I just was handed a patacon from someone who just returned from Argentina.  The first 
thing that hits you is that it looks so much like their peso.  The patacon was issued 
and used to pay government worker salaries. They key state power here was the 
declaration that patacones would be accepted in payment of taxes.  Of course, then 
there is another state power implied there--the power to tax.  An the power to issue 
the patacon.  And the power to set prices for goods and services the government 
purchases.  So any state power theory of money must recognize at least these powers: 
1) power to tax; 2) power to issue currency; 3) power to declare "public 
receivability" (what will settle obligations at state pay offices); 4) power to set 
certain prices.  This is straight chartalist monetary theory. Mat

-----Original Message-----
From: Devine, James [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2002 12:05 PM
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Subject: [PEN-L:21251] state power theory of money


[was: RE: [PEN-L:21246] Re: FW: Re: Re: sinking Argentina ]

Romain Kroes writes:> Very interesting and relevant subject of controversy,
Jim.<

thanks.

> But is the "forced circulation" of fiat money a reality? <

By "forced circulation," I mean (and I believe Marx meant) the use of state
power to ensure that the fiat currency is used and accepted within a certain
geographical area. The U.S. dollar has legal status in the U.S. -- it's
legal tender for payment of all debts, public or private -- while the U.S.
government accepts the fiat money in payment of dollars, fees, fines, etc.,
creating a permanent demand-side underpinning for its having a market-value
above its production cost. (One interpretation of one U.S. financial crisis
under 19th-century President Jackson was that it was sparked by the
government's refusal to accept fiat money in payment for its sales of
western lands. That is, the government lapsed in its role as underpinning
the demand the fiat money.) Further, the Federal Reserve -- an agency of the
U.S. government -- keeps its supply limited. 

As I said, if the power of the state collapses -- as in Germany after World
War I or the U.S. Confederacy in 1865 -- the fiat behind the money
collapses, so the fiat money itself loses value.  (BTW, this presumes that
the state doesn't want hyperinflation. I think that makes sense except when
the state itself is falling apart.)

> If it were, general level of prices would be immutable. <

I don't get this, unless the power of the state is always constant. Also,
though the power of the state is the fundamental or structural basis for the
value of fiat money, there are all sorts of short-term or conjunctural
factors which play a role. 

> Unless you believe in the "quantity theory". Do you? If yes, it is another
controversy. <

Somewhere in volume III of CAPITAL (I'll look for the reference if you
wish), Marx endorses a version of the quantity theory of money for _fiat
money_ (though not for gold or other commodity moneys). That is, if the
quantity supplied of a convertible non-gold currency rises relative to the
amount of gold that backs it up, the gold price of the former falls (cet.
par.) so that prices stated in the non-gold currency rise. Under the gold
standard, the same happens with officially non-convertible moneys. 

I don't believe in the quantity theory of money (which I interpret as
positing a simple and stable positive relationship between the quantity of
money and the price level), because the demand for money is typically
unstable. Further, the quantity theory's added assumption that the economy
always operates at full employment is demonstrably false. 

The quantity theory does have a "rational core," i.e., that if there's
persistently too much fiat money in circulation relative to demand it
encourages inflation and even hyperinflation. The problem is that the
quantity theorists (e.g., Milton Friedman) interpret this type of event as
merely a mistake by the government or as a sign of its perfidy. I interpret
it instead as a sign that the state is falling apart, that society is
divided by severe class and other struggles, that the government can't
collect sufficient taxes or cut expenditures enough -- and finds itself able
to borrow only at usurious rates that make its budget deficit worse. (If it
can't borrow, then the deficit must be "monetized.") Economic dependency
makes this sitution more likely. (Internal struggles need not be reflected
in hyperinflation, as seen (until recently) in Argentina. With the kind of
forced dollar/peso parity that Argentina had, the conflict is reflected in
other ways. So even though conflict causes inflation cet. par., it need not
do so in all situations.) 

> On the other hand, if people don't trust a fiat money, nobody can force
them to use it. They use another one. I think that the problem lies
elsewhere.<

Though subjective trust in money -- i.e., a belief that other people will
accept it -- is crucial, I believe that the forcing of the circulation of
money described above is the objective basis for the subjective trust. 

> What can be forced is not the circulation but the full-discharge payment.
In other words: the account unit of the debt. Fiat money enables producers
to reflect all increasing costs of production in their prices of production
and, this way, to pass additional cost on to the creditors.<

please explain.

> What the ancient monetary units like raw materials, grain, silver and gold
did not allow,  because of the "scarcity" you mention and define, that is to
say they did not allow to restore relative prices when upstream prices
increase. So that monarchs and oligarchs were periodically lead to purge the
debt (as reflected in Ancient Testament, by the "jubilee"). But in both
cases,  recurrent moratoriums or full-discharging fiat money, the purge of
debt is a destruction of financial capital. And this is, I think, the reason
why fiat money is seen as "forced".<

To me, it's not just the natural scarcity of gold, etc. (i.e., the need to
use labor to produce them) that stands behind their use. (It's also not just
the fact that gold is easy to make into coins, etc.) Rather, it's the fact
that there's no need to use state power to ensure that people accept gold as
money. The government's role is relatively minor, i.e., trying to make sure
that the goldsmiths don't adulterate the metal, etc. That's why gold
prevailed in Western Europe in the feudal period, where centralized states
were the exception rather than the rule. That's why gold prevailed in the
19th century on the international level, when there was no hegemonic power
of the U.S. sort (and no world government, of course). When there's no
political unity under the power of the state, "natural" means are applied. 

Again, I don't quite get what you mean by not allowing the restoration of
relative prices when upstream prices increase. Do you mean that the gold
standard has a severe deflationary bias, except when there are new gold
discoveries? and that such a bias squelches capitalist or commercial
business operations? If so, I agree. 

But I would interpret the purging of debt -- jubilee -- in slightly
different terms. I think it represents (1) an effort to respond to the
social unrest that occurs under deflation as nominal debts become more
valuable relative to wages and commodity prices; and (2) the government's
own excessive indebtedness (typically due to wars). The latter also
encouraged kings to "cheat" on the gold standard, adulterating the coins,
etc. 

> Therefore, the problem is the one of debt a world money has first to be
related to. It is matter of a full-discharging world money that depends, I
agree with you, on the kind of economy which gets hegemony. If hegemony was
of say oil-producers countries, world money would be oil or any currency
related to oil. As hegemony is of an oil importer, world money is a fiat one
that allows to govern relative and real prices between oil and final goods
and services.<

I don't think that an oil-based international monetary would work very well.
The problem is that the price of oil fluctuates too much (since both supply
& demand are inelastic). (I don't think the gold standard would work well
now that gold has become a speculative commodity. One of the things that
made the gold-dollar standard of the old Bretton Woods system work was that
gold was prevented from being a speculative commodity.) It would only work
if the hegemonic power could use its monopoly power to stabilize the price
of oil relative to the average of other prices. More likely, that state
would circulate fiat money and it would be accepted due to its
military-financial-economic power, including its control over the oil supply
& market. 

>So, the only way of getting out of monetary crises is an agreement between
countries according to which every country may pay its debt in any
convertible currency, but its own. The BIS can manage that. But that poses
the problem of getting rid of asymmetric exchanges and of all kind of
imperialism, when even UNO has become an instrument of occidental empire.
Has it not?<

Yes it has. The problem is that the kind of agreement between countries that
you refer to has never fit with the interests of the hegemonic power, i.e.,
the U.S. 

Jim Devine

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