Dear Ben, Joe, List--
I take it that by verification most folks mean something like determining
whether the sign faithfully stands for (corresponds to or evokes) the
object. And that to make this determination requires some sort of direct
(or collateral) experience with the object that differs in kind from the
sorts of experience one has with signs (of objects).
But I'm not convinced that Peirce makes a distinction between our experience
of an object and our experience of a sign. I take it that for Peirce ALL of
our conceptions of objects are through signs. Thus we have no conception of
an object other than through the process of representation. Even our
colladeral experience of objects is through signs.
I think we all agree that the word tree is not the same sort of thing as the
what we call an actual tree growing in the forest. The word tree we think
of as a sign and the actual tree in the forest as the object of a sign.
But how do we in practice distinguish between an actual tree and the sign of
a tree? Do we conceive of a tree (as a so called object) that we encounter
in a forest through a different process than we conceive of the so called
sign of a tree that we encounter in a sentence? Do we have knowledge of
or aquaintance with a tree in the forest that either goes beyond or is more
fundamental that the sort of knowledge we have of tree conceived of through
signs? I think not.
I think all our conceptions and knowledge of our experience is through
signs. That, for us, all the world is signs. But I will concede that in
certain situations for certain purposes some signs carry more evideniary
weight (both literally and figuratively) than others. Not all signs are
equally abstract. The sign that we typically call a tree in the forest is
less abstract than the sign we typically call the word tree. The word tree
has abstracted most of the form from the substance of the tree growing in
the forest. To mistake one sign of a tree for another is a mistake we make
at our own peril. But to suppose that reality is neatly divided into
objects and signs of those objects is I think a mistake that Peirce was
trying to correct. So called concrete objects are no more real than their
abstract cousins. Nor vice versa. One emphasizes substance the other
orm -- each has its place but there exists neither pure substance nor pure
form. And ultimately both form and substance are conceptualized only
through signs. The distinction between a sign and an object is a matter of
usage not a distinction that by which god has carved up reality. One man's
sign is another man's object. The distinction between signs and objects is
closer to the distinction between verbs and nouns than folks suppose. It's
a matter of usage.
If a discussion refers to some properties of trees that grow in a forest
(as opposed, for example, to trees that are manipulated in our minds or
word processors) than verification may well involve a visit to those signs
of objects we call trees found in the forest (and others call signs of a
forest or signs of home or etc). IOWs collateral experience is merely a
reference to the sort of shared experience that serves as the basis upon
which a common understanding of what is discussed can be built. But the
process (like semiosis) never ends and there is always room for some
misunderstanding arising from the fact that no two points of view are
entirely the same and thus no two experiences are entirely equivalent.
Collateral experience is not a qualitatively different experience than any
other sort of experience --again, it is merely the experience designated
as determinative in establishing the reference of a sign as used in some
discussion. Maybe.
For some purposes we prefer the more abstract object of a sign. For other
purposes we prefer the more concrete objects of signs. For example it is
easier to speak of or think about how to build a house out of abstract trees
than to actually do the the trial and error of using less abstract trees.
Conversely it is much easier to live in a house built of the more
substantial variety of trees. I might add too that our conception of a tree
in the forest is more problematic and abstract than we generally suppose.
What for example is the difference between a grasses, bushes and trees
I think Bill Bailey put the matter well in an earlier post when he said some
signs move faster than others -- and so it is with the trees we call signs
and the trees we call objects. Tree in the forest and trees on the page are
similar but not indentical signs. Likewise they are similar but not
identical objects. We use one as a surrogate for the other at our own risk.
Even in the hardest of science verification ultimately boils down to a
comparison of our conceptions of experience. There is nothing in life so
objective that it can escape the prison of our conceptions. Nor is there
such a thing as validity independent of usage or purpose. Verification or
validity is limited to the purpose at hand. BTW, my apologies, Bill, if
I've misapplied your point.
Well, I've rambled a good bit and I'm not sure the above comments are all
that relevant to your discussion or exactly what questions I'm trying to
raise or answer -- so let me just conclude by saying thanks for your very
ineresting, informative and fun discussion. I look forward to reading more.
Jim Piat
----- Original Message -----
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 4:16 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list,
Thank you for your response, Joe. Comments interspersed below.
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