Dear Kirsti::
I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again.
In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how:
"...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]."
My words are in brackets
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again.
In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how:
"...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]."
My words are in brackets
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
From: Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Joe & Bill,
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of
the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But
that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response
:). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you
gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
> JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
> second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
> the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
> authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
> to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
> recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
> on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
> interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
> something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
> believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?
And later in the discussion you wrote:
JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social
consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of
tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity,
the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and
one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of
when one thinks of one's identity.
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate)
justification in considering the method of authority as far superior to
the method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
CSP: "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and
if belief is of the nature of a habit"
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds
in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in
view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of the
order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate preparedness to act according to the
formula believed? My original article carried this back to a
psychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was
developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a
definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–
Kirsti Määttänen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of
the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But
that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response
:). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you
gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
> JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
> second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
> the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
> authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
> to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
> recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
> on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
> interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
> something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
> believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?
And later in the discussion you wrote:
JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social
consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of
tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity,
the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and
one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of
when one thinks of one's identity.
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate)
justification in considering the method of authority as far superior to
the method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
CSP: "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and
if belief is of the nature of a habit"
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds
in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in
view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of the
order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate preparedness to act according to the
formula believed? My original article carried this back to a
psychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was
developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a
definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–
Kirsti Määttänen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Joe & Bill,
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order
of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed.
But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this
response :). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the
title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
<excerpt><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>JR:
"...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? </bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
</excerpt>
And later in the discussion you wrote:
<fontfamily><param>New York</param><bigger><bigger>JR: Well, I was
thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is
prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me
to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive
tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are
an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of
one's identity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>It can only be the 'summum
bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering
the method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But
Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if
belief is of the nature of a habit"
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce
proceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here
taking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the
logic of the order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
<fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param> CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate
preparedness to act according to the formula believed? My original
article carried this back to a psychological principle. The
conception of truth, according to me, was developed out of an original
impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–</fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>Helvetica</param>Kirsti Määttänen
<<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
</fontfamily>
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order
of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed.
But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this
response :). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the
title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
<excerpt><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>JR:
"...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? </bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
</excerpt>
And later in the discussion you wrote:
<fontfamily><param>New York</param><bigger><bigger>JR: Well, I was
thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is
prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me
to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive
tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are
an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of
one's identity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>It can only be the 'summum
bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering
the method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But
Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if
belief is of the nature of a habit"
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce
proceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here
taking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the
logic of the order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
<fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param> CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate
preparedness to act according to the formula believed? My original
article carried this back to a psychological principle. The
conception of truth, according to me, was developed out of an original
impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–</fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>Helvetica</param>Kirsti Määttänen
<<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
</fontfamily>
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
