http://20committee.com/2014/08/24/war-and-the-islamic-state/



War and the (Islamic) State



John R. Schindler



The barbaric murder this week of the American journalist James Foley by a
British jihadist has served as a tragic reminder of the gravity of the
global threat posed by the Salafi jihad movement. For the first time in
years, the Western public, seeing the horrific images of Foley’s
butchering, has been confronted with the reality of our enemy. Those who
thought the death of Osama bin Laden three years ago signaled the beginning
of the end of his vile cause, a view championed by the Obama
administration, were naively mistaken. Bin Laden’s demise was, as Churchill
said of British victory at El Alamein, “the end of the beginning” of the
struggle against the Salafi jihad movement.



And a movement it is, rather than an organization; those who apply Western,
military-style organizational charts to it, in the manner beloved by
intelligence analysts everywhere, are and have always been wrong. It shares
an ideology but operates differently depending where it goes: there is
tactical flexibility nested in severe ideological rigidity. Al-Qa’ida (AQ)
never had a monopoly on the global jihad movement, and its slow,
predictable decline under the uninspired leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri
has opened the door to the even more extreme jihadists of the
self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). While AQ is far from dead — its
Yemen-based franchise in particular, AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
remains very dangerous — it’s evident that the center of gravity in the
global jihad movement has shifted to the fanatics of the Islamic State and
their self-proclaimed Caliphate.



The struggle between AQ and the group now calling itself IS goes back a
decade in Iraq, beginning with Sunni resistance to the U.S. invasion in
2003, and, given the gradual decline of bin Laden’s faction, it was perhaps
inevitable that the even more murderous IS would win out. Its message of
uncompromising holy war against all enemies, from “infidels” outside the
Muslim world to the many “apostates” within it, appeals to the basest human
instincts and is intoxicating to angry young men who pine for murder,
martyrdom, and glory. IS embraces the extreme Salafi vision — they are
takfiris to use the proper term — of jihad for jihad’s sake, a fanatical
fantasy of “pure” Islam that invariably kills more Muslims than “infidels.”
The takfiri tendency lies in the DNA of the Salafi jihad movement, and has
burst forth murderously on many occasions, most horrifically in Algeria in
the 1990s, where the local AQ affiliate, the Armed islamic Group (GIA), was
expelled from the “official” movement for its indiscriminate killing, just
as IS was recently. The only difference now is that the world has noticed,
with horror, the mass killings of innocents perpetrated by IS murderers in
Iraq. True “shock and awe” in Iraq has been delivered by masked fanatics
rallied around a black flag, not the U.S. military.



I’ve watched the global jihad movement closely for years, both as a
security practitioner and a scholar, and I’ve analyzed its metastasis as
it’s moved from region to region. I’ve written books about its strategy and
operations as well as its growth in the 1990s into a worldwide phenomenon.
Since 9/11, I’ve witnessed two American presidents wage war against the
global jihad movement in a rather similar manner, contrary to much public
fuss about the differences between Bush and Obama-style counterterrorism,
and from the outset I’ve maintained that the U.S. approach is deeply flawed
and doomed to fail. My sharper critiques of American counterterrorism
strategy have been largely confined to secret and off-record discussions
inside the government, within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Intelligence Community (IC), as well as with key Allies. As I am now
leaving government employ, I am free to speak my mind. This is a start.



Let me state unambiguously that this is a war that the West must win. Our
Salafi jihadist enemy is a threat to virtually every country on earth,
including Western ones. Their vision is fanatical and uncompromising. They
are a foe who must be killed off through attrition. There is no room for
negotiation or dialogue. We must face the reality that our struggle against
these fanatics will last decades, not years; everybody currently waging
this war will retire before the job is done.



Winning the war will require the full effort of Western governments,
working with each other and partners across the Muslim world. This is a
two-front war, against Salafi jihadists who struggle against the Muslim
world, and also against the fanatics in our midst who reside inside the
West itself. For years, we’ve heard facile statements that America embraces
a (bad) military-focused approach to counterterrorism while Europeans stick
to a (good) law enforcement model. This view was arguably true a decade ago
but is wholly false today, with all Western governments now employing
police, militaries, and above all intelligence to combat the Salafi jihad
wherever it finds sanctuary.



