Bill, Kirsti, and list generally:
Let's go back to a short MS from 1869-70 (available on-line, from Vol 2 of the Writings), which is the earliest MS I am aware of -- but not necessarily the earliest one there is -- in which we find Peirce explicitly approaching logic, in what is clearly a projected introductory logic text, from the perspective of logic as inquiry. In German "inquiry" would be "Forschung", as in Karl Popper's Logik der Forschung of 1914, which was disastrously -- for the course of logic in the 20th Century -- mistranslated as "Logic of Scientific Discovery". (More on that later.) The immediate point of interest is that in it we find Peirce working initially with only two methods, tenacy and what will later be called the "method of reason" or "method of science" or, in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, "the experiential method". It is short and I include the whole of it here and wll as follows:
=========quote Peirce============
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_37/v2_37.htm
Practical Logic (MS 165: 1869-70)
Chapter I
"All men naturally desire knowledge." This book is meant to minister to this passion primarily and secondarily to all interests that knowledge subserves.
Here will be found maxims for estimating the validity and strength of arguments, and for deciding what facts ought to be examined in the investigation of a question.
That the student may attain a real mastery of the art of thinking, it is necessary that the reasons for these maxims should be made clear to him, and that the maxims themselves should be woven into a harmonious code so as to be readily grasped by the mind.
Logic or dialectic is the name of the science from which such rules are drawn. For right reasoning has evidently been the object of inquiry for Aristotle in all the books of the Organon except perhaps the first, as it was also that of the Stoics, of the Lawyers, of the medieval Summulists, and of modern students of Induction, in the additions which they have made to the doctrines of the Stagyrite. "Dialectica," says the most celebrated medieval logic, "est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola enim dialectica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum."
Exercise 1. Let the student write out an impartial discussion of the question whether the principles of right reasoning can be investigated. For it would seem that these principles must be known before any investigation whatever can be made. In this writing, let precision of thought be the first object, precision in the order of discussion the next. Let no ornament of style be permitted.
A science by which things are tested is necessarily a classificatory science. Thus, every system of qualitative chemical analysis consists in a classification of chemical substances. Accordingly, we have to study, in the first place, the classification of inferences. Just as there are several different systems of qualitative analysis,--as ordinary analysis by sulphuretted hydrogen, blowpipe analysis, and analysis by carbonate of baryta,--based on different classifications of chemical substances, but all valid, so there are different valid systems of logic, based on different classifications of inferences. The accomplished reasoner will do well to be familiar with more than one such system.
Chapter 2
First of all, the student has to gain a perfectly definite conception of the true function of reasoning.
The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation.
Upon the next point, somewhat more thought must be bestowed. Any useful inquisition must lead to some definite conclusion. A method of investigation which should carry different men to different results without tending to bring them to agreement, would be self-destructive and worthless. But if by a sufficiently long result a settlement of opinion could be reached, this concordance (even if further exploration would disturb it) is all that research really tends towards, and is therefore its only attainable end. The only legitimate aim of reasoning, then, is to ascertain what decision would be agreed upon if the question were sufficiently ventilated. To this it may be objected, 1st, that the primary object of an investigation is to ascertain the truth itself and not the opinions which would arise under any particular circumstances; and, 2nd, that the resolution of my own doubt is more my object in an investigation than the production of unanimity among others. Undoubtedly, that which we seek in an investigation is called truth, but what distinct conception ought to be attached to this word it is so difficult to say, that it seems better to describe the object of an investigation by a character which certainly belongs to it and to it alone, and which has nothing mysterious or vague about it. In like manner, it may be admitted that a genuine investigation is undertaken to resolve the doubts of the investigator. But observe this: no sensible man will be void of doubt as long as persons as competent to judge as himself differ from him. Hence to resolve his own doubts is to ascertain to what position sufficient research would carry all men.
For attaining this unanimous accord,--this catholic confession,--two plans have been pursued.
The first, simplest, and most usual is to adhere pertinaciously to some opinion and endeavour to unite all men upon it. The means of bringing men to agree to such a fixed opinion are an efficient organization of men who will devote themselves to propagating it, working upon the passions of mankind, and gaining an ascendency over them by keeping them in ignorance. In order to guard against all temptation to abandon his opinion, a man must be careful what he reads and must learn to regard his belief as holy, to be indignant at any questioning of it, and especially to consider the senses as the chief means whereby Satan gains access to the soul and as organs constantly to be mortified, distrusted, and despised. With an unwavering determination thus to shut himself off from all influences external to the society of those who think with him, a man may root //opinions/faith// in himself ineradicably; and a considerable body of such men, devoting all their energies to the spread of their doctrines, may produce a great effect under favourable circumstances. They and their followers may truly be said to be not of this world. Their actions will often be inexplicable to the rest of mankind, since they live in a world, which they will call spiritual and others will call imaginary, with reference to which their opinions are certainly perfectly true. The belief of one of these men, though perhaps resulting in large measure from the force of circumstances, will also be strengthened by a direct effort of the will, and he should therefore consistently regard it as wrong-willed and wicked to allow one's opinion to be formed, independently of what one wishes to believe, by that play of Sense which the Devil puts in one's way.
