A string search of "representamen or representamen's or representamens
or representamina" in the electronic CP yields the following passages (I
have not included comments by the editors of the CP). Note that what
follows are in most cases the complete paragraphs in which the terms
occur, but in a very few cases I have excluded a continuation of the
paragraph which did not seem relevant, or added a short paragraph
preceding or following the one employing the term. This has not been
indicated in any special way.
Gary Richmond
CP 1.480 Cross-Ref:††
480. Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a
mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly
genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in
the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily
involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of
some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an
interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living.
Peirce: CP 1.540 Cross-Ref:††
540. The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of
genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough
blackboard sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the
examination of representation by defining representation a little more
accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the
word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the
object for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject
that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use these two
words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean anything
which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such
conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this
familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to
a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis
applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis,
part of what I say about signs will be false. For in that case a sign
may not be a representamen. The analysis is certainly true of the
representamen, since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis
is correct, something may happen to be true of all signs, that is of
everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to
regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be
something which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not
true. In particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I
know no reason why every representamen should do so.
Peirce: CP 1.541 Cross-Ref:††
541. My definition of a representamen is as follows:
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called
its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic
relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant
to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some
interpretant.
Peirce: CP 1.542 Cross-Ref:††
542. It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any
actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would
be another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant
of its own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an
endless series of events which could have actually occurred, which is
absurd. For the same reason the interpretant cannot be a definite
individual object. The relation must therefore consist in a power of
the representamen to determine some interpretant to being a
representamen of the same object.
Peirce: CP 1.557 Cross-Ref:††
557. Since no one of the categories can be prescinded from those above
it, the list of supposable objects which they afford is,
What is.
Quale (that which refers to a ground)
Relate (that which refers to ground and correlate)
Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant)
It
Peirce: CP 1.564 Cross-Ref:††
564. I must acknowledge some previous errors committed by me in
expounding my division of signs into icons, indices and symbols. At
the time I first published this division in 1867 I had been studying
the logic of relatives for so short a time that it was not until three
years later that I was ready to go to print with my first memoir on
that subject. I had hardly commenced the cultivation of that land
which De Morgan had cleared. I already, however, saw what had escaped
that eminent master, that besides non-relative characters, and besides
relations between pairs of objects, there was a third category of
characters, and but this third. This third class really consists of
plural relations, all of which may be regarded as compounds of triadic
relations, that is, of relations between triads of objects. A very
broad and important class of triadic characters [consists of]
representations. A representation is that character of a thing by
virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may
stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I
term a representamen, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant,
the thing for which it stands, its object.
Peirce: CP 2.228 Cross-Ref:††
228. A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that
is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps
a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes †1 called the
ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be understood in a sort
of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that
sense in which we say that one man catches another man's idea, in
which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some
previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as
the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
instant of the interval a new idea.
Peirce: CP 2.229 Cross-Ref:††
229. In consequence of every representamen being thus connected with
three things, the ground, the object, and the interpretant, the
science of semiotic has three branches. The first is called by Duns
Scotus grammatica speculativa. We may term it pure grammar. It has for
its task to ascertain what must be true of the representamen used by
every scientific intelligence in order that they may embody any
meaning. The second is logic proper. It is the science of what is
quasi-necessarily true of the representamina of any scientific
intelligence in order that they may hold good of any object, that is,
may be true. Or say, logic proper is the formal science of the
conditions of the truth of representations. The third, in imitation of
Kant's fashion of preserving old associations of words in finding
nomenclature for new conceptions, I call pure rhetoric. Its task is to
ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign
gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another.
Peirce: CP 2.233 Cross-Ref:†† §3. DIVISION OF TRIADIC RELATIONS †1
233. The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to
describe, in a distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations
must be. But until we have met with the different kinds a posteriori,
and have in that way been led to recognize their importance, the a
priori descriptions mean little; not nothing at all, but little. Even
after we seem to identify the varieties called for a priori with
varieties which the experience of reflexion leads us to think
important, no slight labour is required to make sure that the
divisions we have found a posteriori are precisely those that have
been predicted a priori. In most cases, we find that they are not
precisely identical, owing to the narrowness of our reflexional
experience. It is only after much further arduous analysis that we are
able finally to place in the system the conceptions to which
experience has led us. In the case of triadic relations, no part of
this work has, as yet, been satisfactorily performed, except in some
measure for the most important class of triadic relations, those of
signs, or representamens, to their objects and interpretants.
