Frances to Joseph Ransdell and listers... You replied partly in effect that the distinction between "sign" and "representamen" for Peirce in his writings is indifferent. You stated that the word "representamen" was likely introduced by Peirce as the name for his refined conception of the word "sign" which then enabled him to understand interpretational processes more broadly than the word "sign" would ordinarily permit, though he later thought that he did not need to have recourse to "representamen" at all, presumably meaning that he thought the word "sign" could be used more broadly than he thought it could earlier; so that wherever interpretation is involved, he uses the two terms indifferently.
You then kindly provided some passages in support of this position. This basically was my assumption as well, but there are however some other passages that for me seem to contradict your reasoned claim. They had confused me somewhat, which lead me into positing the two words differently within my understanding of Peircean philosophy. In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however limited, which further irritates me. ____________ "A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamen that have been much studied." CP:2.242 (1903) "A 'Sign', or 'Representamen', is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 'Object', as to be capable of determining a Third, called its 'Interpretant', to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. ...A 'Sign' is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But 'thought' is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation." CP:2.274 (circa 1902) "I make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. ...in particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so." CP 1.541 (1903) "A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication and a medium of communication is a species of medium, and a medium is a species of third." MS 283 "The Basis of Pragmaticism" (circa 1905) ____________ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
