > participate in a universal process of mind. As for God, I'd say that if God > has anything like consciousness, it is much more abstract and universal > than what we think of consciousness as being > > Finally, I'd conclude that according to Peirce, anything that feels has > consciousness, from protoplasm, plants and animals, through humans. (Recent > research regarding how plants feel would seem to support this idea.) > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sat, Dec 14, 2024 at 1:29 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R, Jon, list, (trying again to get the links to work) >> >> The passage you quote, Jon, represents one pole of a spectrum of concepts >> of consciousness (or at least uses of the word) that Peirce expressed from >> time to time. At the other end, perhaps, is his remark in the Additament to >> his “Neglected Argument” essay of 1908: >> >> “Since God, in His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a >> disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we >> call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or >> some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God >> probably has no consciousness” (EP2:447 >> <http://gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm#xcnc>). In the middle is the graded >> concept of consciousness that he refers to as a “bottomless lake >> <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snm.htm#btmlslk>.” Whether these are three >> different aspects of “consciousness” or three ways of talking about it is >> hard to say, in my opinion. >> >> Love, gary f. >> >> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >> >
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