Jon A and John S,
According to the classification of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within", Peirce treats three individual objects or three individual facts standing in a relation of brute reaction (e.g., A, B, and C accidentally collided) as a dyadically degenerate triadic relation. A situation in which two individual objects or facts are governed by a law--such as a dynamical law of inertia, is treated as a genuinely triadic relation. It is not obvious from what he says in that essay whether or not the genuinely triadic character of the law governing the individual objects or facts requires that we also consider the relation to future possible facts as well as those that are actual at the present time. I've tended to assume the relation of governance to future possibilities is essential to the triadic relation being genuine, but the point is not made obvious in that analysis. What is clear, is that representation is treated as a separate species of genuine triadic relations that called "thoroughly genuine". These seemingly minor points will probably matter when it comes to explaining how order has grown from a series of relatively accidental interactions of, say, massless photons--such as we encounter in the cosmology of the early universe. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, March 29, 2021 7:48:08 AM To: [email protected]; Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: [email protected]; Jon Alan Schmidt Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories and Semeiotic Dear John, I agree with saying the analysis or modeling of goal-directed, purposive, or intentional conduct, as opposed to brute action, stimulus-response behavior, or cause-effect dynamics, demands triadic relations to capture the complexity of the phenomena. But the converse does not follow. Not all triadic relations involve a “mediating intention (goal or purpose) by some mind or quasi-mind”. Otherwise the essence of logic boils down to something substantially psychological or quasi-psychological. That would not comport with Peirce's stated intention for his brand of logic. Regards, Jon On 3/28/2021 11:25 PM, John F. Sowa wrote: > > Jeff, > > JBD: when the cars make contact, does the triadic relation exist? > In saying that the triadic relation is degenerate, do you > take that to imply it is reducible in all cases? > > The essential aspect of Thirdness is a > mediating intention (goal or purpose) by some mind or quasi-mind. > Peirce's most characteristic example is 'giving', which requires an > intention by the giver A to transfer ownership of some gift B to some > recipient C. > > If A happens to put B on a table and C takes > it. The transfer is completed, but there is no evidence of a mediating > intention. You could represent that transfer by a triadic relation. But > that triad is degenerate because it is equivalent to a conjunction of > dyads. > > If you apply that principle to the collision of three > cars, we must ask whether there was any mind or quasi-mind that had some > intention, plan, or goal to cause that collision. If so, any adequate > representation of the situation must contain at least one triadic > relation. If not, it could be represented by a conjunction of > dyads. > > John >
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