I don't understand this stuff about the observational consequences of
theories at the level of generality of the theory of value. What if the
labor theory of value is part of the central core of Marxism ? If that is so
then in itself it does not have any specific empirical implications
period.
Jim Devine seems to take a position of this sort in a piece on the web:
Marx's goals for the LoV were to analyze the societal
nature and laws of motion of the capitalism; another way of
saying this is that the LoV summarizes the method of analysis
that Marx applies in Capital. The LoV is part of what Imre
Lakatos [1970] terms the "hard core" of tautologies and
simplifying assumptions that is a necessary part of any research
program.1 The quantitative aspect of value should be seen as a
true-by-definition accounting framework to be used to break
through the fetishism of commodities -- allowing the analysis of
capitalism as a social system. Prices, the accounting framework
most used by economists, both reflect existing social relations
and distort their appearance. It is necessary to have an
alternative to prices if one wants to understand what is going
on behind the level of appearances: looking at what people do
in production (i.e., labor, value) helps reveal the social
relations between them.
If this interpretation is correct then Quine-Duhem's stuff is irrelevant not
that it makes much sense to me anyway. Seems like a neanderthal idea to
speak of theories implying empirical consequences just like that without
assumptions conditions etc. assumed: or of "evidence" straightforwardly
supporting a theory. So the Quine-Duhem stuff is not relevant and even if it
were why should it be given any particular weight? Is it any less dubious
than the Marxian theory of value?
Cheers, Ken Hanly
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ian Murray" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2002 4:27 PM
Subject: [PEN-L:22192] Re: RE: Re: re: re: Historical Materialism
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sent: Friday, February 01, 2002 2:11 PM
> Subject: [PEN-L:22191] RE: Re: re: re: Historical Materialism
>
>
> Ian quotes Joan Robinson:
> > "The awkwardness of reckoning in terms of values, while
> commodities
> > and labor power are constantly changing in values, accounts for
> > much of the obscurity of Marx's exposition, and none of the
> > important ideas he expresses in terms of the conceptof value
> cannot
> > be better expressed without it."
>
> I don't think the obscurity of Marx's writing (which is supposed to
> be
> pretty easy to read as German theoretical writing goes) is due to
> his use of
> values. Instead it's because he doesn't do what modern writers do,
> i.e., say
> "this is what I'm going to say first; then I'll talk about this,
> etc.,"
> explaining the level of abstraction and stuff like that (i.e.
> assumptions)
> at each stage. Instead he plays at being Hegel and starts out very
> abstract
> (the Commodity in General) and becomes progressively more concrete
> without
> explaining the logic of his presentation (even though his analysis
> does make
> sense). (Charlie Andrews' recent book follows Marx on value theory,
> but has
> a much better presentation.)
>
> > "As a logical process, the ratio of profits to wages for each
> > individual commodity, can be calculated when the rate of profit
> is
> > known. The transformation is from prices into values, not the
> other
> > way."
>
> this is what's been called the Steedman critique, though obviously
> Robinson
> thought of it first. It's at the center of Analytic Marxism. I
> think it's
> based on a misunderstanding of Marx's project, the facile
> assumption that
> Marx was a minor post-Ricardian who was first and foremost
> interested in
> price theory and distribution theory.
>
> Jim Devine
>
> ================
>
> Ok, but given the Quine-Duhem underdetermination problem-link
> below-is not the burden of proof for the indispensability of Marx's
> value theory on those who wish to retain it? Steve Fleetwood has an
> essay on this in a recent issue of Capital & Class.
>
> Ian
>
>
> **
> UNDERDETERMINATION
>
> Empirical equivalence
>
> Two theories T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent if every
> observational consequence of T1 is also an observational
> consequence of T2.
>
> e.g. curved space-time vs.
> flat space-time plus forces
>
> solar system at rest vs.
> solar system moves with uniform rectilinear velocity v
>
>
> Underdetermination and Scepticism
>
> If T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent, every possible piece of
> evidence that supports T1 will also support T2.
>
> The evidence underdetermines our choice between T1 or T2.
> How do we decide which of T1 and T2 is true?
>
> Note This problem only arises where there are empirically
> equivalent theories.
>
> < http://www.dur.ac.uk/~dfl0www/modules/scikandr/ROHP.HTM >
>
>
