[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen a ¨crit : Dear list,   Just now I was thinking about some passages of Peirce. About some small sentences which for me appeared to be quite important somehow. For me they are now, whatever  the answers to my questions I have to ask here now. The questions relate to the term “diagrammatic” of C.S. Peirce. I saw that term in some posts before, connected with at least thoughts.   My questions here are, whether in the original texts of Peirce (whatever texts he wrote):   1)       It is only mentioned that thoughts would be (or are) diagrammatic A diagram is a special kind of iconic relation between a sign and its object (more precisely the ressemblance lies between  the parts of the object an the parts of the sign). So it is much more the train of thought, its form,  which can accurately be said diagrammatic. This amounts to say that it is reasoning that is diagrammatic, particularly in the syllogistic form. For example (CP 3.363): ------------------------------Quote Peirce------------------------ The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. For instance, take the syllogistic formula,                All M is P                    S is M                .¨. S is P. This is really a diagram of the relations of S, M, and P. The fact that the middle term occurs in the two premisses is actually exhibited, and this must be done or the notation will be of no value. As for algebra, the very idea of the art is that it presents formulæ which can be manipulated, and that by observing the effects of such manipulation we find properties not to be otherwise discerned. In such manipulation, we are guided by previous discoveries which are embodied in general formulæ. These are patterns which we have the right to imitate in our procedure, and are the icons par excellence of algebra. The letters of applied algebra are usually tokens, but the x, y, z, etc., of a general formula, such as                (x+y)z = x z + y z, are blanks to be filled up with tokens, they are indices of tokens. Such a formula might, it is true, be replaced by an abstractly stated rule (say that multiplication is distributive); but no application could be made of such an abstract statement without translating it into a sensible image. ------------------------------------------------------ 2)       Whether he also stated somewhere that (something in the) real world would be diagrammatic. Yes, I think, while it is only indirect. The deductive syllogism has a diagrammatic form and Peirce often makes the case of the example of the frog as a syllogism: -----------------------------Quote Peirce- CP 2.711-------------------------------- . The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion.†P1 In point of fact, a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of inervation, the physiological equivalents escape our observation; but, psychologically, we still have, first, habit--which in its highest form is understanding, and which corresponds to the major premiss of Barbara; we have, second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to the minor premiss of Barbara; and we have, third, volition, corresponding to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident they will appear. They give a significance to the ancient system of formal logic which no other can at all share. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------Quote Peirce CP 6.286---------------------------------------- A decapitated frog almost reasons. The habit that is in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a drop of acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping it away. All that is of any value in the operation of ratiocination is there, except only one thing. What he lacks is the power of preparatory meditation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regards Bernard   I am also very interested in passages where to find them and for 2) what is exactly stated For me myself, it is also very interesting to see that the term is dia-grammatic (or might it even be called dia-grammatical in some places by Peirce?)   If everything goes well I will visit Thomas Riese this Wednesday if so that might lead to lots of interesting questions ;-)   Kind regards,   Wilfred --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. 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