Peirce: CP 2.234 Cross-Ref:††
234. Provisionally, we may make a rude division of triadic relations,
which, we need not doubt, contains important truth, however
imperfectly apprehended, into--
Triadic relations of comparison,
Triadic relations of performance, and
Triadic relations of thought.
Triadic relations of Comparison are those which are of the nature of
logical possibilities.
Triadic relations of Performance are those which are of the nature of
actual facts.
Triadic relations of Thought are those which are of the nature of laws.
Peirce: CP 2.241 Cross-Ref:††
241. In every genuine Triadic Relation, the First Correlate may be
regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some respect; and
triadic relations may be divided according as that determination of
the Third Correlate is to having some quality, or to being in some
existential relation to the Second Correlate, or to being in some
relation of thought to the Second for something †2.
Peirce: CP 2.242 Cross-Ref:††
242. A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the
same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have
been much studied.
Peirce: CP 2.274 Cross-Ref:†† CHAPTER 3 THE ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL
§1. ICONS AND HYPOICONS †1
274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be
capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the
same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the
same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three
members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any
complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or
Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must
stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. Nor
can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely similar
to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of
the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must
indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of
determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a
second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the
relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object,
and must be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this
must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and
this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign; and as the
term Representamen is here used, nothing more is implied. A Sign is a
Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be
Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning
towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same
reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the
sun. But thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.
Peirce: CP 2.275 Cross-Ref:††
275. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons,
Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually
functions as such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it
becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this;
and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its
ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually
having an Object.
Peirce: CP 2.276 Cross-Ref:††
276. An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of
"substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine
thirdness.) Whether there are other kinds of substitutes or not we
shall see. A Representamen by Firstness alone can only have a similar
Object. Thus, a Sign by Contrast denotes its object only by virtue of
a contrast, or Secondness, between two qualities. A sign by Firstness
is an image of its object and, more strictly speaking, can only be an
idea. For it must produce an Interpretant idea; and an external object
excites an idea by a reaction upon the brain. But most strictly
speaking, even an idea, except in the sense of a possibility, or
Firstness, cannot be an Icon. A possibility alone is an Icon purely by
virtue of its quality; and its object can only be a Firstness. But a
sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its
similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be
wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material
image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of
representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be
called a hypoicon.
Peirce: CP 2.277 Cross-Ref:††
277. Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of
Firstness of which they partake. Those which partake of simple
qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the
relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by
analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which
represent the representative character of a representamen by
representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors.
Peirce: CP 2.278 Cross-Ref:††
Peirce: CP 2.283 Cross-Ref:†† §2. GENUINE AND DEGENERATE INDICES
283. An Index or Seme†1 ({séma}) is a Representamen whose
Representative character consists in its being an individual second.
If the Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If
the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate. A genuine
Index and its Object must be existent individuals (whether things or
facts), and its immediate Interpretant must be of the same character.
But since every individual must have characters, it follows that a
genuine Index may contain a Firstness, and so an Icon as a constituent
part of it. Any individual is a degenerate Index of its own characters.
Peirce: CP 2.286 Cross-Ref:††
286. . . . A low barometer with a moist air is an index of rain; that
is we suppose that the forces of nature establish a probable
connection between the low barometer with moist air and coming rain. A
weathercock is an index of the direction of the wind; because in the
first place it really takes the self-same direction as the wind, so
that there is a real connection between them, and in the second place
we are so constituted that when we see a weathercock pointing in a
certain direction it draws our attention to that direction, and when
we see the weathercock veering with the wind, we are forced by the law
of mind to think that direction is connected with the wind. The pole
star is an index, or pointing finger, to show us which way is north. A
spirit-level, or a plumb bob, is an index of the vertical direction. A
yard-stick might seem, at first sight, to be an icon of a yard; and so
it would be, if it were merely intended to show a yard as near as it
can be seen and estimated to be a yard. But the very purpose of a
yard-stick is to show a yard nearer than it can be estimated by its
appearance. This it does in consequence of an accurate mechanical
comparison made with the bar in London called the yard. Thus it is a
real connection which gives the yard-stick its value as a
representamen; and thus it is an index, not a mere icon.
