Dear Steven, Okay, 1866 instead of 1867. Indeed he regularly said that his categories are indecomposible into more basic elements; they _are_ his basic elements. That's why your indecomposability argument fails in the case of the Prolegomena-categories (which he says he prefers to call "Predicaments") - it's because there he does _not_ call them indecomposable; instead he says that they are "classes that, being enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices."
Note that he did not say that the classes in question are indices of their elements or members. Instead he said that they are classes denotable (actually) only by indices and not by satisfactory definitions (since there actually are none). You imply that he could not have meant that because it would have led to an infinite regress. Yet it is in fact what he did say, and we are not entitled to silently revise him as if it were a mere typographical error. I'm not sure why you think it leads to infinite regress but, supposing that it does, it is not necessarily a problem for Peirce. Peirce believed in infinite series of signs in semiosis that has nevertheless a beginning and an end (at least by interruption) in time, since he was a synechist. In fact he based his synechism on the four incapacities, for example the incapacity for intuition, that is, the incapacity for a cognition devoid of inferential relation to a previous cognition. From final paragraph (CP 5.263) of "Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man": So that it is not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of the Achilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion, if it seems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination of one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are fictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgments are fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or that logical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a _process_ of beginning, as any other change comes to pass. In 1904 he still thought that the Four Incapacities lead to the establishment of synechism. From his brief intellectual autobiography*: "Upon these four propositions he based a doctrine of Synechism, or principle of the universality of the law of continuity, carrying with it a return to scholastic realism." *(1904), Intellectual autobiography in draft letter L 107 (see the Robin Catalog) to Matthew Mattoon Curtis. Published 1983 in "A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce" by Kenneth Laine Ketner in American Journal of Semiotics v. 2, nos. 1-2 (1983), 61-83. Some or all of it is in pp. 26-31 in Classical American Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays, John J. Stuhr, ed., Oxford University Press, USA, 1987. L 107 and MS 914 are in "Charles Sanders Peirce: Interdisciplinary Scientist" (first page at Oldenbourg) by Kenneth Laine Ketner in the 2009 Peirce collection Logic of Interdisciplinarity. As I said to Jon, I don't see why Peirce would refuse to call his own categories predicate of predicates, and maybe indeed he wouldn't refuse. I agree with Jon that "There is nothing very exotic about predicates of predicates." But it doesn't follow that the Prolegomena-categories are Peirce's own, and the other reasons given above, and below in my previous post, stand against such a consequence. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 11:43 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Dear Ben, There is no inconsistency as I see it, though I may not have stated the case clearly enough. In the first I said Peirce is not referring to his categories AS "predicates of predicates," not that he is not referring to his categories. As index I am referring to the category itself, not its elements. A category stands apart from the elements that it may select by virtue of its properties. Apprehended, denoted, the category is indexed; 1st, 2nd, 3rd. You object to my saying that a category IS an index, by which I mean that it has the properties of an index. You appear to suggest that indices has another level of being, that will lead to an infinite recurse. Again: "... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices." A year earlier, in 1866, Peirce wrote "On A Method Of Searching For The Categories" in which he lists the categories as "Quality, Relation, Representation." So it seems clear that in this period he already had "his categories" and is referring to them here. See p. 520 and p. 524 of the first volume of the chronological edition "Writings of CSP." On "they cannot be decomposed," in CP 1.299 Peirce writes: "We find then a priori that there are three categories of undecomposable elements to be expected in the phaneron: those which are simply positive totals, those which involve dependence but not combination, those which involve combination." "Predicaments" are predicates of predicates for Peirce, Aristotle's "Categories." With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering http://iase.info ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 7:35 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Dear Steven, In your previous post, you said, >Although the dialogic makes these passages a little difficult to read, it seems very clear to me that Peirce, in CP 4.549, is explicitly not referring to his own categories as predicated predicates, or assertions on assertions. >I think the question of "what is a category" is clearly addressed earlier, in CP 4.544, Peirce says: >"... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices." Now you say, >After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben. >Peirce is indeed referring to "his own" categories (it is difficult to read the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning "predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred earlier. >The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, i.e., they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. Peirce doesn't say in "Prolegomena" (CP 4.530-572) that categories _are_ indices, instead he says that, for categories are denotable only by indices, and the reason that he gives is not indecomposibility, but instead their being "enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part" such that they "cannot be satisfactorily defined.". But the supposed indecomposibility of Prolegomena-categories was the only specific positive reason you give for thinking that by "Category" in "Prolegomena" he means the same that he means by "Category" pretty much everywhere else. Meanwhile you've left untouched the positive reasons for thinking that it is not the same Category as everywhere else: 1. He says: "I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments and which you have explained as predicates of predicates." Peirce usually calls his own categories "Categories," not "Predicaments," and usually uses "Predicaments" as an alternate term for Aristotle's categories (substance, quantity, relation, quality, position (attitude), state, time (when), place, action, passion (undergoing). 2. He calls "Modes of Being" three things whose terms, as the CP editors note, he often enough uses as terms for his own categories - "Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny)" - that is, Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness, respectively. 3. He says that "the divisions so obtained" - i.e., 1st-intentional, 2nd-intentional, 3rd-intentional - "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates" - i.e., the Prolegomena-categories - "is different in the different Modes of Being." And on those successions, he says, and remember the year is 1906, his "thoughts are not yet harvested." Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Cc: Benjamin Udell Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 5:20 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Dear Ben, After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben. Peirce is indeed referring to "his own" categories (it is difficult to read the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning "predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred earlier. The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, i.e., they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. In my terms, Peirce argues that they are necessary distinctions. The world forces them upon us, we do not force them upon the world. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 9, 2012, at 2:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
