Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States involvement. --- yeah yeah ... and Britain was also involved ... that doesn't exonerate US actions.
Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial post, but it's "*Typical*": --- it was a good example of US involvement with Iran politics ... but since you'll justify anything that the US does to middle east countries it doesn't matter what you think ... interventionist warmonger. On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 11:21:47 AM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: > > Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's > involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States > involvement. > > Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial > post, but it's "*Typical*": > > > > > https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-reagan/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war > > Both of these circumstances—Iran’s location between the USSR and the > Persian Gulf, and the presence of major oil reserves—guaranteed the > country’s importance during the Cold War. In addition, a third factor came > into play: the emergence, even before the end of World War II, of the > global military and ideological competition between the United States and > the Soviet Union. Fear of losing influence in a vital part of the world to > Soviet-led Communism motivated much of American foreign policy for the next > several decades. American sentiment about competition and democracy was > spelled out, sometimes in almost Biblical terms, in conceptual documents > like NSC-68 and in numerous policy papers over the years. > > In two key incidents in Iran from the post-war period these precepts were > plainly evident, and produced consequences for the United States that were > in some ways utterly unanticipated. At other moments later in the Cold War, > described further below, Washington’s fixation on the Soviet threat left it > unprepared to deal with crises of local origin that were equally > significant for America’s standing in the region. > > The first of these earlier episodes unfolded at the end of the Second > World War when the USSR threatened to abrogate its agreement with Britain > and Iran to remove its large troop presence from Iran’s northern province > of Azerbaijan within six months of the cessation of hostilities. Anxious to > gain an oil concession that would balance Britain’s privileged access in > the south of the country, as well as to create a buffer zone in a > vulnerable border region, Joseph Stalin planned to solidify Soviet > influence in the southern Caucasus region—perhaps even to annex part of > Azerbaijan province, according to Soviet archival records—but met > surprising resistance from President Harry Truman, who gave a range of > support to the young Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Stalin ultimately > decided to withdraw from the country in late 1946. The actions of the > United States were seen as a sign of genuine respect for the rights of > sovereign states—highly unusual for a major power—and made a powerful > impression on the Iranian people. To this day, the Azerbaijan crisis > accounts for some of the positive views many still have of the United > States. > > Less than a decade later, however, a second major incident dramatically > changed many Iranians’ opinion of the United States. In 1951, Iran’s > recently elected prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, nationalized the > country’s petroleum industry, long the domain of the British-dominated > Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The move pitted the two governments > against each other in a bitter political fight, leaving the United States > once again to play the intermediary. But while the Truman administration > had tried to work with both sides, President Dwight Eisenhower and his > advisers quickly concluded that Mosaddeq represented the problem rather > than the solution to the crisis. Based strictly on Cold War calculations, > Eisenhower authorized a preemptive covert operation to oust Mosaddeq before > Moscow might have an opportunity to do so. The coup in August 1953 was > carried out at US and British instigation but relied on a variety of > Iranian groups and individuals for its eventual success. > > The overthrow achieved the immediate objective of restoring to the throne > the Shah, who had fled the country during the turmoil, and replacing > Mosaddeq with a more amenable figure. For the next twenty-five years, > Mohammad Reza Shah remained in power and made significant contributions to > the interests of his superpower patron. But even though the coup had had > the support of significant segments of Iranian society at the time, it came > to be seen by many Iranians as a sea change in American conduct—from > munificent protector of smaller countries to archetypal great power > pursuing its own interests regardless of the wishes of local populations. > This view of the United States gained currency inside Iran over the course > of the Shah’s reign as he proceeded to exercise more and more arbitrary and > dictatorial power at the expense of his subjects with little visible effort > at restraint from Washington. In fact, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and > Johnson did press the Shah repeatedly to enact reforms, but that strategy > effectively ended with the assertion of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. > Reflecting the heavy strain on American military resources caused by the > Vietnam War, the new doctrine relied on regional powers to act as the first > line of defense against potential Soviet expansionism. For the next several > years, the Shah not only gained access to sophisticated American weaponry > he had long coveted, but also obtained tacit White House permission to > forgo any serious effort at reform. > > By the 1970s, conditions inside Iran that were purely local in origin—with > no connection to the Cold War—had begun to emerge that the United States > was ill-equipped to address. Internal resentment against the Shah’s > political and economic policies was building to a peak (and extending to > his US sponsors), but the depth of the problem escaped the notice of > American decision-makers. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a fierce public critic > of Iran’s reliance on American backing who had been exiled for years for > his views, Iran’s growing anti-Shah sentiments burst into open revolution > in 1978–1979. After Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran in early 1979 it > was only a matter of months before the revolution gelled in the form of a > theocratic state, not surprisingly characterized by significant > anti-American overtones. > > In the context of the Cold War, the revolution appeared to many Americans > to signify the “loss” of Iran to Soviet influence, a loss that was > magnified by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In fact, > Moscow was never able to gain a foothold in Iran because of the Islamic > Republic’s deep suspicion of Russia’s history of aggressive behavior and > the religious leadership’s antipathy for official Soviet atheism. This did > not necessarily bode well for Washington, however. Instead, it was a sign > of the rise of another factor in international politics that would have > implications beyond the Cold War: Moslem fundamentalism, which not only > incorporated the concept of national sovereignty (captured in the phrase > “neither East nor West”) but was animated at its core by the ambition of > creating a theocratic state and spreading Islam across the region. > > Hand in hand with the revolution