Jon, List,

Here is a small technical point. Consider the classification of triadic 
relations Peirce provides in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop 
my categories from within."


He draws a distinction between the following classes of triadic relations:


  1.   A monadically degenerate triadic relation, such as a relation of 
similarity between three qualities of color.
  2.  A dyadically degenerate triadic relation, such as a relation between 
three existing individual objects (e.g., three cars simultaneously running into 
one another at a three-way intersection).
  3.  A genuinely triadic relation between facts, such as a physical law 
governing the relation of cause and effect between two masses.
  4.  A thoroughly genuine triadic relation between object, sign and 
interpretant.

Just out of curiosity, what do you think we should say about the second sort of 
triadic relation:  when the cars make contact, does the triadic relation exist? 
In saying that the triadic relation is degenerate, do you take that to imply it 
is reducible in all cases? If so, is that another way of saying that it isn't 
really a triadic relation--or just that it isn't genuine?

--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________
From: [email protected] 
<[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
<[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, March 28, 2021 7:07:03 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Categories and Semeiotic (was Bruce's 
'Twisted, Closed Loop')

Edwina, Gary R., List;

ET: ... it is not the case that the majority of Peircean scholars consider that 
the triad has no existential reality.

That is not the statement that Gary R. actually quoted and disputed. Here it 
is, along with my response to it that he paraphrased and with which he agreed.

ET: Furthermore, semiosis as a triad enables morphological existence; the triad 
exists in itself in time and space and does not require an external agent.

JAS: According to Peirce, a triad is not something that exists in time and 
space, it is a real relation with three correlates; and these may be in any of 
the three Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants. A genuine triad, 
like that in which a sign (1st correlate) mediates between its object (2nd 
correlate) and its interpretant (3rd correlate), is one that cannot be reduced 
to the three dyadic relations between pairs of those correlates.

No one is disputing that signs can be existents, namely, sinsigns/tokens. 
However, the term "triad" refers to the irreducible relation between a sign, 
its object, and its interpretant--not the sign itself.

ET: And it's a straw man to deviate from my meaning of an existential reality 
to reduce the meaning of the term 'existence' to something only operative in a 
mode of 2ns.

It is not a straw man to point out how someone else's "meaning of an 
existential reality" is different from Peirce's, since he carefully 
distinguishes existence as reacting with other like things in the environment 
from reality as being such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. 
Existence corresponds to genuine 2ns, while reality corresponds to genuine 3ns. 
Accordingly, everything that exists is real, while there are realities that do 
not exist.

ET: And there is absolutely nothing against the views of Peirce with using the 
term 'input' to refer to an incoming amount of data - and the term 'output' to 
refer to an interpretation of that data via the mediative function.

As far as I know, Peirce never uses the language of "data," "input," "output," 
and "function" when discussing semiosis. That makes it highly problematic to 
impose such vocabulary and then insist that it is still somehow consistent with 
Peirce's actual insights, especially since he wrote extensively about the 
ethics of terminology and strongly advocated maintaining the words and 
definitions established by the originator of a scientific concept--in this 
case, Peirce himself.

ET:  I disagree that all three categorical modes are operative in every 
semiosic action. Again, consider the ten classes ...

Gary R. did not say this, either. Here is what he actually said.

GR: ... all three categories are always present in every phenomenon; and there 
are no "pure modes" of any of the three categories (vs. Edwina writing of a 
"pure mode of 1ns"). Of course, one or two of the categories may predominate in 
any given observation of a phenomenon; but all three are 'always-already' 
present in each and every present phenomenon.

He was talking about Peirce's phenomenological categories, not "categorical 
modes," whatever those might be. He said that they are "present in every 
phenomenon," which is exactly what Peirce himself consistently maintained. He 
was not talking about the classification of signs at all, which is only one 
particular manifestation of Peirce's categories within speculative grammar as 
the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic. Again, someone 
who refuses to be scrupulously faithful to Peirce's own concepts and 
terminology will be off the mark when attempting to apply them in other domains.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sun, Mar 28, 2021 at 7:46 AM Edwina Taborsky 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

Gary R, list

Gary- you've inserted quite a few straw men arguments in your response.

