> On 16 Feb 2024, at 13:57, Peter Eisentraut <pe...@eisentraut.org> wrote: > > On 16.02.24 10:16, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: >>> 2. The crypt() and gen_salt() methods built on top of them (modes of >>> operation, kind of) are not FIPS-compliant. >> I wonder if it's worth trying to make pgcrypto disallow non-FIPS compliant >> ciphers when the compiled against OpenSSL is running with FIPS mode enabled, >> or >> raise a WARNING when used? It seems rather unlikely that someone running >> OpenSSL with FIPS=yes want to use our DES cipher without there being an error >> or misconfiguration somewhere. > > I wonder on what level this kind of check would be done. For example, the > password hashing done for SCRAM is not FIPS-compliant either, but surely we > don't want to disallow that.
Can you elaborate? When building with OpenSSL all SCRAM hashing will use the OpenSSL implementation of pg_hmac and pg_cryptohash, so it would be subject to OpenSSL FIPS configuration no? > Maybe this should be done on the level of block ciphers. So if someone > wanted to add a "crypt-aes" module, that would then continue to work. That's a fair point, we can check individual ciphers. I'll hack up a version doing this. -- Daniel Gustafsson
