The following is an original message, despite the citation marks. -------------------------------------------------------------------- The debate on "truth" is showing signs of dissipation, and that's > indicative of how difficult it is to talk about "objective truth". > Ajit's remarks on Lenin are correct: Lenin never gives up the notion > of absolute truth; truth is relative only to the degree > that we have not yet reached the absolute truth. And Lenin claims to > know the path to that truth, namely, his own interpretation of > dialectical materialism. (I might add that Lenin is not the > person to bring into this debate, since his 1908 book is a > political text (as Zarembka now recongnizes when he refers to > Althusser's essay "Lenin and Philosophy"). Lenin was a political > genius, not a philosopher. > > > Ajit's basic claim is that all claims to objective truth assume the > objectivity of truth. Whichever way they turn, the defenders of > objectivity cannot avoid making this assumption. And Ajit will > keep on reminding them of it. However, this does not exculpate Ajit > of his own "arbitrary" positions. That Althusser is not the answer > has been long shown by Hindess and Hirst, who argue that although > Althusser distinguishes the concepts of reality from reality itself, > the basic concepts of historical materialism are still thought to > approapriate the essence of reality. That is, Althusser still > conceives the "economic instance" as determining in the last instance > the essential character of all other instances. So, although > Althusser questions the correspondence of concepts to the > world, and insists that these concepts not be confused with the real > itself, he still maintains that the concepts of historical > materialism designate, or correspond to, the essence of the real. > Other domains of reality are acknowledge as significant, but the > essential nature of society is thought to be determined by the > "structure in dominance". > > Moreover, on what grounds does Althusser draw a > distinction between "science and "ideology", if not to show that > those concepts which are not consistent with marxists concepts are > ideological, while those concepts which belong to Marx's problematic > are scientific? > > So, the question is: how can we put forward a presuppositionless > philosophy? I think (following other interpreters) that > Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to do just that. Ajit insists that > Hegel still presupposes something or other (a view which Schelling > elaborates, and which Ajit should check if he wants to stregthen his > argument against Hegel). I insist that Hegel, in his Phenomenology of > Spirit, starts without any assumptions except the very claims that > have already been made by successive philosophers. He judges them on > their own terms and determines whether they are true to their own > claims...dialectically moving from one claim to another. > Philosophy here is self-grounding because it proceeds from its > own experience. > > > deconstructive moment here, except that Hegel preserves that which is > > > > > > > >