First, the external front. Here there is some good news. In the first
place, the very fanaticism of IS and its make-believe Caliphate will
ultimately undo it. Without exception, Salafi jihadists who embrace takfiri
methods sooner or later wind up alienating the great majority of Muslims
around them. While Iraqi Sunnis have allowed IS to play a vanguard role in
their broad-based uprising against the Shia-run regime in Baghdad which
they hate, eventually mainstream Sunnis will sour on IS butchery visited on
co-religionists. Yet this should not overly comfort us, as it will be
years, not months, before most Iraqi Sunnis realize they fear IS fanatics
more than Shia.



Yet the war against IS in Iraq will be aided by the fact that we have many
allies and partners in the struggle who are eager to put the “boots on the
ground” that we do not wish to. Kurdish militias are fighting for their
lives and Shia militias may be able to show the stamina in battle that the
U.S-raised and trained Iraqi military so humiliatingly failed to against
IS. We are already assisting Kurds, and more help is needed, with the
proviso that DoD should supply weapons, logistics, and some intelligence —
and no more: let locals fight in the manner they know how to. The collapse
of the Iraqi military in the face of lightly armed fanatics, with whole
divisions fleeing before an IS battalion, illustrates that the U.S.
military, having wasted years and billions of dollars on Baghdad’s security
forces, is thoroughly incompetent at building Middle Eastern militaries. We
need to stop pretending otherwise and let the Iraqis, who are quite
competent at killing, get on with fighting the fanatics.



Here U.S. and Allied airpower will be decisive, as long as it is applied
properly. For years, I dined out on my oft-stated belief that if the Salafi
jihadists wanted to destroy their cause, all they had to do was 1. embrace
takfirism as a strategy, and 2. set up physical sanctuary somewhere, the
Caliphate they pine for. Which is exactly what the Islamic State has done.
I believed this because takfiri views are rejected by the vast majority of
Muslims, who find them repugnant and barbaric, moreover setting up shop in
any place for very long would be an open invitation to be crushed
mercilessly by American airpower. I had assumed, naively, that no U.S.
president would hesitate to dispatch AC-130 gunships to annihilate any
jihadists foolish enough to control large swaths of territory.



Let me be clear: Attriting IS out of existence in Iraq — and Syria too —
where they have erased the Allied-drawn state boundaries of the post-World
War One settlement, will not be quick but it can be done through proper
application of Western airpower tied to proxy forces on the ground. Indeed,
this is the sort of fight the U.S. military today is ideally suited for.
Since 9/11, the DoD and IC have honed their terrorist-killing acumen, with
secret warriors of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), guided by
time-sensitive intelligence, becoming the bane of jihadists in many
countries. They have no equal at what they do in secret. The JSOC-IC
combination will be critical to destroying IS, one deadly raid at a time.



Just as important will be airpower, delivered through both manned and
unmanned platforms. As yet, IS has only rudimentary air defenses, and U.S.
and Allied air forces can deliver hammer blows to their battalions without
serious losses on our side. Contrary to what activists tell you, the U.S.
military goes to great lengths to avoid civilian deaths, what we
euphemistically term “collateral damage,”  in its use of airpower. We must
understand that IS will use civilians as shields, as HAMAS has done in
Gaza. This must not deter us. IS leaders (high-value targets or “HVTs” in
the trade) must be killed wherever they are, regardless of whose house they
are hiding in. After enough airstrikes, Sunnis will seek to expel IS from
their midst for fear of our lethal reach.



The virulent extremism of the Islamic State — they represent to the Salafi
cause roughly what the Khmer Rouge did to Marxism-Leninism — means that
nearly everybody will want to partner with the West to some degree in
fighting it. Once they see the seriousness of our intent, certain Gulf
states whose support for IS has been important to their growth will quickly
reconsider their position. Even Russia could be a valuable partner in the
fight against IS, while Putin’s friends in Damascus are very eager to
eliminate this existential threat to the Assad regime. Iran must be handled
carefully, as Tehran will be an enemy of the West as long as it is ruled by
the mullahs, but they are deadly serious about destroying the Islamic State
in both Iraq and Syria. To wax Churchillian again, the British prime
minister famously said that if Hitler invaded Hell he would make at least a
favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons, and that nicely
sums up Iran’s place in the loose anti-IS coalition too.