This method (which we may term the Divine, Spiritual, or Heavenly method) will not serve the purpose of the Children of This World, since the world in which they are interested has this peculiarity: that things are not just as we choose to think them. Consequently, the accord of those whose belief is determined by a direct effort of the will, is not the unanimity which these persons seek.
===========end Peirce quote==========
I'll close this message and comment in a separate one/.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Note new email address; old address at cox.net now defunct)
Let's go back to a short MS from 1869-70 (available on-line, from Vol 2 of the Writings), which is the earliest MS I am aware of -- but not necessarily the earliest one there is -- in which we find Peirce explicitly approaching logic, in what is clearly a projected introductory logic text, from the perspective of logic as inquiry. In German "inquiry" would be "Forschung", as in Karl Popper's Logik der Forschung of 1914, which was disastrously -- for the course of logic in the 20th Century -- mistranslated as "Logic of Scientific Discovery". (More on that later.) The immediate point of interest is that in it we find Peirce working initially with only two methods, tenacy and what will later be called the "method of reason" or "method of science" or, in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, "the experiential method". It is short and I include the whole of it here and wll as follows:
=========quote Peirce============
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_37/v2_37.htm
Practical Logic (MS 165: 1869-70)
Chapter I
"All men naturally desire knowledge." This book is meant to minister to this passion primarily and secondarily to all interests that knowledge subserves.
Here will be found maxims for estimating the validity and strength of arguments, and for deciding what facts ought to be examined in the investigation of a question.
That the student may attain a real mastery of the art of thinking, it is necessary that the reasons for these maxims should be made clear to him, and that the maxims themselves should be woven into a harmonious code so as to be readily grasped by the mind.
Logic or dialectic is the name of the science from which such rules are drawn. For right reasoning has evidently been the object of inquiry for Aristotle in all the books of the Organon except perhaps the first, as it was also that of the Stoics, of the Lawyers, of the medieval Summulists, and of modern students of Induction, in the additions which they have made to the doctrines of the Stagyrite. "Dialectica," says the most celebrated medieval logic, "est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola enim dialectica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum."
Exercise 1. Let the student write out an impartial discussion of the question whether the principles of right reasoning can be investigated. For it would seem that these principles must be known before any investigation whatever can be made. In this writing, let precision of thought be the first object, precision in the order of discussion the next. Let no ornament of style be permitted.
A science by which things are tested is necessarily a classificatory science. Thus, every system of qualitative chemical analysis consists in a classification of chemical substances. Accordingly, we have to study, in the first place, the classification of inferences. Just as there are several different systems of qualitative analysis,--as ordinary analysis by sulphuretted hydrogen, blowpipe analysis, and analysis by carbonate of baryta,--based on different classifications of chemical substances, but all valid, so there are different valid systems of logic, based on different classifications of inferences. The accomplished reasoner will do well to be familiar with more than one such system.
Chapter 2
First of all, the student has to gain a perfectly definite conception of the true function of reasoning.
The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation.
Upon the next point, somewhat more thought must be bestowed. Any useful inquisition must lead to some definite conclusion. A method of investigation which should carry different men to different results without tending to bring them to agreement, would be self-destructive and worthless. But if by a sufficiently long result a settlement of opinion could be reached, this concordance (even if further exploration would disturb it) is all that research really tends towards, and is therefore its only attainable end. The only legitimate aim of reasoning, then, is to ascertain what decision would be agreed upon if the question were sufficiently ventilated. To this it may be objected, 1st, that the primary object of an investigation is to ascertain the truth itself and not the opinions which would arise under any particular circumstances; and, 2nd, that the resolution of my own doubt is more my object in an investigation than the production of unanimity among others. Undoubtedly, that which we seek in an investigation is called truth, but what distinct conception ought to be attached to this word it is so difficult to say, that it seems better to describe the object of an investigation by a character which certainly belongs to it and to it alone, and which has nothing mysterious or vague about it. In like manner, it may be admitted that a genuine investigation is undertaken to resolve the doubts of the investigator. But observe this: no sensible man will be void of doubt as long as persons as competent to judge as himself differ from him. Hence to resolve his own doubts is to ascertain to what position sufficient research would carry all men.
For attaining this unanimous accord,--this catholic confession,--two plans have been pursued.
