Ajit Sinha writes: >>As anyone could see in Jim's response, he fumbled almost
every second line. <<
Ajit tells us that _all_ statements of truth are arbitrary (i.e., "coming
about seemingly at random or by chance or as as a capricious and unreasonable
act of will" according to my dictionary). Thus, the above statement from Ajit
should be ignored, since I am sure that he does not exempt himself from his
own general rules. It's just capricious or unreasonable. (Or maybe it's simply
false, since Ajit would avoid arbitrariness.)
Nonetheless, let's humor him.
I had written: >>I assume that reality exists independent of my perception of
it, even if I perceive it incorrectly and incompletely.<<
Ajit answers: >And you also believe that your "assumption" should be accepted
by all human beings on this planet? So I ask the age old question: where is
the beef?<
The latter question is meaningless, so let's focus on the former: since when
is the consensus of all human beings the only criterion for truth or anything
else? Even majority rule is bogus in deciding matters of truth, though
sometimes we're forced to rely on it (as with juries in US criminal cases).
I was "assuming" that reality exists independent of my experience of it not
because it's _popular_ but because it's the only way of dealing with the world
that makes any sense.
>>This is only an unprovable _assumption_, since you might be a product of my
fevered imagination. <<
>If you could prove it, then why the hell you assumed it? Where is the logic
....? You and Doug Henwood are implying that I'm 'irrational' ..., but I find
that I'm able to hold to your tenet of 'reason' more faithfully then you can.<
I never said that I could _prove_ it.
I am glad that you believe in what I think of as "the realist postulate" (if
indeed that's what you're agreeing to). If you don't explicitly _assume_ it
(as I do), then it must be an unthinking act of faith. (Or is there some third
alternative I don't know about?)
The difference between an assumption and a tenet of faith, IMHO, is that the
former is a necessary evil while the latter is something one glories in as
part of some religion. I reject the latter.
BTW, how can you "hold" to the "tenet" of "reason" if it is arbitrary, as you
asserted before?
I continued: >>But it's an assumption which we have to make if we want
anything to make sense.<<
>Is it because you said so, or you got some arguments for it?<
No, there's no reason to assume that what I say is true, just as there's no
reason to assume that what you say is true.
But consider the alternative, the assumption that there is absolutely nothing
behind empirical appearances. (I can't think of any other alternatives to
external reality existing or not existing.) Under the alternative assumption,
eventually thought becomes impossible.
>>Given that assumption, a greater _approach_ to the truth would involve
having a subjective picture of that reality that fits the objective reality
more accurately and completely.<<
>But, according to yourself, since you do not know the 'objective reality',
how would you know that your "subjective picture" of that unknown "reality"
fits that reality better or worse?<
I already answered that question. It involves the usual toolkit of serious
social scientists that Ajit already knows. Also, see below.
>>As I said, there is no absolute truth that we can know. We can only approach
it, attain relative truth. <<
>... If you cannot know the absolute truth, then how do you know you are
approaching it? You could be going in absolutely wrong direction. So how do
you know?<
Good question. But I never said it was _easy_; it involves work. In fact, as I
said before, it's quite possible to get closer to the truth according to one
criterion (e.g., logical consistency) while going further on according to
another (e.g., consistency with empirical data). Given the complication of
serious issues in social science, it's much easier to tell when you're moving
away from understanding what's really going on than to tell when you're moving
toward it. (That's why it's always easier to criticize than to actually
contribute something to our understanding.)
I follow Popper a little, but not all the way. The possibility of
falsification is crucial; any vision of the empirical world that can't be
falsified should be seen as an assumption, the number of which should be
minimized.
We should either make our propositions explicit as assumptions or try to test
them (by dealing with new questions, different cases, etc.) If a proposition
doesn't fit perceived reality, that suggests that something is wrong. If a
theory is logically inconsistent, something is wrong. If the perceptions of
external reality and the logical theory don't mesh very well (e.g., involves
the forcing of data to fit the theory) then it's methodologically suspect. If
the theory doesn't work in practice (as a guide to policy or political action)
something is wrong.
Avoiding mistakes is a major criterion for nearing truth. "Hard" sciences are
much better at it than the social sciences. That's because our subject matter
is harder, involving much greater possibility for ideology, etc. (Even
physics, of course, has to deal with quantum mechanics, where things become
very hard.)
>>... I for one embrace agnosticism (as opposed to religion ...) In fact, I
think agnosticism -- skepticism -- is the only _scientific_ attitude.<<
> Which you have shown an incredible lack of, as a matter of fact. You have
shown absolutely no skepticism about your own BELIEF in truth, eventhough
you keep saying that you can never know it.<
In earlier missives and above, I explicitly noted that it was _an assumption_
rather than a "belief." Evelyn Woods has failed you.