I have been a frequent critic of post-9/11 American beliefs that there is a
military solution to every problem, a viewpoint that has caused much
heartache for the United States and many foreigners in recent years. In the
long run, the wave of Salafi radicalism that has shaken the Muslim world in
recent decades will burn itself out. Islam has seen similar waves before.
But we would be naive to expect it to recede anytime soon, and the wave may
not have crested yet. Moreover, political problems across the Middle East
that have assisted the rise of extremism, for instance the sectarian
stupidity of the Baghdad government that emerged under U.S. tutelage,
leading to a Sunni rebellion with IS at its head, are largely beyond the
West’s control to repair or even ameliorate. A Bosnian-style partition of
Iraq into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish entities, devolving power on
ethno-sectarian lines while maintaining a notional Iraqi state, looks like
an even better idea now than when Vice President (then Senator) Joe Biden
proposed it in 2006 (whatever my criticisms of Bosnian dysfunction, that
country looks like Switzerland compared to Iraq now), but we ought not
believe that politico-economic reform in the Muslim world, however welcome
and necessary it may be, offers any short term solutions to the problem of
Salafi jihadism. Right now the sole remedy to the challenge presented by
the Islamic State is crushing it with brutal force.



The issue, then, is intent. We have it in our power to destroy IS in Iraq
and Syria, and although that attrition-based strategy will not achieve
success quickly, ultimate victory over at least this part of the Salafi
jihad movement is assured as long as we pursue the struggle with patience
and vigor. Will, not way, is our problem. President Obama’s take on the
jihadist enemy has never inspired confidence in the counterterrorism
community, and his reaction to the rise of the Islamic State does not
reflect the seriousness of the threat we now face. While none can fault
Obama for a lack of ardor for certain aspects of the war that he refuses to
call a war, as the death of Osama bin Laden and hundreds of lethal drone
strikes during his presidency attest, his unwillingness to confront the
ideological aspects of the struggle has been troubling to many who wage
that war. Obvious White House squeamishness about the “I-word,” coupled
with idiocies like terming the massacre of thirteen U.S. soldiers by Nidal
Hasan, Army psychiatrist turned self-styled jihadist, an incident of
“workplace violence,” bespeak a fundamental lack of seriousness about the
struggle we are in. While we must always be careful about delineating Islam
from Islamism, and I have been sharply critical of those who do not,
pretending that Salafi jihadism is not what it actually is only helps the
enemy.



President Obama’s penchant for golf, particularly at inopportune moments,
has received much criticism of late, with even what might be termed the
court press reporting frankly on its negative impact on public perception,
including scathing op-eds. It is difficult to escape the suspicion that the
president is tired of the hard job of being Commander-in-Chief. Certainly
his public comments on the Islamic State lack the dire tone emanating from
some senior administration officials. This week, Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel spoke of IS in alarming terms as a threat “beyond anything that we’ve
seen…They’re beyond just a terrorist group.” General Martin Dempsey, DoD’s
military head, stated that IS possesses an “apocalyptic, end-of-days
strategic vision” and the group “will eventually have to be defeated.” It’s
an open secret in the Pentagon that such blunt statements reflect
widespread concerns in DoD and the IC that President Obama is not taking
the current threat seriously enough. At a minimum, the president must
inject his national security staff, which I’ve never found talented or
inspired, with purpose and seriousness, while antics such as disclosing
failed top secret counterterrorism operations to score political points are
unworthy of the presidency and must cease at once.



It is hoped that, confronted by the rising madness and violence of IS in
Iraq and Syria, Obama will find the ability to pursue the war against
Salafi jihadism with the required vigor, as well as to communicate to the
public the nature of the threat we face, including the reality that the
struggle will be long and difficult. The Islamic State can be crushed in
what remains of Obama’s second term, while defeating Salafi jihadism itself
is a generational enterprise, but refusing to use the time between now and
January 2017 to fight IS with all the means at our disposal will not only
give the enemy time to grow and metastasize further, it would amount to
presidential dereliction of duty. If President Obama does not possess the
will to wage this war that has been forced upon us, he should consider
devoting himself to golf full time and stepping aside in favor of Joe
Biden, who has demonstrated some quite sensible views on terrorism over the
years.



