Joe, Kristi, list,
At the risk of offering a post hoc, ergo propter hoc
argument, I'll try looking at the issue from the prespective of
Peirce's more mature views.
I consider the "Fixation" essay to be organized around
a sort of development/growth principle that leads to the scientific
method as the method of choice of reason. I believe that growth here
can be thought of categorially. The method of tenacity "works"
as long as the individual is considered monadically (the social
impulse must be held in check) and as long as there is no attempt to
examine a belief against experience. A "monadic" mind
(what could that be???) would think what it thinks,
irrespective of anything else. Of course, the individual (the self) is
not a monad (see Colapietro's work on this) and the social impulse
cannot be held in check forever. With the method of authority belief
is achieved in relation to the belief of others (those in
authority) -- not in relation to experience. There is a growing sense
of dualism here with the introduction of "others". With the
third, a priori, method we find something interesting. This third
method is "far more intellectual and respectable from the
point of view of reason than either of the others which we have
noticed", says Peirce (italics mine). He adds, however: "It
makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste".
Now, as you know, Peirce (much) later introduced esthetics to the
normative sciences and saw both ethics and logic as requiring the help
of esthetics. Esthetics being concerned with the formation of the
summum bonum and of ideals or ends. Now there is a strong connection
in Peirce between esthetics and abduction (and agapasticism), in the
sense that the formation of ideals and the summum bonum lies on the
latter's ability to attract us before we can even consider the
consequences of adopting them with regards to
conduct or thought either by way of imagination through deduction
or concretely through induction. This requires insight (il
lume naturale), the very principle for the (very) weak form of
assurance we can get from abduction. Peirce tells us, in short, that
it is rational for us to trust our guesses. Moreover, the Law
of Mind explains that instinct, our ability to guess right, is itself
subject to growth in concrete reasonableness. (The mind of God, for
Peirce, is a mind whose "guesses" are all right guesses).
All this to say that, in his later years, Peirce will be brought to
recognize the third method of fixing belief (agreeableness to reason)
as a keystone to the scientific method of experience. The problem is
that this method, on its own, cannot distinguish between accidents and
reality. This is why Peirce concludes that the only method likely to
obtain a controlled (and growing) representation of reality is the
scientific method. However, it seems that both the 3rd and 4th methods
are related to the object (reality) through the mediation of reason
(the 3rd method, however, only in a somewhat degenerate manner,
through insight). Another way of saying it is to consider that neither
of the first two methods imply indefinite growth whereas only the
scientific method can approximate reality by mimicking (iconically)
and being affected (indexically) by it (and not by "accidents"
of another nature), understood that reality is that which is
independent from us while idefinitely growing in concrete
reasonableness (in kalos).
At the time of writing "Fixation" it seems Peirce was
not quite ready to see the full impact of the rationality of the 3rd
method. Thus his rejection of it as relating to "taste" and
his criticism of "taste" as being a matter of fashion.
However, his realization that esthetics belongs to the normative
sciences and that ethics and logic require its help a realization
prepared in part by his cosmological writings -- may impact our
retroactive reading of the "Fixation" essay. Thus it could
be argued (here might lie the post hoc turn of the argument) that
Peirce, in the way he ordered the 4 methods, was already manifesting
some insight with regards to esthetics's connection to logic (though
somewhat unwittingly)...
Martin Lefebvre
Dear Joe,
Thanks for your response and the quote. On second thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature. I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.
But it might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition, involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason.
Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these lines. But it is an ordering of "intellectual enditions". So the method of tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding.
CP 5.524 ""...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks the habit."
Kirsti Määttänen<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
25.9.2006 kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti:
Dear Kirsti::I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again.In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how:"...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]."My words are in bracketsJoe Ransdell[EMAIL PROTECTED]----- Original Message ----From: Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?Joe & Bill,Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order ofthe methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. Butthat wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response:). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title yougave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:> JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the> second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have> the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be> authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried> to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't> recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory> on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much> interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of> something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I> believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?And later in the discussion you wrote:JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that socialconsciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method oftenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity,the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, andone's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think ofwhen one thinks of one's identity.To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based onthe degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order inevolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness hasto do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is notnecessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree ofgoodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), showto the person its truth or falsity.If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. Ifstill persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, itmight as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Beingsurprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematicobservations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not giveexamples of this kind.But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called themethod of authority, we must, in the first place, allow itsimmeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate)justification in considering the method of authority as far superior tothe method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here.Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:CSP: "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, andif belief is of the nature of a habit"How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceedsin this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking inview of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of theorder of the methods in presenting them.As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce isreferring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevantquote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:How do we know that a belief is nothing butCP 5.28 ²... the deliberate preparedness to act according to theformula believed? My original article carried this back to apsychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, wasdeveloped out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have adefinite intention.²Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. Forthe reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.Best,Kirsti---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]Joe & Bill,Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the orderof the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed.But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing thisresponse :). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on thetitle you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:<excerpt><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>JR:"...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to thesecond method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not havethe order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should beauthority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever triedto justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don'trecall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memoryon this since it has not always been a topic in which I had muchinterest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold ofsomething right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, Ibelieve, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? </bigger></bigger></fontfamily></excerpt>And later in the discussion you wrote:<fontfamily><param>New York</param><bigger><bigger>JR: Well, I wasthinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness isprior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to meto be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctivetendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs arean important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks ofone's identity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based onthe degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order inevolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness hasto do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is notnecessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree ofgoodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), showto the person its truth or falsity.If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. Ifstill persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, itmight as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Beingsurprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematicobservations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not giveexamples of this kind.But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called themethod of authority, we must, in the first place, allow itsimmeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>It can only be the 'summumbonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in consideringthe method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. ButPeirce does not take that up here.Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:<bold><fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and ifbelief is of the nature of a habit"</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirceproceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is heretaking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to thelogic of the order of the methods in presenting them.As to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce isreferring to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevantquote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:How do we know that a belief is nothing but<fontfamily><param>Times New Roman</param> CP 5.28 ²... the deliberatepreparedness to act according to the formula believed? My originalarticle carried this back to a psychological principle. Theconception of truth, according to me, was developed out of an originalimpulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.²Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. Forthe reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree.Best,Kirsti</fontfamily><fontfamily><param>Helvetica</param>Kirsti Määttänen<<[EMAIL PROTECTED]></fontfamily>---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Kirsti Määttänen
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