Gary F.
I'm not going the respond at any length here because I don't think my side
belongs here. Yours, as a Peircean concern might.
Bill,
[[ To deny what I said of the Bhagavad Gita, you have to deny what is
written there. ]]
Well, if you choose (or are predisposed) to read it as an apology for a
totalitarian ethic, then i'm sure there is no difficulty in doing so. I
think this is evident in the principles shared by semiotics and
hermeneutics. It is also evident that at least some of its deepest
readers -- Gandhi, for one -- do not read it that way.
I could as easily say you are predisposed to reading it as an argument for a
communitarian ethic. In fact, it has nothing to do with either. It is not
a politico telling Arjuna what his social duty is; it is a god telling a
human what his duty is to God. I suppose gods tend to be a bit
totalitarian, but that's just the way they are.
[[ I've seen Ghandi's commentary, and whether he liked the Gita or not
is irrelevant. He, in fact, treated the Mahabharata War as
allegorical. ]]
Naturally, he treated it as metaphorical (i would not say
"allegorical"). It was, among other things, a metaphor for his own "war"
against British imperialism. What's relevant is not whether Gandhi liked
the Gita but his testimony that he based his *practice* on it. It's not
possible, in my view, to base one's practice on an ancient scripture
without reading it metaphorically -- not if you value *truth* as both
Peirce and Gandhi did (i believe Gandhi is reported as saying "there is
no god higher than truth"). In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer
to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another
way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice
we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the
guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality.
Well, here again--and this is my chief complaint with what I've read of your
contentions--you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were
yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism. But more of
this just below.
Your description of the bodhisattva presented him as a quasi-mythic
figure. What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it.
Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional Buddhist and
see if he or she recognizes it. Many Christians take similar vows to work
for the salvations of others and work at it as if they mean it. Is that
appearance enough? The enlightenment the Buddhists speak of precedes the
work, is in fact the pre-condition for the work. You cannot held others to
achieve enlightenment until you have achieved it. I submit to you that
state of mind is only achieved after much struggle and self discipline.
Perhaps we can send our scientists away to a monastery for re-training? I'm
sorry to be flip, but you seem to me to be taking a thin similarity and
reducing Buddhism to fit it, leaving only a pale New-Age image in its place.
Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient
beings rather than for some personal attainment or "reward." It is the
reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal
which functions to guide actual practice.
That may well be. But given your position, would not Buddhist monks do it
better? This is what bothers me. You take one Buddhism's highest values,
and try to stir it up as a potion in western water, as if it were
immediately soluable.
The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same
way, in my view.
You think the Peircean ideal of scientific method functions exactly the same
as the Buddhist state of mind that is enlightenment? Exactly the same way
as what?
It's probably not necessary to append Peircean passages
about this, which are many and well known; but i'll try to do that if
requested. The upshot of it all is that the true scientist, like the
bodhisattva, devotes his personal life to a *collective* enterprise (the
quest for truth) in which he can only play a minute role. He must lose
himself in that role, precisely because that's the only way to actualize
his unique contribution to the quest. Peirce did not, to my knowledge,
put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective,
public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more
mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called "art" or "practice" --
obviously my sense of "practice" is different.) His emphasis was
appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part,
i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between
individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal
habits does not contribute to its development.
Peirce also emphasized that science and logic both demand and depend on
"identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited
community." (For the source and context of the Peirce quotes i'm giving
here, see http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm .) This is what lies
behind his statement that "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to
save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his
inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle." This
is where the Peircean ideal of science and the Buddhist ideal of the
bodhisattva coincide.
Here again it seems to me you assert equivalency, or coincidence, without
any real elaboration of that ideal in the Buddhist context. What if, for
example, Buddhist logic is not rooted in the social principle? Would that
affect your claim? Or is it, as I feel, just the general similarity that
you are interested in.
I hope this answers your question
[[ How can there be personal responsibility in selfless action?
...
Was Ghandi deficient in conscience? If he had one, yes. Arjuna had a
conscience, and that was his problem. ]]
Your usage of "conscience" -- an interesting word in its etymology and
history -- strikes me as peculiar; i don't think you'd claim it is
Peircean, would you? Anyway, Arjuna's problem is that he was only
concerned about the fact that he was about to take the battlefield
against his own relatives. He was not yet capable of identifying his
interests with those of "an unlimited community." And i don't think that
Peirce meant that phrase to be read as hyperbolic. He's talking about an
ideal community, not any that have actually appeared in history or are
likely to appear in the future.
No, I would not claim my use of "conscience is "Peircean." You didn't ask
me about Peirce, you asked me if Ghandi was deficient in conscience, and I
replied appropriately for both Hindu and Buddhist religions. Conscience is
a western concept of an individual attribute. You say of Arjuna "He was not
yet capable of identifying his interests with those of "an unlimited
community." As seen through whose communitarian interests? Peirces? I can
assure you Krishna has none. Arjuna is putting his individual
conscience--an gross error of ego--against what the Absolute (in the avatar
of Krishna) has ordained. Where does Krishna speak of community values???
Were Arjuna of right mind, he would be dead to self and all earthly cares,
his mind clearly fixed on the Absolute.
Now you are, obviously, free to view whatever you want through a Peircean
lens. But, ignorant as I still am about Peirce's work, I can't believe he'd
want the lens to be a dark glass. I hope I've made my objection both
reasonable and clear because I see nothing left but a piling up of chapter
and verse on Hinduism and Buddism, which I'm not going to do.
Best,
Bill Bailey
There's more to say, but this will do for now. As mentioned above, i've
collected a few Peirce passages relevant to this thread at
http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Peirce.htm . So i'll shut up now and let
Peirce speak for himself, while i catch up on your exchange with the
other Gary.
gary F.
}Our duty is to strive for self-realization and we should lose ourselves
in that aim. [Gandhi]{
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