came another event with momentous > implications for US-Iran relations: the storming of the US embassy in > Tehran and the seizure of American hostages in November 1979. Iranian > accounts indicate that the country’s leadership was initially unaware of > the student-led plan to assault the embassy (which the students claimed was > a response to years of perceived US antagonism dating back to the 1953 > coup), but Khomeini was quick to embrace the move for domestic political > reasons. While it helped to consolidate radical rule over the country, > however, the takeover also created a political crisis for Iran, landing it > in long-term diplomatic isolation, and engendering extraordinary enmity > from Washington. The bitterness of the hostage crisis continues to poison > official American attitudes toward the Islamic regime. > > One other episode from this period was critical in forming the current > antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States. From 1980 > through 1988, Iran and Iraq fought a horrific war initiated by Saddam > Hussein’s opportunism but fueled by historical animosity, among other > factors. In retrospect the record is clear that the United States sided > with Baghdad (as the lesser of two evils), providing political, economic, > and even military support for Saddam’s war effort, including tacit > acquiescence to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and missile attacks on > Iran’s cities. Toward the end of the conflict, US forces directly engaged > elements of Iran’s navy and Revolutionary Guards, and in July 1988 a US > naval ship mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian jetliner, killing all > 290 on board. Ironically, these encounters helped lead to a cease-fire by > persuading Iran’s leaders that America would stop at nothing to defeat them. > > The Iran-Iraq War took place during the Cold War but it had virtually > nothing to do with the East-West conflict; it was a local dispute sparked > by indigenous factors. Washington’s actions, however, did grow out of the > American mindset of that era: a desire to protect the flow of oil from the > Persian Gulf and a determination to block the Soviets from gaining > influence in the region. Regardless of each side’s intentions, the war > produced a number of enduring results. One was that the leaders of Iran’s > revolution were able to link their cause to the survival of the nation > itself. Another was the elevation of the status of the Revolutionary > Guards, eventually rivaling even the power of the clerical leadership. (The > country’s current combative president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, was a member > during the war.) Still another outcome, of direct relevance to US standing > in the region, was the cementing of the perception among the country’s > hardliners of Washington as an irreconcilable enemy of the Islamic Republic. > > Although the Cold War ostensibly came to an end twenty years ago, the > United States still confronts circumstances in Iran that emerged during > that crucial period. Some are unchanged—the critical need for oil, for > example. Other challenges have been altered or eliminated, but new ones > take their place. The Communist threat has disappeared, for instance, but > the menace of international terrorism has strengthened. Meanwhile, certain > US strategic concepts rooted in the ideological thinking of the Cold War > have been temporarily revived. George W. Bush’s national security doctrine > reasserted Washington’s Cold War–era determination not to permit the > emergence of another rival power (like the Soviets, or in an earlier era, > the Nazis) to threaten American interests, and echoed Eisenhower’s concept, > employed in Iran in 1953, of preempting a perceived threat. Although > current US strategy no longer focuses on some of these ambitious concepts, > their impact can be seen in the history of American involvement in the > Middle East and continues to be felt across the region. > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 10:45 AM, plainolamerican <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > The *1953 Iranian coup d'état*, known in Iran > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran> as the *28 Mordad coup*, was the > overthrow <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat> of the Prime > Minister <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Iran> Mohammad > Mosaddegh <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Mosaddegh> in favour of > strengthening the monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi> on 19 August 1953, > orchestrated by the United States > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> (under the name > *TPAJAX Project*).[3] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-3> > [4] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CN-IC-01-4> > [5] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-FP_2013-5> > [6] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-6> > > Mossadegh had sought to audit the books of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> (AIOC), a > British corporation (now BP <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BP>) and to > change the terms of the company's access to Iranian petroleum reserves > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_reserves>. Upon the refusal of > the AIOC to co-operate with the Iranian government, the parliament (Majlis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majlis>) voted to nationalize > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalization> the assets of the company > and expel their representatives from the country.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > Following > the coup in 1953, a government under General Fazlollah Zahedi > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> was formed which > allowedMohammad-Rezā > Shāh Pahlavi <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi>, the > Shah <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah> of Iran (Persian > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language> for king),[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > to > rule the country more firmly as monarch > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarch>. He relied heavily on US and UK > support to hold on to power until his own overthrow in February 1979.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > [10] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-10> > In > August 2013, 60 years after the coup, the American Central Intelligence > Agency <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency> (CIA) > admitted that it was involved in both its planning and its execution, > including the bribing of Iranian politicians, security and army > high-ranking officials, as well as pro-coup propaganda.[11] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_rt-11> > [12] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Guardian_19.8.2013-12> > The > CIA is quoted acknowledging the coup was carried out "under CIA direction" > and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the > highest levels of government."[13] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_cnn-13> > > Iran's oil had been discovered and later controlled by the British-owned > AIOC.[14] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-14> > Popular > discontent with the AIOC began in the late 1940s: a large segment of Iran's > public and a number of politicians saw the company as exploitative and a > central tool of continued British imperialism > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_imperialism> in Iran.