Peirce: CP 2.292 Cross-Ref:†† §3. THE NATURE OF SYMBOLS
292. A Symbol is a Representamen whose Representative character
consists precisely in its being a rule that will determine its
Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and other conventional
signs are Symbols. We speak of writing or pronouncing the word "man";
but it is only a replica, or embodiment of the word, that is
pronounced or written. The word itself has no existence although it
has a real being, consisting in the fact that existents will conform
to it. It is a general mode of succession of three sounds or
representamens of sounds, which becomes a sign only in the fact that a
habit, or acquired law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as
meaning a man or men. The word and its meaning are both general rules;
but the word alone of the two prescribes the qualities of its replicas
in themselves. Otherwise the "word" and its "meaning" do not differ,
unless some special sense be attached to "meaning."
Peirce: CP 2.309 Cross-Ref:†† CHAPTER 4 PROPOSITIONS†1
§1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DICISIGNS
309. Of the three classes of the [third] trichotomy of
representamens--the simple or substitutive signs, or sumisigns
[rhemes]; the double or informational signs, quasi-propositions, or
dicisigns; the triple or rationally persuasive signs, or arguments, or
suadisigns--the one whose nature is, by all odds, the easiest to
comprehend, is the second, that of quasi-propositions, despite the
fact that the question of the essential nature of the "judgment" is
today quite the most vexed of all questions of logic. The truth is
that all these classes are of very intricate natures; but the problem
of the day is needlessly complicated by the attention of most
logicians, instead of extending to propositions in general, being
confined to "judgments," or acts of mental acceptance of propositions,
which not only involve characters, additional to those of propositions
in general--characters required to differentiate them as propositions
of a particular kind--but which further involve, beside the mental
proposition itself, the peculiar act of assent. The problem is
difficult enough, when we merely seek to analyze the essential nature
of the Dicisign, in general, that is, the kind of sign that conveys
information, in contradistinction to a sign [such as an icon] from
which information may be derived.†P1
Peirce: CP 2.311 Cross-Ref:††
311. This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object,
the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign in so far as
it is the relate of the existential relation which is the Secondary
Object of the Dicisign, can evidently not be the entire Dicisign. It
is at once a part of the Object and a part of the Interpretant of the
Dicisign. Since the Dicisign is represented in its Interpretant to be
an Index of a complexus as such, it must be represented in that same
Interpretant to be composed of two parts, corresponding respectively
to its Object and to itself [the Dicisign]. That is to say, in order
to understand the Dicisign, it must be regarded as composed of two
such parts whether it be in itself so composed or not. It is difficult
to see how this can be, unless it really have two such parts; but
perhaps this may be possible. Let us consider these two represented
parts separately. The part which is represented to represent the
Primary Object, since the Dicisign is represented to be an Index of
its Object, must be represented as an Index, or some representamen of
an Index, of the Primary Object. The part which is represented to
represent a part of the Dicisign is represented as at once part of the
Interpretant and part of the Object. It must, therefore, be
represented as such a sort of Representamen (or to represent such a
sort), as can have its Object and its Interpretant the same. Now, a
Symbol cannot even have itself as its Object; for it is a law
governing its Object. For example, if I say, "This proposition conveys
information about itself," or "Let the term 'sphynx' be a general term
to denote anything of the nature of a symbol that is applicable to
every 'sphynx' and to nothing else," I shall talk unadulterated
nonsense. But a Representamen mediates between its Interpretant and
its Object, and that which cannot be the object of the Representamen
cannot be the Object of the Interpretant. Hence, a fortiori, it is
impossible that a Symbol should have its Object as its Interpretant.
An Index can very well represent itself. Thus, every number has a
double; and thus the entire collection of even numbers is an Index of
the entire collection of numbers, and so this collection of even
numbers contains an Index of itself. But it is impossible for an Index
to be its own Interpretant, since an Index is nothing but an
individual existence in a Secondness with something; and it only
becomes an Index by being capable of being represented by some
Representamen as being in that relation. Could this Interpretant be
itself there would be no difference between an Index and a Second. An
Icon, however, is strictly a possibility involving a possibility, and
thus the possibility of its being represented as a possibility is the
possibility of the involved possibility. In this kind of Representamen
alone, then, the Interpretant may be the Object. Consequently, that
constituent of the Dicisign, which is represented in the Interpretant
as being a part of the Object, must be represented by an Icon or by a
Representamen of an Icon. The Dicisign, as it must be understood in
order to be understood at all, must contain those two parts. But the
Dicisign is represented to be an Index of the Object, in that the
latter involves something corresponding to these parts; and it is this
Secondness that the Dicisign is represented to be the Index of. Hence
the Dicisign must exhibit a connection between these parts of itself,
and must represent this connection to correspond to a connection in
the object between the Secundal Primary Object [i.e., the primary
object so far as it is dyadic in structure] and the Firstness [or
quality of the primary object] indicated by the part [of the Secundal
Primary Object] corresponding to the Dicisign.