>> We _don't_ know the objective truth. All we really have is "working
hypotheses" which can be rejected when better working hypotheses come along.
But the fact that there may be better working hypotheses indicates the
importance of _relative truth_ and of truth criteria in the first place.<<
>You seem to be talking Karl Popper here. Popper had a theory of
verisimilitude, on the basis of which he thought theories could be ranked. But
under attack, Popper had to accept that his theory of verisimilitude was
inconsistent with his theory of hypothesis and refutation. So Popper, who you
are trying time and time again to bring in for help, would not be much of help
here. <
I agree with Popper on one thing: I think that appeal to authority is a BS
way of arguing. I really don't care about what he said, even if what I say is
similar in some ways (because it is dissimilar in others). (This is especially
since I am far from being a serious scholar of Popper's stuff.)
What I said should stand on its own (de)merits. That Pooper made a mistake
with X does not imply that I am wrong with Y. (And it seems not worth anyone's
time to have Ajit prove the identity of X and Y.)
Ajit, why is Popper's inconsistency relevant anyway? After all, according to
you, all truth is arbitrary. So why not go with inconsistency? Just do it!
In an earlier missive, Ajit had written: >>>So you give the game up? By
'arbitrary' I mean propositions which are not justified by 'reason'. They are
posited, presupposed.<<<
I answered >>This is the standard yes/no (dichotomous) form of thinking that
is quite fallacious.<<
Now he writes: >Because you said so, or you have some argument?<
If you had bothered to read the explanation of my statement, you would have
avoided wasting our time asking this question.
Here was my explanation: >>You seem to have said that "all truth is totally
subjective & arbitrary" (yes). You interpret my statements as "giv[ing] the
game up," accepting your "yes" interpretation rather than defending the "no"
position you assumed I held (which I guess would be a belief that one can
attain total objectivity and access to absolute truth). But I was pushing the
"maybe" position -- or rather the complex and perhaps difficult-to-understand
position that the reality is a mixture of "yes" and "no." <<
>Earlier on you said that we must assume that there is absolute truth if we
want "anything to make sense". Now you are saying "perhaps", "may be" , "yes
and no". Are you, may be, starting to make no sense? Or you think that you are
still making sense even when the existence of absolute truth has gone into the
category of "may be"?<
The "maybe" was only in response to your "hey you've surrendered" bit.
It's useful to distinguish more clearly between an _ontological_ assumption
and _epistemological_ uncertainty. Even though I _assume_ reality exists
beyond my consciousness of it, I don't know for sure what it is exactly. So
various cultural or ideological matters can easily enter in to my perceptions.
Ajit wrote in an earlier missive: >>>Rest of your post is an exercise in
selfcontradiction. And I'm not in a mood to take pleasure in pointing them
out. My general sense is that you are confusing the idea of empirical 'facts'
with 'truth'. In your case there would be as many truths as empirical facts,
and your position would degenerate into most absurd empiricism of all.<<<
I answered: >>I am not engaged in that empiricist confusion (see next
paragraph). It would be useful if you made an effort to read what I wrote.
(For another author with similar views, see the methodological section of the
introduction to the GRUNDRISSE. However, I don't like to quote authority, so I
left him aside.) <<
> I'm sure Marx would thank you for that.<
Now there's _proof_ of the arbitrariness of all assertions of truth!
>>As is well known, empirical "facts" are totally infused with theory (as when
Keynesian theory defines national income & product accounts that define the
macroeconomic "facts"). However, that does NOT mean that we can reject efforts
to confront our subjective theories with the test of practice or the test of
efforts to measure the world outside our skulls. (I also point to other tests,
like those of logical consistency or methodological coherence.)<<
>So what has this got to do with Truth? This is a practice or convention of
a certain discipline that you are following. Are you claiming that what
most of the economists do is the Truth and all humanity and cultures must
follow their practice?<
I don't capitalize "Truth," you do. (Capitalization of the "t" is a symptom
of religion, which I reject explicitly.) I also have no brief for the practice
of "most economists." This should be pretty obvious because above I
explicitly criticize Keynesians, who are closer to my perspective than
most; you should also notice the many criticisms I've posted to pen-l of
"most economists." In fact, I think that the practice of most economists
contradicts their own methodological pretensions.
I also NEVER said that "all humanity and cultures must follow their practice."
What utter BS! (Next you'll accuse me of agreeing with Dinesh D'Sousa or
something
equally stupid.)
in pen-l solidarity,
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://clawww.lmu.edu/1997F/ECON/jdevine.html
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ.
7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; as far as they are certain, they really do not refer to
reality." -- Albert Einstein.