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [15] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Gasiorowski59-15> > Despite > Mosaddeq's popular support, the AIOC was unwilling to allow Iranian > authorities to audit the company accounts or to renegotiate the terms of > its access to Iranian petroleum <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum>. > In 1951, Iran's petroleum industry was nationalized with near-unanimous > support of the Majlis in a bill introduced by Mossadeq who led theIranian > nationalist <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_nationalist> party, > the National Front <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_(Iran)>. > In response, Britain instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to > pressure Iran economically.[16] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-16> > Initially, > Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the British-built Abadan > oil refinery <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Refinery>, then the > world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Attlee> opted instead to tighten > the economic boycott[17] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-17> > while > using Iranian agents to undermine Mosaddeq's government.[18] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-18> > With > a change to more conservative governments in both Britain and the United > States, Winston Churchill > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill> and the Eisenhower > administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenhower_administration> > decided > to overthrow Iran's government, though the predecessorTruman > administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truman_administration> had > opposed a coup.[19] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-19> > Classified > documents show that British intelligence officials played a pivotal role in > initiating and planning the coup, and that the AIOC contributed $25,000 > towards the expense of bribing officials.[20] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-NYTIntro-20> > > Britain and the US selected General Zahedi to be the prime minister of a > government that was to replace Mosaddegh's. Subsequently, a royal decree > dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi was drawn up by the coup > plotters and signed by the Shah. The CIA had successfully pressured the > weak monarch to participate in the coup, while bribing street thugs, > clergy, politicians and Iranian army > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Iran> officers to take > part in a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh and his government.[21] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-21> > At > first the coup appeared to be a failure when, on the night of 15–16 August, > Imperial > Guard <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Guard_(Iran)> Colonel > Nematollah > Nassiri <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nematollah_Nassiri> was arrested > while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next > day. On 19 August, a pro-Shah mob paid by the CIA marched on Mosaddegh's > residence.[22] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-22> > According > to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared > mobsters in Tehran <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran> were hired by > the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on 19 August. Other CIA-paid men were > brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the > city.[23] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-23> > Between > 300[1] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Ward2009-1> > and > 800 people were killed because of the conflict.[2] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-systemicpeace-2> > Mosaddegh > was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. > On 21 December 1953, he was sentenced to three years in jail, then placed > under house arrest for the remainder of his life.[24] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-24> > [25] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-25> > [26] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-26>Other > > Mosaddegh supporters were imprisoned, and several received the death > penalty.[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > > After the coup, the Shah ruled as a monarch for the next 26 years[8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > while > modernizing the country using oil revenues, until he was overthrown in the > Iranian > Revolution <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution> in 1979.[8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > [27] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-27> > The > tangible benefits the United States reaped from overthrowing Iran's elected > government included a share of Iran's oil wealth[28] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-28> > [*clarification needed > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify>*] and ensuring > the Iranian nation remained under the control of an ally. Washington > continually supplied arms to the Shah and the CIA-trained SAVAK > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAVAK>, his secret police force;[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > however > by the 1979 revolution, his increasingly independent policies resulted in > his effective abandonment by his American allies, hastening his downfall. > [29] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Cooper-29> > The > coup is widely believed to have significantly contributed to anti-American > and anti-British sentiment in Iran and in the Middle East > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-American_sentiment#Contemporary_regional_attitudes>. > > The 1979 revolution deposed the Shah and replaced the pro-Western monarchy > with a largely anti-Western > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Western_sentiment> authoritarian > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarian> theocracy > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theocracy>.[30] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Iran:_A_Brief_Study-30> > [31] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Middle_East_Studies_1987.2C_p._261-31> > > Contents [hide > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#>] > > - 1Background > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Background> > - 2Oil nationalization crisis > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Oil_nationalization_crisis> > - 2.1Assassination attempt on the Shah, and the Appointment of > Mossadegh as Prime Minister > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Assassination_attempt_on_the_Shah.2C_and_the_Appointment_of_Mossadegh_as_Prime_Minister> > - 2.2Oil nationalization, the Abadan crisis, and rising tensions > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Oil_nationalization.2C_the_Abadan_crisis.2C_and_rising_tensions> > - 2.3Final months of Mossadegh's government > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Final_months_of_Mossadegh.27s_government> > - 3Execution of Operation Ajax > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#Execution_of_Operation_Ajax> > - 4United States role > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#United_States_role> > - 4.1CIA records > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#CIA_records> > - 4.2United States motives > > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#United_States_motives> > > ... -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. 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