Dear Ben, Folks--
Thanks for the reassuring clarification, Ben. Here's my thought on the
matter for today.
The distinction between the knowledge we gain from direct acquaintance with
an object verses the knowledge we gain of the same object through a symbolic
sign of that object is that direct aquaintance is mediated by an actually
indexed icon of the object whereas indirect symbolic aquaintance is mediated
by an imputed icon of the object. The meaning of symbols depends in part
upon the reliability of linguistic conventions, customs and habits. The
meaning of icons depends primarily upon the reliability of direct
observation.
Ideally the meanings we assign to our symbols are rooted in aquaintance with
the actual objects to which they refer, but customs take on a life of their
own and are notoriously susceptible to the distorting influence of such
factors as wishful thinking, blind allegiance to authority, tradition and
the like. Science and common sense teach us that it is useful to
periodically compare our actual icons with our theories and symbolic
imputations of them.
Symbols provide indirect aquaintance with objects. Actual observation of
objects provides direct aquaintance. However in both cases the aquaintance
(in so far as it provides us with a conception of the object) is mediated by
signs. In the case of direct aquaintance the sign is an icon. In the case
of indirect aquaintance the sign is a symbol with an imputed icon.
Whenever we make comparisons we do so with signs. Mere otherness is
basically dyadic. Comparison is fundamentally triadic. "A is not B" is not
a comparison but merely an indication of otherness from which we gain no
real sense of how A compares to B. On the other hand the analogy that "A is
to B as B is to C" is a comparison which actually tells us something about
the relative characters of the elements involved.
Comparing a collateral object with a symbol for a collateral object is
really a matter of comparing the meaning of an actual icon with the meaning
of an imputed icon. We are never in a position to compare an actual object
with a sign of that object because we have no conception of objects outside
of signs.
Sometime I think, Ben, that you are just blowing off the notion that all
our conceptions of objects are mediated by signs. You say you agree with
this formulation but when it comes to the collateral object you seem to
resort to the position that direct aquaintance with the collateral object is
not "really" mediated by signs but outside of semiosis. But what Peirce
means (as I understand him) is that the collateral object is not actually
iconized in the symbol that stands for it but is merely imputed to be
iconized. To experience the actual icon we must experience the collateral
object itself. That is the sense in which the collateral object is outside
the symbol but not outside semiosis.
One of the recurring problems I personally have in understanding Peirce is
that I am often unsure in a particular instance whether he is using the term
sign to refer to a symbol, an icon or an index. Morevover when it comes to
icons and indexes I am often unclear as to whether he means them as signs or
as degenerate signs. Maybe this is where I am going astray in my present
analysis of the role of the collateral object in the verification of the
sign.
In anycase I continue to find this discussion helpful. Best wishes to all--
Jim Piat
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
