Charles Januzzi wrote:
The Sunni Resistance of the sort
that fought it out with the US over Anbar and continue to do so has
shown itself quite resilient and coherent--for a Resistance. And it
has no superpower sponsorship, unlike the NLF in Vietnam...
Reslient, yes - but I'm not sure what you mean by "coherent" and why you
objected to my saying the Sunni resistance is more limited than that which
arose in Vietnam. Is there an organization in Iraq comparable to the NLF
representing the whole of the Sunni resistance and what is its program?
It would be even better if there were a united resistance not only of
Sunnis, but one also representative of the Shia and Kurdish communities,
with a well developed program combining the demands of the popular classes,
and the national, religious and other social constituencies. The NLF was
such an organization, and If there were a broader, united, and more
ideologically coherent resistance movement of this sort in Iraq, then I
wouldn't be making the distinction.
==============================================
It is simplistic to use the categories 'Shia', 'Sunni' and 'Kurd', as
I have pointed out to you numerous times before Marvin. First, a
bigger divide is religious vs. secular. For example, the Baathist
Party ran Iraq because relatively secular (but nationalist) elements
from all the three groups you list formed its mass core. The 'Sunni'
were as excluded from leadership as much as Shia or Kurd because of
the domination of Saddam Hussein's al Tikriti.
Sorry, I don't recall my posting on this subject or you rebuking me about
this before - but maybe. In any event, if these identities were ignored or
suppressed or superceded by nation or class or other categories under the
Baathists - and you may be exaggerating the extent to which this was so -
it's pretty clear that Iraqis now identify themselves (or are forced to
identify themselves as such by others) as Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds and that
they are politically organized along these lines. That's unfortunate, and I
also wish they identified themselves along class lines, as many did when the
Iraqi CP was an important force - you could say the same about most
conflicts since the demise of the socialist movement - but that's one of the
things the occupation has wrought.
==============================
[MG]...If the Sadrists, in particular, had chosen to move
towards
unity with the Sunni militias after the battle of Najaf rather than
becoming
part of the Shia-dominated client government established by the
occupation
authority, it's doubtful the US would still have forces in the country,
much
less be contemplating whether to reinforce them.
[CJ]The Sadrists might say they had no other choice. Militarily they were
unable to come to the aid of the Fallujahans, and they were not yet
ready to take on their Shia opponents while at the same time fight US
and UK troops on multiple battefronts...
That's true. My reference wasn't to joint military action, for the reasons
you point out and because political unity would have to be a prerequisite.
Sadr spoke of the need and made moves in the direction of unity with the
Sunni resistance after Najaf, but has done so less as the divisions have
deepened between the two communities. Maybe his overtures were rebuffed by
the Sunnis. The politics are sectarian on both sides.
Now they have true Resistance credentials, and they seem to be giving
indications that they are ready to deal with the rival Shia elements...
Maybe, we'll see. You, Yoshie, Carrol and others are more confident in your
ability to determine the causes and predict the outcomes of conflicts than I
am.
