I highly recommend Beer's book Platform for Change, which hopefully one can still find in the library. It's a very easy read, written for a more popular audience, I think, than the passages Michael cited above. It is a collection of presentations that he gave over 1972-3, and you can see how his ideas about cybernetics evolved through the interaction with the Chile project. That is, to put it very crudely, he started with a set of ideas and tools about how to make decision-making in an organization more efficient and effective by "driving decisions down" the hierarchy, giving people lower in the hierarchy the tools to make decisions and communicate, and found that in Chile people were calling that "democratic socialism." I think the spirit of Beer's vision in Chile (forgive my shorthand of saying "Beer" here when I really mean everyone involved in the project) had much more in common with the Albert/Hahnel vision than with that of market socialism or a centrally planned economy. I was delighted to see the NYT article, but it didn't do the subject justice if it gave the impression that the project was about making people at the center more efficient and effective. It was about making people at the bottom more efficient and effective, and dare one say less alienated from their species-being, by giving them better information and more authority.
On Sat, Mar 29, 2008 at 1:43 AM, Perelman, Michael <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Jim asked if there was anything wrong with the NYT story. I did not > have a problem with it. I just thought that Beer's book added a bit > more. > > > Michael Perelman > Economics Department > California State University > michael at ecst.csuchico.edu > Chico, CA 95929 > 530-898-5321 > fax 530-898-5901 > www.michaelperelman.wordpress.com > > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jim Devine > Sent: Friday, March 28, 2008 7:57 PM > To: Progressive Economics > Subject: Re: [Pen-l] cybernetic flash from Chile's past > > so is there anything in the NYT story that strikes you as inaccurate? > > On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 7:49 PM, Perelman, Michael > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Beer, Stafford. 1972. Brain of the Firm (NY: Wiley. 2nd ed. 1981). > > 246: "I myself was proceeding with many affairs, when a letter > arrived > > from Chile. It is true that I had had vicarious dealings with Chile > > before, since my (then) consulting firm SIGMA (Science in General > > Management) had undertaken work for the steel industry and for the > > railways there in the early sixties. But although I had been > concerned > > with that work, I had never been to Chile: teams of SIGMA people had > > been there for several years, but as Managing Director I did not then > > conceive that I had the time to go. So what now, dated 13th July > 1911, > > was this letter from Chile? Like most Englishmen, I was aware that > Dr > > Salvador Allende had become president of Chile the previous autumn > > (1970)." > > 247: "... the letter that I received come from there, under the > > signature of the Technical General Manager, by name Fernando Flores. > He > > introduced himself also as the President of INTEC (lnstituto > > Technologico de Chile), which bears organizational comparison with > the > > National Physical Laboratory in Britain -- although it is of course > much > > smaller. This letter spoke of 'the complete reorganization of the > > public sector of the economy, for which it appeared its author would > be > > primarily responsible." 248: "The primary point of which I had to > > convince my friends was that we should firmly take the wholly > innovatory > > step of seeking to regulate the social economy in real time. Even > the > > most advanced countries in the world suffer from a vast lag in the > > receipt of economic data, and they suffer too from the bureaucratic > time > > it takes to process these data towards any kind of conclusion." > > 248: "The country's electronic technology was antiquated: there was > > no foreign exchange to buy a lot of computers, teleprocessing > equipment, > > video units, and so on, even though their scientists well knew how to > > use them. How could we develop a system that would be twenty years > > ahead of its time, using equipment that was already out of date? The > > answer to that was that was that the rich world had never understood > the > > managerial cybernetics of electronic technology, and had therefore > > absurdly misused it." > > 252: The code-name Cybersyn "is an abbreviation of 'cybernetic > > synergy'. If we were going to work in real time, we should need a > > communications network extending down the three thousand miles of > Chile. > > This was nicknamed Cybernet. Cybernet was a system whereby every > single > > factory in the country, contained within the nationalized social > > economy, could be in communication with a computer. Now ideally, > this > > computer would have been a small machine, local to the factory, and > at > > best within it, which would process whatever information turned out > to > > be vital for that factory's management. But such computers did not > > exist in Chile, nor could the country afford to buy them. Therefore > it > > was necessary to use the computer power available in Santiago: it > > consisted of an IBM 360/50 machine and a Burroughs 3500 machine." > > 252: "Chile could not afford teleprocessing equipment either. And > so > > we resolved the problem by the only means available, namely the telex > > network already instituted in the country, linked together by > microwave > > communication that had already been established for other purposes > > (namely the tracking of satellites). These microwave linkages > existed > > from Arica in the far north of Chile down to Santiago, and beyond to > > Puerto Montt. And there were in addition radio links that could > > complete the network down to the world's most southerly city, Pun to > > Arenas. The plan for Cybernet, therefore, called for the > requisitioning > > of telexes, and the use of the communications links to put everyone > in > > touch with everyone else -- and with the computer system in Santiago. > > The plan allowed just four months for this to be accomplished." > > 253: "Readers of this book by now understand the concept of the > triple > > index, which measures productivity, latency, and their product -- the > > overall measure of performance. But the problem remained: to which > > activities in factories ought these measures to be applied? > > Accordingly, under the direction of Raul Espejo, the Senior Project > > Manager in Chile, and Jorge Barrientos, another senior member of the > > directing group, operational research teams were to make analyses of > > every sector of the social economy, down to plant level. Their > primary > > job was to construct a quantitative flow chart of activities within > each > > factory that would highlight all important activities." > > 253: "We needed to measure any process that might prove to be a > > bottleneck in the system. And there were other standard measures > too: > > for example, it has always been my ambition to find a measure of > social > > unease. The best approximation to such a measure that I could > envisage > > at this time was the ratio of employees on the payroll to those > present > > on any given day. In short, absenteeism is some kind of measure of > > morale." > > 260-1: "President Allende wrote to me on 28th April, 1972, saying > that > > he considered it 'of prime importance to count on your presence in > Chile > > in a more permanent way and in a more executive role'. In May 1972 I > > was confirmed as Scientific Director of the work of which Fernando > > Flores was Political Director. It seems necessary to record this; > for > > had it not been so, the momentum of the work at large could not have > > been sustained. There is a limit to what anyone can do in an > advisory > > capacity, unless he accepts responsibility too." > > 261: "The Cyberstride Program Suite is to monitor information flow > at > > all levels of recursion; to provide alerting signals to any Incipient > > change so that action could be taken to avert trouble before it > arises." > > > > 284: "Algedonic Participation" was a technological module of the > > system to allow people to give immediate feedback to the system. > > 312: The Gremio Strike "The gremios were . for example, the owners > of > > small fleets of lorries, by which the country's transportation system > > largely operated. They were also retailers, owners of local shops > and > > small distribution centres for daily requisites. The gremios were > > insistent on the protectionist line; they saw themselves as > threatened > > by the potential nationalization of transportation and distribution > > under the government of Popular Unity. Indeed, they had the power to > > paralyse both these systems on a nationwide scale; and they had made > > half-hearted efforts to do so before. Their problem was that they > could > > not sustain their 'strike' action for long -- because they ran out of > > money." > > 313: "Instability continued to grow; the President declared a State > of > > Emergency, and appointed a military governor in Santiago. From the > rate > > at which the crisis escalated, it was evident that this was a serious > > attempt to pull the government down. Far from being a 'ridiculous' > > gesture, it was a massive assault, and it was soon obvious that > external > > resources were being made available in its support. Fernando Flores > was > > appointed as Coordinator of Interior Government." > > 313: "Within twenty-four hours messages were flowing, non-stop round > > the clock, at the rate of two providing the requisite variety to > handle > > such an inundation. Two of the senior cyberneticians organized a > > filtration system: some signals were algedonic [pertaining to > > regulation in a nonnalytic mode], requiring instant decisions, while > > others could be attenuated into elements of the pattern that > established > > the factual situation in real time." > > 313: "The ,first cybernetic point is that the huge surge of > > information into the loops sprang into being, and instant decisions > were > > available. This contrasted loops sprang into being, and instant > > decisions were available. This contrasted with the turgid operation > of > > the bureaucratic system, the entropy of which was close to unity -- > as > > is so common. Secondly, the inefficiency of the existing > distribution > > system had lead to high physical redundancy -- again, as is normal in > > unplanned economies (think of idle motor transport pools, railway > > marshalling yards, demurrage); the ability of the cybernetic > regulator > > to survive the hostile action, derived from the effective use of the > few > > physical facilities remaining under the government's control." > > > > > > Michael Perelman > > Economics Department > > California State University > > michael at ecst.csuchico.edu > > Chico, CA 95929 > > 530-898-5321 > > fax 530-898-5901 > > www.michaelperelman.wordpress.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > > pen-l mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > > > > > > -- > Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own > way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante. > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l >
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