Gary, Ben, Jon,
Gary, I think you got this just right.
Best,
Gary R.
On 3/9/12, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> Ben, Jon and list,
>
> I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me
> that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in
> question, Peirce does NOT use the term "Categories" in reference to what he
> elsewhere calls categories, or "elements" of the phaneron, or even sometimes
> "universes" -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
>
> The "Prolegomena" is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs,
> and the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of
> propositions. The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP
> 4.544-5:
>
> [[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs
> fail.... But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote
> Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large,
> very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily
> defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a
> single instance, is the collection of all things in the Physical
> Universe....
>
> Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category
> are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of
> Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of
> Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe
> the two correctly is a question for careful study. ]]]
>
> Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to
> Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying
> that he prefers the term "Predicaments" for classes of predicates, no doubt
> because this avoids confusing them "with the different Modes of Being" which
> are elsewhere called "categories. And indeed he never mentions "Categories"
> again in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in
> the whole article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only conclude
> that the passage you quoted from it, Jon, tells us nothing about *those*
> "categories", which i guess are the ones you referred to as "Peirce's
> categories." The connection between them and the triad of first, second and
> third *intentions* is very tenuous, as i think Peirce indicates by saying
> that his thoughts about the latter triad are "not yet harvested" --
> something he could hardly say in 1906 about his phaneroscopic "categories".
>
> Gary F.
>
> } We are circumveiloped by obscuritads. [Finnegans Wake 244] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: March-08-12 11:05 PM
>
> Ben & All,
>
> I see that I omitted to give my initial thoughts on that last paragraph of
> yours, so let me do that now.
>
> BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
> "different in the different Modes of Being"? Where in his other
> writings does he call his own categories "predicates of predicates"?
> It's hard not to think that by "Predicates of Predicates" he does not
> mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional,
> 2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that
> his "thoughts are not yet harvested," will end up being treated by him
> as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds — instances or applications of his
> categories.
>
> There is nothing very exotic about predicates of predicates. We use them
> all the time without taking much notice of the fact or bothering to describe
> them as such.
> For example, terms like "monadic", "dyadic", "triadic" are predicates of
> predicates.
> When a phenomenon requires a k-adic predicate or a k-adic relation for its
> adequate description, we say that the phenomenon has "k-ness". So category
> k is the category of phenomena that need k-adic predicates or relations for
> their adequate description.
>
> When it comes to what Peirce means here by "Modes of Being", I guess I had
> assumed from the words he used — Actuality, Possibility, Destiny — that he
> was talking about the traditional triad of modalities, but I'm not so sure
> about that now. At any rate, those would not be the first words that come
> to mind when I think of the categories. I am more used to the paradigm of
> Quality, Reaction, Representation and its later variants, and the only way I
> could force an association would be by interpreting those modes of being, or
> modalities, if that is what they are, in relational terms. Shy of that, I
> have the feeling that Peirce could talk us into any given order he chose on
> any given day ex tempore.
>
> But maybe my readings will bring more light tomorrow ...
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
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--
Gary Richmond
Humanities Department
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College--City University of New York
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