nope; standard Ricardian argument from comparative advantage. Israel finds it cheap to produce Arab hostages but cannot produce Israeli hostages at all. Hizbollah can't produce Arab hostages and can only produce Israeli hostages at very high cost. Therefore, the terms of trade suggest an exchange rate under which Israeli hostages are very expensive (because they are produced by the scarce factor of production ie terrorists) but Arab hostages are very cheap (because they are produced by the IDF which is not a scarce factor of production).
The frightening thing is that I could easily produce a version of this argument with graphs and charts to illustrate my point. The terrifying thing is that a political sociology journal would probably publish it. best dd -----Original Message----- If the imbalance of military power favors the Israelis, why do the Israelis have to give up so many more prisoners than what they receive in exchange? Should it not be the opposite if military power determines the terms of the trade? David Shemano
