Neither Theresa nor I
disagree with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign"
being more narrow in scope of application than the word "representamen"
Here we seem to be in agreement (there is a small question about "the
vernacular word" however).
and I assume you
agree that there are several quotations which make clear that he
regards the one as a technical explication of the other.
But he does not seem to be consistent in this matter. More on this at a
later date.
If so there is no
disagreement there.
If the representamen is broader in scope and if "the vernacular word
"sign" is in fact used as a technical term in semeiotic--as it most
certainly is--then the situation seems more complex than the simple
distinction between a vernacular and a technical term, at least as I
see it at present
I think I was
mistaken, though, in identifying confusion about the nature of that
distinction as being what would account for the unintelligibility I
find (or think I find) in her message.
Well, as earlier noted, while you find it unintelligible, I do not.
Yes, the neologisms are problematic, irksome, etc. but it seems to me
possible to make good sense of what Frances is arguing (although her
last post to Theresa tended to mystify me a bit).
Also, I agree with
Theresa in objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes
from her:
========quote
Frances=============
In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things
"representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then
"signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say
triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may
not.
===========end
quote==============
I take it that what
she objects to in Frances saying that representamens need not be
triadic. Are they not defined as being triadic, just as signs are?
We are talking about entities which represent in either case, and that
is surely a relation. Can a monad, considered as such, be a
representation? Can a mere other as such be a representation? What
would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad something that
represents?
I think that you and Theresa are certainly quite correct here:
representamen/signs are all necessarily triadic. If Frances has
suggested otherwise, I would think she may have to retract that
assertion.
Perhaps we could make
sense of it if he means to say that a representamen is a sign that is
not a symbol but only an icon or an index, but then why talk about it
as a definitional explication of the idea of a sign and define it again
and again in just the way he defines sign?
Perhaps. But when one looks at the 10-adic classification of signs one
sees that icons and indices are most certainly triadic as well. So this
is not really a way out.
The only other
possibility I can see is that it is -- as Frances seems to think --
a term for referring to things as they would be if there were no minds
to take account of them. Are we to suppose that he would put this
forth as his basic term for the sort of entity which semiotic is
particularly concerned to study?
Probably not. This proto semiotic--for example, considerations of the
early cosmos--are pre-philosophic, pre-scientific. But there IS a bio-
a physio-semiosis, is there not, even if it can't be semeiotically
analyzed--or at least not in much depth--that is, triadically (but see
Thomas Sebeok's Global Semiotics, Indiana U., 2001, passim).
Peirce did not invent
the term, by the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines it as
follows: "In metaph., representation, an object serving to represent
something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W. Hamilton.
This is most interesting. But can one really equate representation with
the representamen? Perhaps. I don't know. It remains a question
in my mind
Gary Richmond
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Neither Theresa nor I
disagree with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign"
being more narrow in scope of application than the word "representamen"
and I assume you agree that there are several quotations which make
clear that he regards the one as a technical explication of the other.
If so there is no disagreement there. I think I was mistaken, though,
in identifying confusion about the nature of that distinction as being
what would account for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find)
in her message.
Also, I agree with
Theresa in objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes
from her:
========quote
Frances=============
In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things
"representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then
"signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say
triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may
not.
===========end
quote==============
I take it that what
she objects to in Frances saying that representamens need not be
triadic. Are they not defined as being triadic, just as signs are?
We are talking about entities which represent in either case, and that
is surely a relation. Can a monad, considered as such, be a
representation? Can a mere other as such be a representation? What
would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad something that
represents? Perhaps we could make sense of it if he means to say that
a representamen is a sign that is not a symbol but only an icon or an
index, but then why talk about it as a definitional explication of the
idea of a sign and define it again and again in just the way he defines
sign? The only other possibility I can see is that it is -- as Frances
seems to think -- a term for referring to things as they would be if
there were no minds to take account of them. Are we to suppose that he
would put this forth as his basic term for the sort of entity which
semiotic is particularly concerned to study?
Peirce did not invent
the term, by the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines it as
follows: "In metaph., representation, an object serving to represent
something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W. Hamilton.
