For those who are curious, I have a recently published
paper on these issues.
"Aspects of dialectics and non-linear dynamics," _Cambridge
Journal of Economics_, May 2000, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 311-324.
It is also available on my website without the figures at
http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb.
Barkley Rosser
-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Burford <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thursday, May 25, 2000 3:39 AM
Subject: [PEN-L:19551] Re: Re: Dialectical materialism and ecology
>At 16:51 24/05/00 -0400, Charles Brown wrote:
>
>
>
>> >>> Jim Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 05/24/00 04:27PM >>>
>>At 03:27 PM 5/24/00 -0400, you wrote:
>> >This means developing an appreciation for what Engels was trying to do
in
>> >Dialectics of Nature and expanding upon it as well.
>>
>>I think too much noise has been made about the "dialectics of nature."
That
>>is, there's been too much criticism of Engels on this score.
>>
>>________
>>
>>CB: Yea, and it was notes for a book , not a completed book. A bit unfair
>>to Engels.
>
>The problems have come from domgatically treating Engels upublished notes
>as a secret ten commandments (or rather three commandments) of science.
>Critics of such dogmatism have then gone on to attack the concept of
>dialectical materialism which in essence is inherent in all Marx and Engels
>work.
>
>>CB: Of course, the dialectics of nature are prior to the dialectics of
>>society for a materialist. But the dialectics of human society constitute
>>and emergent level from nature, that is a qualitative change from nature.
>
>I support the introduction of the word "emergent" which is associated with
>modern complexity theory. I think it is fully compatible with Marx's
>approach. It is about levels of organisation. It is no accident that his
>critique of political economy began with the unit of the commodity.
>
>
>>The focus on dynamic mutual interaction and the
>>importance of totalities that is part of dialectical thinking seems
>>relevant to both kinds of dialectic. But the dynamics of society involve
>>praxis -- the dialectical interaction of consciousness and practice as a
>>sometimes contradictory totality. Nature has no consciousness (except as
>>part of humanity or humanity's likely alien cousins on faraway planets),
>>so its dialectics must be different.
>
>I have argued elsewhere that implicit in Marx's epistemology is a
>theory of *partial* consciousness.
>
>On this I would not quite agree with the following:
>
>>CB:
>>
>>One other point, in class society alienation causes human history to
>>become natural history-LIKE.
>
>I do not see that explanation anywhere in Marx, but I am open to
>interesting references.
>
>I think he clearly saw humans as on a continuum with the animals. (See his
>notes on Wagner) Only we cannot be conscious of everything. We can become
>more conscious of the hidden inner workings of complex processes, like the
>capitalist market which is social in nature although it is superficially
>to do with individual owenership of the means of production.
>
>
>
>>So, Marx says in the Preface to to the Contribution to the Critique of
>>Polit Economy that economics can be done almost with the exactness of a
>>natural science, unlike art, etc.
>
>Could you give the quote as I would like to consider the argument? I also
>think that Marx and Engels's writings are compatible with a probabilistic
>theory of ontology, although they approach things from a dialectical
>perspective.
>
>
>>Why is this ? Because in class oppressive modes of production, humans
>>become thinglike and thus their economic behavior can be studied AS IF
>>humans were natural objects in motion.
>
>This is where I differ slightly. The human species *is* a natural object in
>motion and is coming up against the limiting factors of its environment. It
>is behaving like a species of caterpillars that have found a new cabbage
>patch. Without consciousness of this process, which will have to be social
>consciousness and not left to the blind partial consciousness of individual
>owners of the means of production, our species will become unstable and is
>likely to die out.
>
>>[Jim] To Marx, capitalist does have "laws of motion" that _seem_ to act as
if
>>they were natural laws (as he says in the afterword to the second edition
>>of vol. I of CAPITAL). But if I understand him correctly, he sees such
>>nature-like laws as an expression of human alienation, the fact that the
>>democratic community of the associated producers does not rule society.
>
>Again I would like to delete the emphasis on "seem". I think in a previous
>polemic on marxism thaxis, Charles and I unearthed numerous references in
>which Marx passed by analogy from the natural world to the human world. I
>think he uses these as anlogies and not just as metaphors. He was
>particularly interested and well informed about the different qualities
>produced by the carbon series of organic molecules, thanks to their German
>friend Schorlemmer, undervalued professor in Manchester. There are
>thousands of pages of unpublished manuscripts by Marx on the natural
>sciences. His admiration of Darwin was not opportunistic.
>
>
>
>>(((((((((((((((
>>
>>CB: Amazing ! We reached the exact same conclusion on that . I wrote the
>>above before reading this last part I sectioned off.
>>
>>Exactly , the afterword to the second edition of vol. I
>
>Yes it is worth re-reading. I think the admission of coquetting (a French
>word imported into German, as in English, and not now in current usage) is
>equivalent of "flirting" but it applies only to Hegel's ways of expression
>(Marx is referring to the chapter on value).
>
>In this important afterward, 1873, after Volume I had been in circulation
>for several years, Marx refers unambiguously to "My dialectical method". He
>refers also to the "general forms of motion" of the dialectic. "Itregards
>every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and
>therefore grasps it transient aspect as well; and because it does not let
>itself be impressed by anything, being in its very nature critical and
>revolutionary."
>
>I would therefore limit the distinction between the human world and the
>non-human world to one of qualitative change in the nature of some of the
>contradictions, a qualitative step that emerged as a result of quantitative
>steps.
>
>Generally Marx refers to the fluidity of the states of everything we can
study.
>
>That goes also for this planet and this (known) universe.
>
>That Marx was a materialist is not in dispute. That Marx also took his
>dialectical method to be fundamental, should be beyond dispute from this
>afterward to the first volume of his most important work.
>
>Those who try to drive a wedge between Marx and Engels and preserve a
>concept of historical materialism which applies only to the social world
>are still in my opinion reacting to simplistic dogmatic interpretations of
>Engels' notes in Dialectics of Nature. They risk limiting their perspective
>to a radical interpretation of bourgeois sociology, by no means totally bad
>in itself, but without understanding the transitory nature of all
>phenomena, and thereby unable to respond with sufficient flexibility and
>judgement to the contradictory nature of events.
>
>It is only in this general probabilistic sense that the capitalist mode of
>production is highly likely to end, not as a result of any simple
>mechanical pre-determination. The human species is also likely to end.Or at
>least change. Indeed we are changing now in becoming a collective
>world-wide organism through the internet, and through increased social
>control of reproduction.
>
>Chris Burford
>
>London.
>
>