Peirce: CP 2.312 Cross-Ref:††
312. We conclude, then, that, if we have succeeded in threading our
way through the maze of these abstractions, a Dicisign, defined as a
Representamen whose Interpretant represents it as an Index of its
Object, must have the following characters:
Peirce: CP 2.312 Cross-Ref:††
First: It must, in order to be understood, be considered as containing
two parts. Of these, the one, which may be called the Subject, is or
represents an Index of a Second existing independently of its being
represented, while the other, which may be called the Predicate, is or
represents an Icon of a Firstness [or quality or essence]. Second:
These two parts must be represented as connected; and that in such a
way that if the Dicisign has any Object, it [the Dicisign] must be an
Index of a Secondness subsisting between the Real Object represented
in one represented part of the Dicisign to be indicated and a
Firstness represented in the other represented part of the Dicisign to
be Iconized.
Peirce: CP 2.322 Cross-Ref:††
322. The above is the best analysis the author can, at present, make
of the Dicisign. However satisfactory the main points of it may
appear, it is not likely, on general principles, to stand without more
or less amendment, though it would seem as if it could not but be
pretty near to the truth. It is doubtful whether it applies fully to
all kinds of propositions. This definition of the Dicisign will
naturally lead one to guess that a Sumisign is any Representamen of
which the Interpretant represents it as an Icon; and that the Argument
or Suadisign is a Representamen of which the Interpretant represents
it as a Symbol. Close examination encourages the student to believe
that this is something like the truth, but so far as it has been
carried, excites doubt whether this be the whole story. . . .
Peirce: CP 2.340 Cross-Ref:††
340. In 1867 I defined a symbol as any general representamen;†1 and so
far I was right. But I immediately proceeded after the traditional
manner, to divide symbols into terms, propositions and argumentations,
with the meaning that "terms" have no assertoric element, and there I
was wrong, although the division itself is not so much wrong as it is
unimportant. Subsequently, noticing that I had classed natural
symptoms both among indices and among symbols, I restricted symbols to
conventional signs, which was another error. The truth is that my
paper of 1867 was perhaps the least unsatisfactory, from a logical
point of view, that I ever succeeded in producing; and for a long time
most of the modifications I attempted of it only led me further wrong.
Peirce: CP 4.418 Cross-Ref:†† CHAPTER 4
ON EXISTENTIAL GRAPHS, EULER'S DIAGRAMS, AND LOGICAL ALGEBRA†1P
§INTRODUCTION
418. A diagram is a representamen †2 which is predominantly an icon of
relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more
or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent
system of representation, founded upon a simple and easily
intelligible basic idea.
Peirce: CP 4.446 Cross-Ref:††
Convention No. 7. A branching line of identity shall express a triad
rhema signifying the identity of the three individuals, whose
designations are represented as filling the blanks of the rhema by
coincidence with the three terminals of the line.