That said, the war against IS inside the Muslim world is only part of the
struggle we now face, and in many ways it’s the easy part. That James
Foley’s killer is British (his identity has been established by British
intelligence but not yet released to the public) has focused attention on
the painful fact that a considerable number of IS fighters in Iraq and
Syria are from the West. British citizens are estimated to represent a
quarter of the roughly 2,000 Europeans fighting with IS at present. Numbers
of Westerners in IS ranks are difficult to estimate and the true figure is
likely 3,000 or more. Additionally, since many jihadists go to Syria or
Iraq for a few months and return home, leading to a high turnover rate, the
number of Westerners who have fought with IS in the Middle East exceeds
5,000 and is rising fast.



Going to Syria or Iraq to join IS is very much in vogue among radical
Salafis across the West. Getting there is easy, especially for Europeans:
Turkey’s looking the other way about the movement of thousands of foreign
fighters through the country en route to the jihad is a key factor here.
The fanatical IS message resonates among an alarming number of European
youths: in a recent poll, sixteen percent of French had a “favorable” view
of IS while three percent admitted to having a “very favorable” view of the
Islamic State. Warnings from dissenting experts that extremism among
European Muslims is considerably more commonplace than it’s politic to
admit fell on deaf ears on grounds of political correctness, but have been
proved wholly correct. It’s fashionable among hardline European Salafis to
go to Syria or Iraq to fight, though in reality most of them spend far more
time hanging out than actually engaging in combat. Many of their rest
centers, safely away from the front, are surprisingly lavish, leading to
the Syrian war being memorably termed a “five-star jihad” in extremist
circles.



Historically, only five to ten percent of foreign fighters engage directly
in terrorism when they return home, but that figure is cold comfort given
the unprecedently vast numbers of Westerners who are going to Iraq and
Syria. Some returnees have already engaged in terrorism in Europe, while it
is obvious that even effective European security services are overwhelmed
by the numbers of jihadists coming back. French intelligence is monitoring
some 300 persons, one-third of them women, with links to the Syrian jihad;
as they require 24/7 surveillance, this is a daunting task for even the
best resourced and most technically capable security services. Some
European intelligence agencies, seeing “huge growth” in jihadist numbers,
admit to being deluged by potential terrorists. Britain’s security services
are likewise overwhelmed by the numbers of jihadist targets they must
monitor, a situation that was hardly helped by the massive leaks by Edward
Snowden, which the head of MI5, Britain’s domestic intelligence agency,
scathingly called a “gift” to terrorists.



Moreover, for every returning jihadist who plots terrorism, ten or twenty
more veterans engage in furthering the cause through proselytizing,
preaching, fund-raising, and generally radicalizing and preparing the next
generation of angry youths for jihad. Those who have actually gone to Syria
or Iraq, where they have learned to butcher innocents, have enormous cachet
among the wannabes back in Europe, who find their message of vitriolic hate
toxically enticing. I have been warning for a decade that the West,
particularly Europe, functions as a de facto safe haven for many Salafi
jihadists who make up what I call the Sixth Column. We have seemingly
forgotten that the 9/11 plot was hashed out more in Hamburg, Germany than
in any Muslim country. It is long past time for the West to deal with this
threat seriously.



There is no single profile for who abandons life in the postmodern West to
join the Salafi jihad, particularly its most virulent brand. Some are
rabidly pious Muslims, but many lack a firm foundation in matters Islamic,
and a surprisingly large number of Western jihadists seem to have scant
interest in anything theological: many join for the hate and the
camaraderie, a need to belong, not the belief. They are consumed by rage
and frustration and seek out a belief system that justifies acting out
their evil urges — not the other way around. Many are ne’er-do-wells who
have spent time in prison and possess unstable family backgrounds, but the
son of privilege who abandons a life of comfort to wage jihad abroad is a
Salafi cliche for a reason. Many are born Muslims who revert to a faith
they never seriously practiced in their youth, while others are converts.
Most are young, with many still in their teens, but the nearly middle-aged
are not unknown in jihadist ranks either. Their psychology in many cases
resembles that of a spree killer more than any popular conception of an
arch-terrorist, while their ideology — a cut-and-paste version of Qutbism,
dumbed-down for the online generation, that thrives on hate — is
astonishingly consistent worldwide. Women often play an important role
behind the scenes in radicalizing their men and keeping them that way.



