> >if i may say something as the resident slow thinker: things are >whizzing by at a good speed on this thread but it seems to me >that certain things are not clear (at least to me!). the examples >and analysis (offered by michael p. and others) seems to touch >upon the dangers of letting experts decide on matters, while jks >argues that within the well-defined scope of their technical >activity, experts are to be left alone and there is no >"democratization possible". to make matters worse (in terms of >the disconnect of rhetoric) jks seems to be thinking of the >hard sciences (though he has mentioned law)
Not particularly. I mentioned law, medicine, and carpentry. while those on the >other side are thinking more generally or less specifically >about the hard sciences. > >so the questions that arise are: > >a) does jks object to democratization of the choice of research > projects and the disposition of their results? (my hunch is > that he does not) Yes I do object. With regard to reserach, neither I nor anyone here wants to be told what to work on. Now, there is some democratization possible in the decision to fund kinds of projects. The legislature can (and does) decide to alot a certain amount of funds to, say, cancer research. Or the NEA rather than the NSF. One wouldn't want the hoi poloi actually picking projects and assisning grants on the microlevel though. > >b) is truth entirely relative especially as we go from the > harder to the softer sciences and humanities? No, he said dogmatically. are experts > the final arbiters of truths within their fields? Well, the historiansd (say) know more hostory than you or I. That doesn't mean they can't be wrong. But if all the serious historians agree (ha!) on some proposition, you need a lot of oomph to overcome that. if so, is > that form of truth meaningful in a general context? What does that mean? There is one one form of truth, which is, as Aristotle said long ago, to say of that which is, that it is,a nd that which is not, that it is not. Much expertise is knowledge how not knowledge that. Legal truth, for example, is not really very interesting. It can be important to know what the law says, but what most people want from the law is solutions to problems, like with medicine and carpebtry. is there > an act of interpreting the technical truth? who best carries > out that activity? Experts/ >is the expert like a computer? unknowing > of semantics but quick and effective at syntactic > manipulation of symbols? No. > >c) could we trust the expert at least at his symbol manipulation > and the trivial decisions involved within? how about those > non-computational steps that penrose would have us believe > are involved in thought? Do you really want to start on philosophy of mind here? Experts aren't Vulcans or mentats. They're just pople with specialized skill and knowledge. It's nothing wierd or mystical. They just studied hard and learned to do things most people haven't. > >(i am trying to evade the questions that follow regarding >reductionism and the use of a well-defined language such as math >for proofs which can then be reviewed say by peers). > Well, peer review is the norm eveb when proofs are impossible. jks _________________________________________________________________ Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: http://messenger.msn.com
