so is there anything in the NYT story that strikes you as inaccurate? On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 7:49 PM, Perelman, Michael <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Beer, Stafford. 1972. Brain of the Firm (NY: Wiley. 2nd ed. 1981). > 246: "I myself was proceeding with many affairs, when a letter arrived > from Chile. It is true that I had had vicarious dealings with Chile > before, since my (then) consulting firm SIGMA (Science in General > Management) had undertaken work for the steel industry and for the > railways there in the early sixties. But although I had been concerned > with that work, I had never been to Chile: teams of SIGMA people had > been there for several years, but as Managing Director I did not then > conceive that I had the time to go. So what now, dated 13th July 1911, > was this letter from Chile? Like most Englishmen, I was aware that Dr > Salvador Allende had become president of Chile the previous autumn > (1970)." > 247: "... the letter that I received come from there, under the > signature of the Technical General Manager, by name Fernando Flores. He > introduced himself also as the President of INTEC (lnstituto > Technologico de Chile), which bears organizational comparison with the > National Physical Laboratory in Britain -- although it is of course much > smaller. This letter spoke of 'the complete reorganization of the > public sector of the economy, for which it appeared its author would be > primarily responsible." 248: "The primary point of which I had to > convince my friends was that we should firmly take the wholly innovatory > step of seeking to regulate the social economy in real time. Even the > most advanced countries in the world suffer from a vast lag in the > receipt of economic data, and they suffer too from the bureaucratic time > it takes to process these data towards any kind of conclusion." > 248: "The country's electronic technology was antiquated: there was > no foreign exchange to buy a lot of computers, teleprocessing equipment, > video units, and so on, even though their scientists well knew how to > use them. How could we develop a system that would be twenty years > ahead of its time, using equipment that was already out of date? The > answer to that was that was that the rich world had never understood the > managerial cybernetics of electronic technology, and had therefore > absurdly misused it." > 252: The code-name Cybersyn "is an abbreviation of 'cybernetic > synergy'. If we were going to work in real time, we should need a > communications network extending down the three thousand miles of Chile. > This was nicknamed Cybernet. Cybernet was a system whereby every single > factory in the country, contained within the nationalized social > economy, could be in communication with a computer. Now ideally, this > computer would have been a small machine, local to the factory, and at > best within it, which would process whatever information turned out to > be vital for that factory's management. But such computers did not > exist in Chile, nor could the country afford to buy them. Therefore it > was necessary to use the computer power available in Santiago: it > consisted of an IBM 360/50 machine and a Burroughs 3500 machine." > 252: "Chile could not afford teleprocessing equipment either. And so > we resolved the problem by the only means available, namely the telex > network already instituted in the country, linked together by microwave > communication that had already been established for other purposes > (namely the tracking of satellites). These microwave linkages existed > from Arica in the far north of Chile down to Santiago, and beyond to > Puerto Montt. And there were in addition radio links that could > complete the network down to the world's most southerly city, Pun to > Arenas. The plan for Cybernet, therefore, called for the requisitioning > of telexes, and the use of the communications links to put everyone in > touch with everyone else -- and with the computer system in Santiago. > The plan allowed just four months for this to be accomplished." > 253: "Readers of this book by now understand the concept of the triple > index, which measures productivity, latency, and their product -- the > overall measure of performance. But the problem remained: to which > activities in factories ought these measures to be applied? > Accordingly, under the direction of Raul Espejo, the Senior Project > Manager in Chile, and Jorge Barrientos, another senior member of the > directing group, operational research teams were to make analyses of > every sector of the social economy, down to plant level. Their primary > job was to construct a quantitative flow chart of activities within each > factory that would highlight all important activities." > 253: "We needed to measure any process that might prove to be a > bottleneck in the system. And there were other standard measures too: > for example, it has always been my ambition to find a measure of social > unease. The best approximation to such a measure that I could envisage > at this time was the ratio of employees on the payroll to those present > on any given day. In short, absenteeism is some kind of measure of > morale." > 260-1: "President Allende wrote to me on 28th April, 1972, saying that > he considered it 'of prime importance to count on your presence in Chile > in a more permanent way and in a more executive role'. In May 1972 I > was confirmed as Scientific Director of the work of which Fernando > Flores was Political Director. It seems necessary to record this; for > had it not been so, the momentum of the work at large could not have > been sustained. There is a limit to what anyone can do in an advisory > capacity, unless he accepts responsibility too." > 261: "The Cyberstride Program Suite is to monitor information flow at > all levels of recursion; to provide alerting signals to any Incipient > change so that action could be taken to avert trouble before it arises." > > 284: "Algedonic Participation" was a technological module of the > system to allow people to give immediate feedback to the system. > 312: The Gremio Strike "The gremios were . for example, the owners of > small fleets of lorries, by which the country's transportation system > largely operated. They were also retailers, owners of local shops and > small distribution centres for daily requisites. The gremios were > insistent on the protectionist line; they saw themselves as threatened > by the potential nationalization of transportation and distribution > under the government of Popular Unity. Indeed, they had the power to > paralyse both these systems on a nationwide scale; and they had made > half-hearted efforts to do so before. Their problem was that they could > not sustain their 'strike' action for long -- because they ran out of > money." > 313: "Instability continued to grow; the President declared a State of > Emergency, and appointed a military governor in Santiago. From the rate > at which the crisis escalated, it was evident that this was a serious > attempt to pull the government down. Far from being a 'ridiculous' > gesture, it was a massive assault, and it was soon obvious that external > resources were being made available in its support. Fernando Flores was > appointed as Coordinator of Interior Government." > 313: "Within twenty-four hours messages were flowing, non-stop round > the clock, at the rate of two providing the requisite variety to handle > such an inundation. Two of the senior cyberneticians organized a > filtration system: some signals were algedonic [pertaining to > regulation in a nonnalytic mode], requiring instant decisions, while > others could be attenuated into elements of the pattern that established > the factual situation in real time." > 313: "The ,first cybernetic point is that the huge surge of > information into the loops sprang into being, and instant decisions were > available. This contrasted loops sprang into being, and instant > decisions were available. This contrasted with the turgid operation of > the bureaucratic system, the entropy of which was close to unity -- as > is so common. Secondly, the inefficiency of the existing distribution > system had lead to high physical redundancy -- again, as is normal in > unplanned economies (think of idle motor transport pools, railway > marshalling yards, demurrage); the ability of the cybernetic regulator > to survive the hostile action, derived from the effective use of the few > physical facilities remaining under the government's control." > > > Michael Perelman > Economics Department > California State University > michael at ecst.csuchico.edu > Chico, CA 95929 > 530-898-5321 > fax 530-898-5901 > www.michaelperelman.wordpress.com > > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l >
-- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
