At 5:48 PM -0500 3/23/04, Joe Schaefer wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Sugalski) writes:

[...]

 #s 3&4 deal with security. This... this is a dodgier issue. Security's
 easy to get wrong and hard to get right. (Though quotas are
 straightforward enough. Mostly) And once the framework's in place,
 there's the issue of performance--how do we get good performance in
 the common (insecure) case without sacrificing security in the secure case?

You might wish to consider a modular design here, similar to linux 2.6's security modules (LSM)

http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/papers/module/x47.html

IMO, the advantage would be that parrot apps will have a better idea
of what security model is appropriate.

Well... maybe.


Parrot apps don't get a whole lot of say here--this is more on the order of OS level security. Not that it makes a huge difference, of course.

I'm not familiar with the new linux system, and I'm not *going* to get familiar enough with it to make any sensible decisions, so I think I'd prefer to stick with a system I'm comfortable with and that I know's got a solid background. (So at least any problems are a matter of implementation rather than design -- those, at least, are fixable)
--
Dan


--------------------------------------"it's like this"-------------------
Dan Sugalski                          even samurai
[EMAIL PROTECTED]                         have teddy bears and even
                                      teddy bears get drunk

Reply via email to