Gary,
I would tend to agree with your analysis below, while I was especially
responsive to your interpreting the Gita in terms of what is real (as
opposed to actual), that it refers to types (not tokens) You wrote:
GF:. . . . . . . . . . . . . In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer
to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another
way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice
we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the
guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality.
Perhaps one could say that our ideals (firstness) must be seen as real
(thirdness) if they are ever to be actualized in us and in the world
(secondness).
Your analysis of the Gita is most valuable from several vantage points,
for example, your comments regarding Ghandi's position a propos of it
(within his own historical context); and I am beginning to see quite
clearly what you're pointing to in Peirce that parallels the
bodhisattvic ideal. You wrote:
GR: What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it.
Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient
beings rather than for some personal attainment or "reward." It is the
reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal
which functions to guide actual practice.
The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same
way, in my view.
I would suggest that the ideal of the scientific method requires a
authentic scientific personality as Peirce conceived it, the kind of
person who, like Peirce, was willing to offer his life to the pursuit of
truth in those areas in which he was most likely to significantly
contribute. But this tendency ought to be alive not only in scientists
but in all of us to some extent--this desire to help make the world a
more reasonable place where "it is 'up to us' to do so".
CP 1.615 The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior
reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we
can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be
to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by
giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as
the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed
that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be
to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. . . .
But Peirce suggests that in the true scientist that this represents a
kind of religious commitment involving a strong sense of duty,
sacrifice, faith in the reality of God (as this is presented in the N.A.
and elsewhere), and so forth. While you are no doubt correct that Peirce
emphasized the communal nature of science, there is yet an individual
contribution to be made beyond this veritable sacrifice of all other
concerns to this compelling scientific pursuit. Commenting on the extent
to which Peirce emphasized the communal you wrote:
GF: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peirce did not, to my knowledge,
put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective,
public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more
mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called "art" or "practice" --
obviously my sense of "practice" is different.) His emphasis was
appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part,
i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between
individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal
habits does not contribute to its development.
I would suggest that the "creative tension between individual and
community" was always there in Peirce, and even in the scientific method
as he conceived it. After all, abduction tends to be--if it is not
exclusively--a personal matter (even when several scientists abduce the
same hypothesis at more or less the same time).
Thanks for your most thought-provoking analysis, Gary. I'll be
reflecting on it for days.
Gary R.
PS I've only had a chance to glance at the quotations you linked to, but
will read through them this week. It looks to be a very rich and
suggestive collection indeed!
gnusystems wrote:
Bill,
[[ To deny what I said of the Bhagavad Gita, you have to deny what is
written there. ]]
Well, if you choose (or are predisposed) to read it as an apology for a
totalitarian ethic, then i'm sure there is no difficulty in doing so. I
think this is evident in the principles shared by semiotics and
hermeneutics. It is also evident that at least some of its deepest
readers -- Gandhi, for one -- do not read it that way.
[[ I've seen Ghandi's commentary, and whether he liked the Gita or not
is irrelevant. He, in fact, treated the Mahabharata War as
allegorical. ]]
Naturally, he treated it as metaphorical (i would not say
"allegorical"). It was, among other things, a metaphor for his own "war"
against British imperialism. What's relevant is not whether Gandhi liked
the Gita but his testimony that he based his *practice* on it. It's not
possible, in my view, to base one's practice on an ancient scripture
without reading it metaphorically -- not if you value *truth* as both
Peirce and Gandhi did (i believe Gandhi is reported as saying "there is
no god higher than truth"). In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer
to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another
way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice
we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the
guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality.
Your description of the bodhisattva presented him as a quasi-mythic
figure. What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it.
Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient
beings rather than for some personal attainment or "reward." It is the
reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal
which functions to guide actual practice.
The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same
way, in my view. It's probably not necessary to append Peircean passages
about this, which are many and well known; but i'll try to do that if
requested. The upshot of it all is that the true scientist, like the
bodhisattva, devotes his personal life to a *collective* enterprise (the
quest for truth) in which he can only play a minute role. He must lose
himself in that role, precisely because that's the only way to actualize
his unique contribution to the quest. Peirce did not, to my knowledge,
put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective,
public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more
mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called "art" or "practice" --
obviously my sense of "practice" is different.) His emphasis was
appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part,
i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between
individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal
habits does not contribute to its development.
Peirce also emphasized that science and logic both demand and depend on
"identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited
community." (For the source and context of the Peirce quotes i'm giving
here, see http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm .) This is what lies
behind his statement that "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to
save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his
inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle." This
is where the Peircean ideal of science and the Buddhist ideal of the
bodhisattva coincide.
I hope this answers your question
[[ How can there be personal responsibility in selfless action?
...
Was Ghandi deficient in conscience? If he had one, yes. Arjuna had a
conscience, and that was his problem. ]]
Your usage of "conscience" -- an interesting word in its etymology and
history -- strikes me as peculiar; i don't think you'd claim it is
Peircean, would you? Anyway, Arjuna's problem is that he was only
concerned about the fact that he was about to take the battlefield
against his own relatives. He was not yet capable of identifying his
interests with those of "an unlimited community." And i don't think that
Peirce meant that phrase to be read as hyperbolic. He's talking about an
ideal community, not any that have actually appeared in history or are
likely to appear in the future.
There's more to say, but this will do for now. As mentioned above, i've
collected a few Peirce passages relevant to this thread at
http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm . So i'll shut up now and let
Peirce speak for himself, while i catch up on your exchange with the
other Gary.
gary F.
}Our duty is to strive for self-realization and we should lose ourselves
in that aim. [Gandhi]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/
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