* Nicholas Weaver wrote: >We need universal protection against active adversaries, because the >precedents have been set and the distinction between passive and active >really is the willingness of the adversary to include active techniques. >We need end-to-end data integrity on all communication and if you have >end-to-end integrity, anything point-to-point rather than broadcast >should also include confidentiality since you can just about get it for >free by this point.
Adversaries do not necessarily have the resources to do anything they are willing to do. Active attacks might require more expensive hardware which they might not have the capital for, or they may increase latency so that people get angry about them slowing down the Internet too much. Authenticity and integrity are also sometimes at odds with other desirable features like anonymity, deniability, and maintainability. In some cases systems are not purely end-to-end, e-mail for instance also has public discussion lists and newsletters with millions of subscribers to consider. -- Björn Höhrmann · mailto:bjo...@hoehrmann.de · http://bjoern.hoehrmann.de Am Badedeich 7 · Telefon: +49(0)160/4415681 · http://www.bjoernsworld.de 25899 Dagebüll · PGP Pub. KeyID: 0xA4357E78 · http://www.websitedev.de/ _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list perpass@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