The first, simplest, and most usual is to adhere pertinaciously to some opinion and endeavour to unite all men upon it. The means of bringing men to agree to such a fixed opinion are an efficient organization of men who will devote themselves to propagating it, working upon the passions of mankind, and gaining an ascendency over them by keeping them in ignorance. In order to guard against all temptation to abandon his opinion, a man must be careful what he reads and must learn to regard his belief as holy, to be indignant at any questioning of it, and especially to consider the senses as the chief means whereby Satan gains access to the soul and as organs constantly to be mortified, distrusted, and despised. With an unwavering determination thus to shut himself off from all influences external to the society of those who think with him, a man may root //opinions/faith// in himself ineradicably; and a considerable body of such men, devoting all their energies to the spread of their doctrines, may produce a great effect under favourable circumstances. They and their followers may truly be said to be not of this world. Their actions will often be inexplicable to the rest of mankind, since they live in a world, which they will call spiritual and others will call imaginary, with reference to which their opinions are certainly perfectly true. The belief of one of these men, though perhaps resulting in large measure from the force of circumstances, will also be strengthened by a direct effort of the will, and he should therefore consistently regard it as wrong-willed and wicked to allow one's opinion to be formed, independently of what one wishes to believe, by that play of Sense which the Devil puts in one's way.
This method (which we may term the Divine, Spiritual, or Heavenly method) will not serve the purpose of the Children of This World, since the world in which they are interested has this peculiarity: that things are not just as we choose to think them. Consequently, the accord of those whose belief is determined by a direct effort of the will, is not the unanimity which these persons seek.
===========end Peirce quote==========
I'll close this message and comment in a separate one/.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Note new email address; old address at cox.net now defunct)
----- Original Message ----
From: Bill Bailey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 9:46:14 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
From: Bill Bailey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 9:46:14 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Kristi, Joe, list:
The human is a social animal, born into a social group
which typically has a full array of habits, customs in place. That strikes
me as a given. "We've always done it that way, and that's the way it will
be done" seems to me what Peirce is talking about as tenacity propped up by
authority. And that too strikes me as a given, even in this empirical,
secular society where tenacity and authority are currently clashing over
Pluto. Peirces "community of investigators" (is that his term?),
the astronomers, settled it with a vote. The experiential evolution in the
conception of Pluto as a planet can be described as the new information that
surprised even the scientists. This scenario seems to me to fit pretty
well Peirce's sketch of the way things necessarily happen in social
groups. But it also involves features I wonder how Peirce would work
out in the terms of his sketch, In some news source, I saw the vote
of the astronomers hailed as a triumph of science over romance. And so it
appears at first glance. But what we have an instance of tenacity ("This
is how we have always defined a planet,") propped up by the authority of
science, the community of investigators. We can certainly say there has
been an advance in information. But has there been an evolutionary advance
in the mode of conception, or just a shift in whose conceptions are
valued?
Dear Joe,
Thanks for your response and the quote. On second thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature. I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.
But it might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition, involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason.
Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these lines. But it is an ordering of "intellectual enditions". So the method of tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding.
CP 5.524 ""...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks the habit."
Thanks for your response and the quote. On second thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature. I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.
But it might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition, involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason.
Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these lines. But it is an ordering of "intellectual enditions". So the method of tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding.
CP 5.524 ""...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks the habit."
Kirsti Määttänen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
25.9.2006 kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti:
Dear Kirsti::
Kirsti Määttänen
I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again.
In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how:
"...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]."
My words are in brackets
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Joe & Bill,
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of
the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But
that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response
:). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you
gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
> JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
> second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
> the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
> authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
> to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
> recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
> on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
> interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
> something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
> believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?
And later in the discussion you wrote:
JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social
consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of
tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity,
the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and
one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of
when one thinks of one's identity.
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate)
justification in considering the method of authority as far superior to
the method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
CSP: "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and
if belief is of the nature of a habit"
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds
in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in
view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of the
order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate preparedness to act according to the
formula believed? My original article carried this back to a
psychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was
developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a
definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Joe & Bill,
Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order
of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed.
But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this
response :). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the
title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:
<excerpt><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>JR:
"...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the
second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have
the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be
authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried
to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't
recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory
on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much
interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of
something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I
believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? </bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
</excerpt>
And later in the discussion you wrote:
<fontfamily><param>New York</param><bigger><bigger>JR: Well, I was
thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is
prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me
to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive
tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are
an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of
one's identity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>
To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on
the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in
evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has
to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not
necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.
So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of
goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,
in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show
to the person its truth or falsity.
If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If
still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it
might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)
belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being
surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic
observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give
examples of this kind.
But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its
immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>It can only be the 'summum
bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering
the method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But
Peirce does not take that up here.
Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:
"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if
belief is of the nature of a habit"
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>
How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce
proceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here
taking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the
logic of the order of the methods in presenting them.
As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is
referring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant
quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:
How do we know that a belief is nothing but
<fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param> CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate
preparedness to act according to the formula believed? My original
article carried this back to a psychological principle. The
conception of truth, according to me, was developed out of an original
impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.”
Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For
the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.
Best,
Kirsti
–</fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>Helvetica</param>Kirsti Määttänen
<<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
</fontfamily>
---
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