Peirce: CP 4.447 Cross-Ref:††
447. Remark how peculiar a sign the line of identity is. A sign, or,
to use a more general and more definite term, a representamen, is of
one or other of three kinds:†1 it is either an icon, an index, or a
symbol. An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the
mind that interprets it as such, by virtue of its being an immediate
image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in
itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the same
were there no object in nature that it resembled, and though it never
were interpreted as a sign. It is of the nature of an appearance, and
as such, strictly speaking, exists only in consciousness, although for
convenience in ordinary parlance and when extreme precision is not
called for, we extend the term icon to the outward objects which
excite in consciousness the image itself. A geometrical diagram is a
good example of an icon. A pure icon can convey no positive or factual
information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing
in nature. But it is of the utmost value for enabling its interpreter
to study what would be the character of such an object in case any
such did exist. Geometry sufficiently illustrates that. Of a
completely opposite nature is the kind of representamen termed an
index. This is a real thing or fact which is a sign of its object by
virtue of being connected with it as a matter of fact and by also
forcibly intruding upon the mind, quite regardless of its being
interpreted as a sign. It may simply serve to identify its object and
assure us of its existence and presence. But very often the nature of
the factual connexion of the index with its object is such as to
excite in consciousness an image of some features of the object, and
in that way affords evidence from which positive assurance as to truth
of fact may be drawn. A photograph, for example, not only excites an
image, has an appearance, but, owing to its optical connexion with the
object, is evidence that that appearance corresponds to a reality. A
symbol is a representamen whose special significance or fitness to
represent just what it does represent lies in nothing but the very
fact of there being a habit, disposition, or other effective general
rule that it will be so interpreted. Take, for example, the word
"man." These three letters are not in the least like a man; nor is the
sound with which they are associated. Neither is the word
existentially connected with any man as an index. It cannot be so,
since the word is not an existence at all. The word does not consist
of three films of ink. If the word "man" occurs hundreds of times in a
book of which myriads of copies are printed, all those millions of
triplets of patches of ink are embodiments of one and the same word. I
call each of those embodiments a replica of the symbol. This shows
that the word is not a thing. What is its nature? It consists in the
really working general rule that three such patches seen by a person
who knows English will effect his conduct and thoughts according to a
rule. Thus the mode of being of the symbol is different from that of
the icon and from that of the index. An icon has such being as belongs
to past experience. It exists only as an image in the mind. An index
has the being of present experience. The being of a symbol consists in
the real fact that something surely will be experienced if certain
conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will influence the thought and
conduct of its interpreter. Every word is a symbol. Every sentence is
a symbol. Every book is a symbol. Every representamen depending upon
conventions is a symbol. Just as a photograph is an index having an
icon incorporated into it, that is, excited in the mind by its force,
so a symbol may have an icon or an index incorporated into it, that
is, the active law that it is may require its interpretation to
involve the calling up of an image, or a composite photograph of many
images of past experiences, as ordinary common nouns and verbs do; or
it may require its interpretation to refer to the actual surrounding
circumstances of the occasion of its embodiment, like such words as
that, this, I, you, which, here, now, yonder, etc. Or it may be pure
symbol, neither iconic nor indicative, like the words and, or, of, etc.
Peirce: CP 4.448 Cross-Ref:††
448. The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a
state of things regarded as if it were purely imaginary. The value of
an index is that it assures us of positive fact. The value of a symbol
is that it serves to make thought and conduct rational and enables us
to predict the future. It is frequently desirable that a representamen
should exercise one of those three functions to the exclusion of the
other two, or two of them to the exclusion of the third; but the most
perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and
symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible. Of this sort
of signs the line of identity is an interesting example. As a
conventional sign, it is a symbol; and the symbolic character, when
present in a sign, is of its nature predominant over the others. The
line of identity is not, however, arbitrarily conventional nor purely
conventional
Peirce: CP 4.464 Cross-Ref:††
464. Every symbol is an ens rationis, because it consists in a habit,
in a regularity; now every regularity consists in the future
conditional occurrence of facts not themselves that regularity. Many
important truths are expressed by propositions which relate directly
to symbols or to ideal objects of symbols, not to realities. If we say
that two walls collide, we express a real relation between them,
meaning by a real relation one which involves the existence of its
correlates. If we say that a ball is red, we express a positive
quality of feeling really connected with the ball. But if we say that
the ball is not blue, we simply express -- as far as the direct
expression goes -- a relation of inapplicability between the predicate
blue, and the ball or the sign of it. So it is with every negation.
Now it has already been shown that every universal proposition
involves a negation, at least when it is expressed as an existential
graph. On the other hand, almost every graph expressing a proposition
not universal has a line of identity. But identity, though expressed
by the line as a dyadic relation, is not a relation between two
things, but between two representamens of the same thing.