1] First - in response to your 'ad populum'  and 'straw man' argument' - it is 
not the case that the majority of Peircean scholars  consider that the triad 
has no existential reality. After all - are you actually going to say that a 
word, an image - and I refer you to any of the ten classes to provide examples 
of existential triads - have no existential reality? Is it the case that an 
iconic sinsign, "an individual diagram" has no existential reality as itself??? 
[2.255]. How about a rhemetic indexical sinsign , "a spontaneous cry" 2.256] - 
does it not also  have an existential reality as itself?

2] In addition, you are misunderstanding what I mean by this lack of an 
external agent. What I mean is that, unlike Saussurian semiology, which 
requires an external agent to move the input data to the output interpretation 
[signifier to signified], the Peircean triad inserts mediation within the 
semiosic unit. Therefore, the process is 'self-organized' and does not require 
that external agent.

3]  In addition, I think that our discussions ought to remain 'our own' 
discussions and not rely on the assumed and asserted 'authority of the 
majority' to prove our points.

4]  And it's a straw man to deviate from my meaning of an existential reality 
to reduce the meaning of the term 'existence' to something only operative in a 
mode of 2ns. And where did I reduce the triad to dyadic relations?

I also disagree with your reduction of the nature of 'functions' to a dyadic 
action; and also, your rejection of the terms of 'input and output' to only 
'dynamic actions'. I certainly don't use those terms in such a reductionist 
meaning. And you cannot claim that these words have only ONE meaning. Remember, 
the algebraic form of 'function' - is a triad. And there is absolutely nothing 
against the views of Peirce with using the term 'input' to refer to an incoming 
amount of data - and the term 'output' to refer to an interpretation of that 
data via the mediative function.

And how do the terms 'interaction' and  'operation' become reduced to dyadic 
acts??? Can't three nodes in a semiosic set 'interact' and 'operate' 
co-operatively??

You and JAS may  consider these terms unacceptable -  but - you cannot go 
beyond your personal views to define them as 'not Peircean'.

2] I disagree that all three categorical modes are operative in every semiosic 
action. Again, consider the ten classes, and four of the six, ie, 40% do NOT 
include 3ns - and for good reason. Most certainly, the six that DO include 3ns 
also include 1ns and 2ns, but our universe does not operate only within laws - 
but within the capacity for randomness, chance [1ns] and pure mechanical 
interactions[2ns]. A universe operative only within laws would be unable to 
allow change, would prevent adaptation and evolution. Thee  has to be, in our 
universe, the capacity for utter novelty - After all - to deny this also denies 
possibility.

Edwina

On Sun 28/03/21 1:54 AM , Gary Richmond 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> sent:

Jon, Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: semiosis as a triad enables morphological existence; the triad 
exists in itself in time and space and does not require an external agent.

As apparently both you and I see it, Jon, in agreement with the vast majority 
of the scholars who have considered it in any depth --  a Peircean 'triad' does 
not, 'exist' (existence, after all is 2ns). Rather, the Peircean 'triad' is, as 
you noted, a real relation of three correlates which cannot be reduced to 
dyadic relations between pairs of them. It follows that semiosis cannot be 
reduced to a purported "functional" triad, while talk of input - output, 
expresses only dynamical action (2ns).

Indeed, the language of  "function' and 'interaction' and 'operation' all refer 
to dyadic 'actions' (i.e., interactions) but not the triadic character 
essential in genuine semiosis. This is not, however, to suggest that a 
functional approach doesn't have potential value in certain applications, but 
that it is essentially not Peircean even as it uses the language of Peirce's 
phenomenology and semeiotic.

Again, as both you, Jon, and Gary f recently noted, all three categories are 
always present in every phenomenon; and there are no "pure modes" of any of the 
three categories (vs. Edwina writing of a "pure mode of 1ns"). Of course, one 
or two of the categories may predominate in any given observation of a 
phenomenon; but all three are 'always-already' present in each and every 
present phenomenon.

As I see it, certain 2ns and 1ns may be prescinded from 3ns, and 1ns from 2ns,  
but this can only be for the purpose of some particular analysis, some 
abstraction from a given phenomenological appearance for a specific conceptual 
purpose, say of directing attention to or emphasizing some aspect or character 
of a manifestation of one of the three categories in its phenomenological 
appearance).

The above ideas are, I believe, well-supported views and, as you put it, Jon, 
many of these views reach "well-established consensus among Peirce scholars" 
and are hardly personal opinions of those who point to them on the List.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
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