You have to follow them home to see what they eat.

On May 7, 2013, at 12:27 PM, Tom Walker wrote:

> You mean, are libertarians libertines? Or do they only eat libertines?
> 
> On Tue, May 7, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Eugene Coyle <[email protected]> wrote:
> So does this mean your view is that that Libertarians are into Bondage and S 
> & M?
> 
> Gene
> 
> 
> On May 7, 2013, at 11:25 AM, David Shemano wrote:
> 
> > I am far removed from academia, but isn't LGBT studies an accepted part of 
> > the leftish canon?  And isn't it inherent to the relevance of such studies 
> > that the fact that one is LGBT is in turn relevant to what one writes or 
> > thinks regarding literature, politics, etc.?  So if so, would it not be 
> > consistent with LGBT studies to try and connect Keynes' economic thinking 
> > to his  homosexuality?
> >
> > David Shemano
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [email protected] 
> > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Jim Devine
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 10:55 AM
> > To: Pen-l
> > Subject: [Pen-l] the Ferguson files
> >
> > from SLATE:
> > Niall Ferguson in 1995: Keynes' Homosexuality Caused His Views on the 
> > Treaty of Versailles
> >
> > By Matthew Yglesias
> >
> > Posted Tuesday, May 7, 2013, at 10:44 AM
> >
> > Niall Ferguson has already apologized for saying over the weekend that John 
> > Maynard Keynes' homosexuality was at the root of his views on fiscal 
> > policy, but Brad DeLong has recovered a remarkable 1995 Spectator article 
> > in which Ferguson alleges that Keynes' views on the Treaty of Versailles 
> > were also caused by his homosexuality. In this case, Ferguson's view is 
> > less that Keynes had a distinctive gay outlook on the issue, and more that 
> > a gay crush on a German representative to the conference led him to adopt 
> > pro-German and pro-inflation opinions.
> >
> > The article's conclusion:
> >
> >>> From 1919 onwards, for reasons which owed as much to emotion as economic 
> >>> logic, he had repeatedly encouraged the Germans in their resistance to 
> >>> Allied demands. He had heard and echoed their arguments at Versailles, 
> >>> predicting currency depreciation, the dumping of German exports and the 
> >>> westward march of Bolshevism as consequences of the treaty. He had shared 
> >>> their dismay at the reparations total set in 1921, and predicted German 
> >>> default from the outset. Even when he began to suspect that his friends 
> >>> were exaggerating their fiscal difficulties, this only inclined him to 
> >>> egg them on to a more confrontational strategy. Only when this ended in 
> >>> the complete collapse of the currency did Keynes distance himself.
> >
> >>> All this sheds revealing light on Keynes's later views on inflation.
> >>> Those who see Keynesianism as, at root, an inflationary doctrine will
> >>> not perhaps be surprised; just as those familiar with Bloomsbury will
> >>> appreciate why Keynes fell so hard for the representative of an enemy
> >>> power. Only those-like Robert Skidelsky-who seek to rescue his
> >>> reputation as a monetary theorist may find Keynes's conduct less easy
> >>> to account for. <<
> >
> > I have not read The Economic Consequences of the Peace, but am somewhat 
> > familiar with the general debates at the time. My view of the situation is 
> > that the whole question of an "enemy power" is actually the crux of the 
> > dispute here. Keynes, in keeping with general liberal sentiments at the 
> > time and vindicated by history, took the view that it was foolish for 
> > France and Britain to try to treat Germany as an enemy-to-be-crushed rather 
> > than a partner-to-be-rehabilitated. The only possible consequence of 
> > crushing the German economy would be to compel the Germans to overthrow the 
> > treaty and thus start a new war.
> > This is roughly what eventually happened, and obviously in the late-1940s 
> > the Western allies took a different approach, which paid off. I don't know 
> > if any key Truman administration advisors were seduced by sexy German 
> > conference representatives. Perhaps someday we'll learn that was the real 
> > story of the Marshall Plan, in which case I think we'd have to be thankful 
> > for the emergence of a sentiment that could transcend petty nationalism.
> >
> > --
> > Jim Devine /  "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way 
> > and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
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> 
> -- 
> Cheers,
> 
> Tom Walker (Sandwichman) _______________________________________________
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