Interspersed comments follow.

On Fri, 30 Mar 2001 14:54:01 -0800, Jim Devine wrote:
>I don't think that this is an accurate presentation of history or the 
>literature on this matter. I, for one, think that the so-called "New 
>solution" (which is hardly "new" at this point) solves all the issues. 
>Instead of burdening the list with this, I'll refer you to Duncan Foley's 
>work or to my article in the 1990 RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY volume. 

Thanks. I found a web site of Foley's at
<http://www.columbia.edu/~dkf2/>. A recent Foley paper on this subject
is at <http://www.columbia.edu/~dkf2/labval.pdf>. The OPE-L list,
mentioned elsewhere, is archived at
<http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/~cottrell/OPE/archive/0103/>. 

In the paper linked to above, Foley argues that the Labor Theory of
Value can serve a similar function in political economics as Newtonian
mechanics does in physics. (p. 23) There is also a discussion of
whether Foley's theory is a mere redescription or more. Although Foley
means to base his concepts on Marx, I don't see how Marx could have
ever conceived of the big picture that Foley argues so well. Thus, I'd
assert that Foley's theory is original.

The Foley solution is open to some criticism. The New Palgrave entry on
"Transformation Problem," written by E.K. Hunt and Mark Glick, for
example, has a few criticisms of Foley's theory as presented in 1982,
developed simultaneously by Dumenil. The entry also criticizes the
Shaikh theory. (I'm relying on the subset edition "New Palgrave on
Marxian Economics," published in 1990.)

>In addition to using Ricardo's phrase "labor theory of value" to discuss 
>Marx's non-Ricardian "law of value," this is a misinterpretation. 

Marx's version of the LTV is better called the "law of value," I admit.
It retains the same grounding premise of Ricardo, though, that from
labor springs value. It's true that Marx has a much more complex notion
of value than this. In reality, according to Marx, prices don't reflect
value, except in society as a whole. Initially, in volume 1, Marx
treated values and prices alike. Then, in what became volume 3, he
wished to show that value and price did not proportionally reflect one
another, except at the general societal level. This fed into his
complaint that something was awry in capitalism. Prices seemed ordinary
and real, though unstable. But according to Marx they were only a thin
veil that concealed a morally revolting hidden reality. Only Marx's
application of the dialectic could penetrate the veil and allow the
proletariat to see reality for what it was, and thereby to progress to
class consciousness. Thence, to revolution.

But reality is much more complicated than this supposed bait and
switch, even the commercial reality of price and value. I won't deny
that prices often don't reflect what a commodity is actually worth. But
there seems to be much more going on in the capitalist economy than
this naked deception.

The Transformation Problem arises because Marx's math didn't add up at
a crucial point in volume 3. He didn't live to finish editing those
manuscripts, unfortunately, so one can argue that Marx had the right
idea, but simply had not expressed himself well. To me, however the
Transformation Problem is indicative of the larger problem in Marx's
law of value. 

>[....] Further, just because uses a single measure (e.g., the Celsius scale for 
>temperatures) doesn't imply "monovalency," i.e., a single-factor theory of 
>why the temperature is so high today.

You're right. The Celsius scale measures air temperature, and is
susceptible to bad temperature approximations if placed in shade, or if
there is a significant so-called "windchill effect," etcetera. Celsius
is not, however, a reliable determinant of such a basic thing as at
what point does water boil, because that varies with altitude, air
pressure, and other factors in addition to temperature. Temperature
measurements are useful, but they can't be our only tool.

>"Overdetermination" refers to an actual theory, usually to a theory of how 
>history works. Any specific institution or concrete event can be seen as 
>the result of several different causes, with the political and ideological 
>"levels" playing a role along with the economic. (I like Althusser's vision 
>of overdetermination better than Resnick & Wolff's, in which everything 
>determines the character of everything else.)

Overdetermination is dialectic, as far as I can tell. I don't see why
we should use overdetermination or dialectic to understand that social
system we call "capitalism," but not to understand that phenomenon of
capitalism and other economies we call value. 

Ricardo's contribution is fallacious that the overall amount of value
present in a society, subject to distribution, is all created by labor.
Ricardo uses deduction extensively. In this way he follows Hume. IMHO,
Hegel undermined Hume by resurrecting the contributions of those Greek
philosophers who came before Artistotle, notably Socrates. Of course
that contribution was the dialectic. The scandal of philosophy was said
in the 1920s to be induction, but this is no scandal. Thanks to the
Hegelian dialectic we have induction available again for academic
discourse. Without induction, I'd argue inductively, there could be no
deduction. (It's late.) It's important to note that these were Marx's
feelings about Hegel, except that Marx said Hegel had simultaneously
uncovered, but then partially concealed the dialectic. Marx endeavored
to fully reveal it.

>From an ecological viewpoint, Ricardo's observation is simply wrong
that from labor comes all value. Unless faith holds the trump card, it
is from the sun that all things in our solar system come. (That object
which slammed into the Earth billions of years ago, in the process
separating the early Earth into two and creating the dual planetoids,
one of which became our Moon, the other Terra, would conceivably be a
relevant exception). Perhaps this is too "spaced-out," but I think it's
notable because much of what is valuable to humans was not created by
us. Originally, we stayed warm and safe in natural caves, for example.
Furthermore, oxygen is released by photosynthetic organisms. Water is
not created by humans, either. From these observations, we should be
able find that Ricardo's observation must have been incomplete or even
wrong.

Thanks for taking my message seriously. I appreciate your criticism
very much.

Andrew Hagen
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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