Peirce: CP 5.73 Cross-Ref:††
73. The representamen, for example, divides by trichotomy into the
general sign or symbol, the index, and the icon.†2 An icon is a
representamen which fulfills the function of a representamen by virtue
of a character which it possesses in itself, and would possess just
the same though its object did not exist. Thus, the statue of a
centaur is not, it is true, a representamen if there be no such thing
as a centaur. Still, if it represents a centaur, it is by virtue of
its shape; and this shape it will have, just as much, whether there be
a centaur or not. An index is a representamen which fulfills the
function of a representamen by virtue of a character which it could
not have if its object did not exist, but which it will continue to
have just the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or
not. For instance, an old-fashioned hygrometer is an index. For it is
so contrived as to have a physical reaction with dryness and moisture
in the air, so that the little man will come out if it is wet, and
this would happen just the same if the use of the instrument should be
entirely forgotten, so that it ceased actually to convey any
information. A symbol is a representamen which fulfills its function
regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object and equally
regardless of any factual connection therewith, but solely and simply
because it will be interpreted to be a representamen. Such for example
is any general word, sentence, or book.
Peirce: CP 5.73 Cross-Ref:††
Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively
degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is
the relatively genuine genus.
Peirce: CP 5.74 Cross-Ref:††
74. Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the
categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does
not imperatively call for any such division. For a pure icon does not
draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents
whatever it may represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is.
It is an affair of suchness only.
Peirce: CP 5.75 Cross-Ref:††
75. It is quite otherwise with the Index. Here is a reactional sign,
which is such by virtue of a real connection with its object. Then the
question arises is this dual character in the Index, so that it has
two elements, by virtue of the one serving as a substitute for the
particular object it does, while the other is an involved icon that
represents the representamen itself regarded as a quality of the
object -- or is there really no such dual character in the index, so
that it merely denotes whatever object it happens to be really
connected with just as the icon represents whatever object it happens
really to resemble? Of the former, the relatively genuine form of
Index, the hygrometer, is an example. Its connection with the weather
is dualistic, so that by an involved icon, it actually conveys
information. On the other hand any mere land-mark by which a
particular thing may be recognized because it is as a matter of fact
associated with that thing, a proper name without signification, a
pointing finger, is a degenerate index. Horatio Greenough, who
designed Bunker Hill Monument, tells us in his book †1 that he meant
it to say simply "Here!" It just stands on that ground and plainly is
not movable. So if we are looking for the battle-field, it will tell
us whither to direct our steps.
Peirce: CP 5.76 Cross-Ref:††
76. The Symbol, or relatively genuine form of Representamen, divides
by Trichotomy into the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument. The
Term corresponds to the Icon and to the degenerate Index. It does
excite an icon in the imagination. The proposition conveys definite
information like the genuine index, by having two parts of which the
function of the one is to indicate the object meant, while that of the
other is to represent the representamen by exciting an icon of its
quality. The argument is a representamen which does not leave the
interpretant to be determined as it may by the person to whom the
symbol is addressed, but separately represents what is the
interpreting representation that it is intended to determine. This
interpreting representation is, of course, the conclusion. It would be
interesting to push these illustrations further; but I can linger
nowhere. As soon as a subject begins to be interesting I am obliged to
pass on to anot
Peirce: CP 5.81 Cross-Ref:††
81. The more moderate nominalists who nevertheless apply the epithet
mere to thought and to representamens may be said to admit Categories
First and Second and to deny the third [i ii]. The Berkeleyans, for
whom there are but two kinds of entities, souls, or centres of
determinable thought, and ideas in the souls, these ideas being
regarded as pure statical entities, little or nothing else than
Qualities of Feeling, seem to admit Categories First and Third and to
deny Secondness, which they wish to replace by Divine Creative
Influence, which certainly has all the flavor of Thirdness [i iii]. So
far as one can make out any intelligible aim in that singular
hodge-podge, the Cartesian metaphysics, it seems to have been to admit
Categories Second and Third as fundamental and to deny the First [ii
iii]. Otherwise, I do not know to whom we can attribute this opinion
which certainly does not seem to be less acceptable and attractive
than several others. But there are other philosophies which seem to do
full justice to Categories Second and Third and to minimize the first,
and among these perhaps Spinoza and Kant are to be included.
Peirce: CP 5.102 Cross-Ref:††
§2. THIRDNESS AND GENERALITY †1
102. You may, perhaps, ask me how I connect generality with Thirdness.
Various different replies, each fully satisfactory, may be made to
that inquiry. The old definition of a general is Generale est quod
natum aptum est dici de multis.†2 This recognizes that the general is
essentially predicative and therefore of the nature of a
representamen. And by following out that path of suggestion we should
obtain a good reply to the inquiry.