Joe Ransdell
-----
Original Message -----
Sent:
Sunday, March 12, 2006 7:54 PM
Subject:
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from
"Peircean elements" topic)
Joe, Frances, and List,
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
I can only say
that I find Frances's usage of words so idiosyncratic in sentence after
sentence that I cannot figure out any way to restate her view in
sentences that make any sense to me.
Perhaps because at one point several years ago I studied rather
intensely for a few weeks some of Frances's work and consequently go
rather familiar with her admittedly idiosyncratic terminology, I am
having none of this difficulty whatsoever. Indeed, I find her thinking
quite clear and, as earlier mentioned, persuasive--that is, for one who
is not totally turned off and revulsed by her strange locutions. I
will, however, await Ben's response to Frances to comment much further
regarding the substantive issues.
I thought perhaps
there might be some one misunderstanding that would account for this in
a systematic way, and guessed that it might be due to taking the
distinction between "sign" and "representamen" as a distinction to be
drawn within semiotic analysis, so that e.g. one can speak of signs as
if they are a special case of representamens, whereas in fact it is a
distinction between a vernacular term and a technical term which Peirce
used as a replacement for theoretical purposes and it makes no sense
to talk that way: if you are going to talk in semiotical terms using
"sign" that is okay; if you are going to talk instead using
"representamen" that is okay; but it is not okay -- because it makes no
sense -- to try to talk in semiotical terms using both. So maybe
that mistake accounts for the impenetrable prose in this particular
message. Or maybe it doesn't.
Well, I would tend to disagree with you as to the sign/representamen
distinction being merely that "between a vernacular term and a technical term" as my recent
response to Theresa Calvet may have suggested.
Perhaps a better
explanation, though, might be that Frances has followed a practice of
accumulating vocabulary from a variety of theoretical sources and made the mistake of thinking that one can
treat every different technical term from whatever theoretical source
as adding a new conceptual element to an overall eclectic theory of her
own that simply combines all others indiscriminately, as is suggested
by her speaking at one point about something being "all in the
Morrisean pragmatic manner". I have noticed before that a lot of her
vocabulary is actually terminology that has been used in this or that
other theory rather than being the neologism it seems at first to be.
If so this is surely a mistake, certain to induce incoherence and,
worse than that, discourage critical thinking by causing an
insensitivity to just such incoherence since it is of her own
intentional making (though with unintended consequences of which she is
not sufficiently aware). Moreover, it is perhaps what encourages her
to keep coming up with ever new neologisms, without any tendency to
explain what they mean, as if it ought to be obvious what she
means. But in fact it is not at all obvious what, say, "tychastics"
means even if one knows what "tychastic" means. The move from an
adverb or an adjective to a noun is not a trivial move nor is it a move
which necessarily results in a sentence that makes any sense. I
suggest that she should resolve to start to work at stripping her
terminology down to an absolute minimum of technical terms from any
source, even avoiding all but a minimum of Peirce's technical terms
when writing about Peirce. Just write in plain vernacular everyday
English as far as possible and do philosophy in that way for a while.
Better to have a few clear ideas than a vast quantity of confused ones,
for philosophical purposes, I should think.
I would agree with you, Joe, that Frances ought continue to consider
the terminology she uses, although is not meant to suggest that I
necessarily approve of all your recommendations to her.
However, that's a matter for her to reflect upon, and I believe I have
now said all that I care to say on the matter.
More when Ben posts a response to Frances (which, again, seems quite
likely, while I understand that he shares some of your consternation,
Joe, with Frances's locution).
Gary
Anyway, Frances,
I'm not intending to be discouraging but wanting to register strongly a
belief that you are defeating your purposes by this indulging this
penchant for verbal embellishments to no good purpose. The points you
are wanting to make are not going to be successfully made this way.
That's it, for
what it's worth. Gary, if you think I am wrong about this please say
so straight out. You are right to defend her against merely negative
criticism that is of no help, but isn't there something that needs to
be dealt with here by way of systematic correction?
Joe Ransdell
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