> Date sent: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 16:08:16 +1100 > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: Ajit Sinha <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: truth Ajit, I agree that Althusser's theory of knowledge can meet some of the objections I raised (via Hindess and Hirst). Still, his overall theory has too many problems: 1) It lacks a concept of agency. This, of course, is true of Marxism in general, which tends to reduce agency to class action. But Althusser aggravated this problem by rejecting the early Marx. Without the early Marx one foregoes the rich intellectual tradition of German philosophy, which Lukacs sought to resurrect, although in a very limited way. 2) It pretends to be a "science" of politics, and it is therefore elitist, and potentially anti-democratic, just like Leninism. 3) Habermas is by far more profound... > At 15:43 16/10/97 -0400, Ricardo wrote: > >> Ajit's basic claim is that all claims to objective truth assume the > >> objectivity of truth. Whichever way they turn, the defenders of > >> objectivity cannot avoid making this assumption. And Ajit will > >> keep on reminding them of it. However, this does not exculpate Ajit > >> of his own "arbitrary" positions. That Althusser is not the answer > >> has been long shown by Hindess and Hirst, who argue that although > >> Althusser distinguishes the concepts of reality from reality itself, > >> the basic concepts of historical materialism are still thought to > >> approapriate the essence of reality. That is, Althusser still > >> conceives the "economic instance" as determining in the last instance > >> the essential character of all other instances. So, although > >> Althusser questions the correspondence of concepts to the > >> world, and insists that these concepts not be confused with the real > >> itself, he still maintains that the concepts of historical > >> materialism designate, or correspond to, the essence of the real. > >> Other domains of reality are acknowledge as significant, but the > >> essential nature of society is thought to be determined by the > >> "structure in dominance". > _______________ > > This is much too serious a question, and I don't think this post will do > justice to it. I agree with you that The thesis or rather just a statement > that the economic instance is *determinant in the last instance* is > problematic to say the least. It threatens Althusser's thesis of > 'overdetermination' and 'structural causality'. The question is, are we in > the last instance reduced to a transcendental cause? > > Let me try to rethink the issue. Althusser's mode of production or the > social formation is made up of three instances, namely: economic, ideology, > and politics. The economic instance is constituted by a complex relation > between the forces and the relations of production. It is itself a > structure dominated by the relation of production. The ideological instance > is constituted by the constitution of individual subjectivities and its > relation to the world. Similarly, politics has its own apparent relations > but largely left ignored by the theory. All these instances have relative > autonomy and they overdetermine the structure, where one instance is in > dominance (Note that dominance is not the same thing as determinant. > Economic instance is dominant in the capitalist mode but Ideology was > dominant in the feudal mode. I will explain what I mean by dominance in the > foot note). The structure gets its classification or its name on the basis > of what relations pertain between forces and relations of production, such > as feudalism, capitalism, etc. The fundamental thing to understand here is > that Althusser's, as well as Marx's, central organizing principle is > REPRODUCTION. If a mode of production is an object of history, then it must > have historical viability, i.e. it must be able to reproduce itself. In > this case, the Ideology as well as Politics must be such that it is > 'supportive' rather than antagonistic to the relationship pertaining at the > level of economics. For example, it may be difficult to conceive of modern > day capitalism with similar Ideology and the influence of the church as was > the case in the medieval period. If these instances stood quite > antagonistic to each other then the structure would not last, and would > collapse into some other structure. The causal relation for this kind of > rupture of the structure Althusser does not speculate about. For him, > Marxism is a revolution in theory and not a theory of revolution. Thus the > reference to the economy being the determinant in the last instance is not > in the sense of ACTIVE CAUSE determining or shaping the other instances > according to its wishes-- as Althusser said, the lone hour of the last > instance never comes. It is rather the determining instance in the context > of a given mode of production reproducing itself. The given mode of > production is defined by its economic relation. > ___________ > > >> Moreover, on what grounds does Althusser draw a > >> distinction between "science and "ideology", if not to show that > >> those concepts which are not consistent with marxists concepts are > >> ideological, while those concepts which belong to Marx's problematic > >> are scientific? > ____________ > > This is also Derrida's problem with Althusser, and I'm sure he has good > reasons for it. But one should be clear about one thing. For Althusser the > distinction between science and ideology is not based on the idea of 'true' > knowledge and 'false' knowledge as was the case with Lukacs. Science is an > understanding of a theoretical object, whereas Ideology has no object of > its own-- it is a relationship of a constituted subject and its relation to > the world. The interesting thing is that though the Ideology is a part of > the social formation or the mode of production, the theoretical practice or > the 'scientific practice' is not. For Althusser knowledge is not power. > Marxism is not a philosophy of praxis. I think Althusser maintains > Descartes idea of 'cogito' in the context of scientific knowledge. How can > cogito can be separated from the ideological subject remains a problem in > my opinion. > > Foot note: By dominance I mean a relationship in which one party is > dominant. For example, father/husband in a patriachal family relation. This > does not mean that father/husband determines every aspect of the family. I > think the idea of dominance plays very interesting role in Foucault's > thought and politics. > > Cheers, ajit sinha > >> > >> So, the question is: how can we put forward a presuppositionless > >> philosophy? I think (following other interpreters) that > >> Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to do just that. Ajit insists that > >> Hegel still presupposes something or other (a view which Schelling > >> elaborates, and which Ajit should check if he wants to stregthen his > >> argument against Hegel). I insist that Hegel, in his Phenomenology of > >> Spirit, starts without any assumptions except the very claims that > >> have already been made by successive philosophers. He judges them on > >> their own terms and determines whether they are true to their own > >> claims...dialectically moving from one claim to another. > >> Philosophy here is self-grounding because it proceeds from its > >> own experience. > >> > >> > >> deconstructive moment here, except that Hegel preserves that which is > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > >
