----- Original Message ----- From: "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, February 01, 2002 2:11 PM Subject: [PEN-L:22191] RE: Re: re: re: Historical Materialism
Ian quotes Joan Robinson: > "The awkwardness of reckoning in terms of values, while commodities > and labor power are constantly changing in values, accounts for > much of the obscurity of Marx's exposition, and none of the > important ideas he expresses in terms of the conceptof value cannot > be better expressed without it." I don't think the obscurity of Marx's writing (which is supposed to be pretty easy to read as German theoretical writing goes) is due to his use of values. Instead it's because he doesn't do what modern writers do, i.e., say "this is what I'm going to say first; then I'll talk about this, etc.," explaining the level of abstraction and stuff like that (i.e. assumptions) at each stage. Instead he plays at being Hegel and starts out very abstract (the Commodity in General) and becomes progressively more concrete without explaining the logic of his presentation (even though his analysis does make sense). (Charlie Andrews' recent book follows Marx on value theory, but has a much better presentation.) > "As a logical process, the ratio of profits to wages for each > individual commodity, can be calculated when the rate of profit is > known. The transformation is from prices into values, not the other > way." this is what's been called the Steedman critique, though obviously Robinson thought of it first. It's at the center of Analytic Marxism. I think it's based on a misunderstanding of Marx's project, the facile assumption that Marx was a minor post-Ricardian who was first and foremost interested in price theory and distribution theory. Jim Devine ================ Ok, but given the Quine-Duhem underdetermination problem-link below-is not the burden of proof for the indispensability of Marx's value theory on those who wish to retain it? Steve Fleetwood has an essay on this in a recent issue of Capital & Class. Ian ** UNDERDETERMINATION Empirical equivalence Two theories T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent if every observational consequence of T1 is also an observational consequence of T2. e.g. curved space-time vs. flat space-time plus forces solar system at rest vs. solar system moves with uniform rectilinear velocity v Underdetermination and Scepticism If T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent, every possible piece of evidence that supports T1 will also support T2. The evidence underdetermines our choice between T1 or T2. How do we decide which of T1 and T2 is true? Note This problem only arises where there are empirically equivalent theories. < http://www.dur.ac.uk/~dfl0www/modules/scikandr/ROHP.HTM >