Peirce: CP 5.119 Cross-Ref:††
119. Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the
economy of the universe, I shall reply that the universe is a vast
representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have,
organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play
in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe -- that
Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I
can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are
the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as
their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented.
But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of
Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of
facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian
supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the
world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new
accretions.†1 These premisses of nature, however, though they are not
the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must
resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by
comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must
involve Qualities.
Peirce: CP 5.119 Cross-Ref:††
Now as to their function in the economy of the Universe. The Universe
as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem -- for
every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true
poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting
-- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a
Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting;
they are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that
belongs to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken;
but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts
of the whole -- which Qualities result from the combinations of
elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses.
Peirce: CP 5.137 Cross-Ref:††
§3. LOGICAL GOODNESS
137. The ground is now cleared for the analysis of logical goodness,
or the goodness of representation. There is a special variety of
esthetic goodness that may belong to a representamen, namely,
expressiveness. There is also a special moral goodness of
representations, namely, veracity. But besides this there is a
peculiar mode of goodness which is logical. What this consists in we
have to inquire.
Peirce: CP 5.138 Cross-Ref:††
138. The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in
English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of
it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or
picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two
weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer
to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a
unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. This
repetitory character of the representamen involves as a consequence
that it is essential to a representamen that it should contribute to
the determination of another representamen distinct from itself. For
in what sense would it be true that a representamen was repeated if it
were not capable of determining some different representamen? "Evil
communications corrupt good manners" and {phtheirousin ethe chresth'
homiliai kakai} are one and the same representamen. They are so,
however, only so far as they are represented as being so; and it is
one thing to say that "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and
quite a different thing to say that "Evil communications corrupt good
manners" and {phtheirousin ethe chresth' homiliai kakai} are two
expressions of the same proverb. Thus every representamen must be
capable of contributing to the determination of a representamen
different from itself. Every conclusion from premisses is an instance
in point; and what would be a representamen that was not capable of
contributing to any ulterior conclusion? I call a representamen which
is determined by another representamen, an interpretant of the latter.
Every representamen is related or is capable of being related to a
reacting thing, its object, and every representamen embodies, in some
sense, some quality, which may be called its signification, what in
the case of a common name J.S. Mill calls its connotation, a
particularly objectionable expression.†1
Peirce: CP 5.139 Cross-Ref:††
139. A representamen [as symbol] is either a rhema, a proposition, or
an argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows
what interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a
representamen which is not an argument, but which separately indicates
what object it is intended to represent. A rhema is a simple
representation without such separate parts.
Peirce: CP 5.140 Cross-Ref:††
140. Esthetic goodness, or expressiveness, may be possessed, and in
some degree must be possessed, by any kind of representamen -- rhema,
proposition, or argument.
Peirce: CP 5.175 Cross-Ref:††
§5. THE MEANING OF AN ARGUMENT
175. We have already seen †1 some reason to hold that the idea of
meaning is such as to involve some reference to a purpose. But Meaning
is attributed to representamens alone, and the only kind of
representamen which has a definite professed purpose is an "argument."
The professed purpose of an argument is to determine an acceptance of
its conclusion, and it quite accords with general usage to call the
conclusion of an argument its meaning. But I may remark that the word
meaning has not hitherto been recognized as a technical term of logic,
and in proposing it as such (which I have a right to do since I have a
new conception to express, that of the conclusion of an argument as
its intended interpretant) I should have a recognized right slightly
to warp the acceptation of the word "meaning," so as to fit it for the
expression of a scientific conception. It seems natural to use the
word meaning to denote the intended interpretant of a symbol.