One trend that is clearly visible among Western jihadists is the prominence
of online recruiting and propaganda. Most young Salafis today enter the
movement virtually, becoming markedly radical before ever meeting another
extremist in the flesh. The time required to become dangerously extreme has
shortened noticeably, no doubt due to the prevalence of online jihadism,
the digihad, if you like. Back in the 1990s, most Westerners who “joined
the caravan” (to use the movement term) were radicalized gradually, over
months and even years, slowly turning their backs on their old life, while
it is now commonplace to see young men who decide to abandon normalcy in
favor of the jihad after only a few months of radicalization, and sometimes
only a few weeks. All this makes it increasingly difficult for Western
security services to track would-be terrorists, or to differentiate the
merely extreme from the positively dangerous.



While the United States has been fortunate in many ways compared to Europe,
possessing a Muslim community that is proportionately smaller and far less
radicalized than in much of the European Union (EU), there is no reason to
think that this will last forever. Americans are fighting with IS abroad
too and some will return home with jihad still on their minds. The FBI,
with the Intelligence Community, has done a commendable job since 9/11
keeping the domestic terrorism threat largely under wraps, aided by the
fact that most of America’s homegrown jihadists to date have been frankly
inept, some of them almost comically so. That, too, is a trend that is
unlikely to continue indefinitely.



America has no room for comfort as it confronts the Salafi jihadist threat.
The enemy’s desire to strike the United States directly remains as great as
it ever was, while the fact that we functionally do not have border
security means that any terrorists who seek to enter the country illegally
will have no more difficulty than the millions of Latin Americans who have
infiltrated without detection. Moreover, the large numbers of extremists
possessing EU passports (and Canadian too: about 130 Canadians are
currently fighting in Syria and Iraq), who are able to enter the USA
without a visa, mean that attacks on the country can be handled by
foreigners easily.



What, then, is to be done? Legal changes are in order if we are serious
about defeating this enemy. Some European countries have recently
criminalized going abroad as a foreign fighter, or facilitating that, and
this is something that all Western countries should adopt promptly. While
this will not cease jihad tourism, it will certainly complicate matters for
would-be holy warriors. Westerners who do engage in jihad abroad should be
deprived of citizenship and told to not come home, ever. While free speech
is to be defended, it should at least be asked if engaging in jihadist
propaganda ought to be criminalized (as, say, Holocaust denial has been in
much of the EU). At a minimum, those who engage in material support of any
Salafi jihad-related activity should face severe legal penalty.



In the United States, this also means we must end our security-theater act
and get serious about stopping terrorism. The terrorist threat to our
airlines is as great as it has ever been, as Attorney General Eric Holder
recently admitted, citing his “extreme, extreme concern” about the threat
emanating from Syria. The TSA is equal parts laughingstock and nuisance and
needs to be wholly revamped into a serious security agency, relying on
profiling rather than making life difficult for countless innocent people
every day. “America doesn’t have an airline security system, America has a
system for bothering people,” said the former head of security for El Al,
Israel’s national airline, and seldom have truer words been spoken.



Yet the long-term way to defeat, rather than merely deter, Salafi jihadism,
is through intelligence and covert action, not war in any conventional
sense. While pummeling IS kinetically in Iraq and Syria is a necessary
first step, it is only the beginning. The military defeat of the Islamic
State by Western airpower and commandos, aided by local proxies, will set
the stage for the strategic defeat of their movement. What must follow is a
version of what I term Special War, tailored for counterterrorism,
combining offensive counterintelligence, denial and deception, and
long-term manipulation of the jihadists leading to their collapse and
self-immolation.



That strategy is the topic of a forthcoming blog post ….












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