Ben wrote:
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
66~~~~~~~~~~
*A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
~~~~~~~~~~99
Dear Ben, Folks--
Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce
Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third
mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented".
So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a
caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of
thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is
pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a
First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so
on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak of mere
firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes sense to
me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to
secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a
different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands
in such genuine triadic relation to a second...
Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have
qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have
effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds. Furthermore,
no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic
relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence
not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking that leads
me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the
interpretation of this particular quote is concerned.
The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three
trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me
are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the
foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first
trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either
hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the
ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative
similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third
trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere
quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three
matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories.
As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress.
All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce.
* I'm working from Peirce's discussion "Three Trichotomies of Signs" as
presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_
Best,
Jim Piat
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