Steven says:

Transparency is a pragmatic. Or, exactly as Joe suggests that Peirce
implies (is there a reference to this Joe?): identifying the author is a
logical necessity.

REPLY:

Here's some quotes to that effect:

CP 2.315 (c. 1902)
For an act of assertion supposes that, a proposition being formulated, a 
person performs an act which renders him liable to the penalties of the 
social law (or, at any rate, those of the moral law) in case it should not 
be true, unless he has a definite and sufficient excuse; and an act of 
assent is an act of the mind by which one endeavors to impress the meanings 
of the proposition upon his disposition, so that it shall govern his 
conduct, including thought under conduct, this habit being ready to be 
broken in case reasons should appear for breaking it.

CP 5.30 (1903)
Now it is a fairly easy problem to analyze the nature of assertion. To find 
an easily dissected example, we shall naturally take a case where the 
assertive element is magnified -- a very formal assertion, such as an 
affidavit. Here a man goes before a notary or magistrate and takes such 
action that if what he says is not true, evil consequences will be visited 
upon him, and this he does with a view to thus causing other men to be 
affected just as they would be if the proposition sworn to had presented 
itself to them as a perceptual fact.

MS 70 (1905)
Declarative sentence: a sentence which, if seriously pronounced, makes an 
assertion; that is, is intended to serve as evidence of its utterer's 
belief, to compel (so far as a sentence may) the belief of those to whom it 
is addressed, and to assume for the utterer whatever responsibility may 
attach to the particular form of the declaration, at least, his reputation 
for veracity or accuracy.

New Elements, in EP2, pp. 312f   MS 517  (1904)
As an aid in dissecting the constitution of affirmation [assertion] I shall 
employ a certain logical magnifying-glass that I have often found efficient 
in such business. Imagine, then, that I write a proposition on a piece of 
paper, perhaps a number of times, simply as a calligraphic exercise. It is 
not likely to prove dangerous amusement. But suppose I afterward carry the 
paper before a notary public and make affidavit to its contents. This may 
prove to be a horse of another color. The reason is that the affidavit may 
be used to determine an assent to the proposition it contains in the minds 
of judge and jury--an effect that the paper would not have had if I had not 
sworn to it. For certain penalties here and hereafter are attached to 
swearing to a false proposition; and consequently the fact that I have sworn 
to it will be taken as a negative index that it is not false.
.  .  .
An affirmation is an act of an utterer of a proposition to an interpreter, 
and consists, in the first place, in the deliberate exercise, in uttering 
the proposition, of a force tending to determine a belief in it in the mind 
of the interpreter. Perhaps that is a sufficient definition of it; but it 
involves also a voluntary self-subjection to penalties in the event of the 
interpreter's mind (and still more the general mind of society) subsequently 
becoming decidedly determined to the belief at once in the falsity of the 
proposition and in the additional proposition that the utterer believed the 
proposition to be false at the time he uttered it.


Joe Ransdell
Joe Ransdell 



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