Peirce: CP 5.455 Cross-Ref:††
455. Other kinds of subjective Modality refer to a Sign or
Representamen which is assumed to be true, but which does not include
the Utterer's (i.e. the speaker's, writer's, thinker's or other
symbolizer's) total knowledge, the different Modes being distinguished
very much as above. There are other cases, however, in which,
justifiably or not, we certainly think of Modality as objective. A man
says, "I can go to the seashore if I like." Here is implied, to be
sure, his ignorance of how he will decide to act. But this is not the
point of the assertion. It is that the complete determination of
conduct in the act not yet having taken place, the further
determination of it belongs to the subject of the action regardless of
external circumstances. If he had said, "I must go where my employers
may send me," it would imply that the function of such further
determination lay elsewhere. In "You may do so and so," and "You must
do so," the "may" has the same force as "can," except that in the one
case freedom from particular circumstances is in question, and in the
other freedom from a law or edict. Hence the phrase, "You may if you
can." I must say that it is difficult for me to preserve my respect
for the competence of a philosopher whose dull logic, not penetrating
beneath the surface, leaves him to regard such phrases as
misrepresentations of the truth. So an act of hypostatic abstraction
which in itself is no violation of logic, however it may lend itself
to a dress of superstition, may regard the collective tendencies to
variableness in the world, under the name of Chance, as at one time
having their way, and at another time overcome by the element of
order; so that, for example, a superstitious cashier, impressed by a
bad dream, may say to himself of a Monday morning, "May be, the bank
has been robbed." No doubt, he recognizes his total ignorance in the
matter. But besides that, he has in mind the absence of any particular
cause which should protect his bank more than others that are robbed
from time to time. He thinks of the variety in the universe as vaguely
analogous to the indecision of a person, and borrows from that analogy
the garb of his thought. At the other extreme stand those who declare
as inspired (for they have no rational proof of what they allege),
that an actuary's advice to an insurance company is based on nothing
at all but ignorance.
Peirce: CP 5.554 Cross-Ref:††
554. Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, its
object, ITS object, mind you. The International Dictionary at the
writer's elbow, the Century Dictionary which he daily studies, the
Standard which he would be glad sometimes to consult, all contain the
word yes; but that word is not true simply because he is going to ask
on this eighth of January 1906, in Pike County, Pennsylvania, whether
it is snowing. There must be an action of the object upon the sign to
render the latter true. Without that, the object is not the
representamen's object. If a colonel hands a paper to an orderly and
says, "You will go immediately and deliver this to Captain Hanno," and
if the orderly does so, we do not say the colonel told the truth; we
say the orderly was obedient, since it was not the orderly's conduct
which determined the colonel to say what he did, but the colonel's
speech which determined the orderly's action. Here is a view of the
writer's house: what makes that house to be the object of the view?
Surely not the similarity of appearance. There are ten thousand others
in the country just like it. No, but the photographer set up the film
in such a way that according to the laws of optics, the film was
forced to receive an image of this house. What the sign virtually has
to do in order to indicate its object -- and make it its -- all it has
to do is just to seize its interpreter's eyes and forcibly turn them
upon the object meant: it is what a knock at the door does, or an
alarm or other bell, or a whistle, a cannon-shot, etc. It is pure
physiological compulsion; nothing else.
Peirce: CP 5.554 Cross-Ref:††
So, then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its
potency, must be compelled by its object. This is evidently the reason
of the dichotomy of the true and the false. For it takes two to make a
quarrel, and a compulsion involves as large a dose of quarrel as is
requisite to make it quite impossible that there should be compulsion
without resistance.
Frances Kelly wrote:
Frances to Joseph Ransdell and listers...
You replied partly in effect that the distinction between "sign" and
"representamen" for Peirce in his writings is indifferent. You stated
that the word "representamen" was likely introduced by Peirce as the
name for his refined conception of the word "sign" which then enabled
him to understand interpretational processes more broadly than the
word "sign" would ordinarily permit, though he later thought that he
did not need to have recourse to "representamen" at all, presumably
meaning that he thought the word "sign" could be used more broadly
than he thought it could earlier; so that wherever interpretation is
involved, he uses the two terms indifferently.
You then kindly provided some passages in support of this position.
This basically was my assumption as well, but there are however some
other passages that for me seem to contradict your reasoned claim.
They had confused me somewhat, which lead me into positing the two
words differently within my understanding of Peircean philosophy. In
my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things
"representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then
"signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say
triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may
not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however
limited, which further irritates me.
____________
"A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the
same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamen that have been
much studied."
CP:2.242 (1903)
"A 'Sign', or 'Representamen', is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 'Object', as to be
capable of determining a Third, called its 'Interpretant', to assume
the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to
the same Object. ...A 'Sign' is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs.
Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very
act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a
sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun,
and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would
become a Representamen of the sun. But 'thought' is the chief, if not
the only, mode of representation."
CP:2.274 (circa 1902)
"I make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I
define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to.
...in particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know
no reason why every representamen should do so."
CP 1.541 (1903)
"A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication and a medium
of communication is a species of medium, and a medium is a species of
third."
MS 283 "The Basis of Pragmaticism" (circa 1905)
____________
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
