Sometimes, the truth hurts Plain Ol'. Again, get some help. You'll be better and maybe you can find some happiness or peace within yourself.
On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:39 PM, plainolamerican <[email protected]> wrote: > You're a typical far left lying asshole who purposely inflicts this type > of misinformation > --- > you're unable to accept the truth that come straight out of history and > Wikipedia .... cowardly, exceptionalist and zionist pig. > > On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 12:25:17 PM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: >> >> You're a typical far left lying asshole who purposely inflicts this type >> of misinformation to cloud the facts. But most Anti-Americans are like you >> and it's easily identifiable to us now. >> >> March on Comrade. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:35 PM, plainolamerican <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's >> involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States >> involvement. >> --- >> yeah yeah ... and Britain was also involved ... that doesn't exonerate US >> actions. >> >> Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial >> post, but it's "*Typical*": >> --- >> it was a good example of US involvement with Iran politics ... but since >> you'll justify anything that the US does to middle east countries it >> doesn't matter what you think ... interventionist warmonger. >> >> >> On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 11:21:47 AM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: >> >> Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's >> involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States >> involvement. >> >> Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial >> post, but it's "*Typical*": >> >> >> >> >> https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-reagan/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war >> >> Both of these circumstances—Iran’s location between the USSR and the >> Persian Gulf, and the presence of major oil reserves—guaranteed the >> country’s importance during the Cold War. In addition, a third factor came >> into play: the emergence, even before the end of World War II, of the >> global military and ideological competition between the United States and >> the Soviet Union. Fear of losing influence in a vital part of the world to >> Soviet-led Communism motivated much of American foreign policy for the next >> several decades. American sentiment about competition and democracy was >> spelled out, sometimes in almost Biblical terms, in conceptual documents >> like NSC-68 and in numerous policy papers over the years. >> >> In two key incidents in Iran from the post-war period these precepts were >> plainly evident, and produced consequences for the United States that were >> in some ways utterly unanticipated. At other moments later in the Cold War, >> described further below, Washington’s fixation on the Soviet threat left it >> unprepared to deal with crises of local origin that were equally >> significant for America’s standing in the region. >> >> The first of these earlier episodes unfolded at the end of the Second >> World War when the USSR threatened to abrogate its agreement with Britain >> and Iran to remove its large troop presence from Iran’s northern province >> of Azerbaijan within six months of the cessation of hostilities. Anxious to >> gain an oil concession that would balance Britain’s privileged access in >> the south of the country, as well as to create a buffer zone in a >> vulnerable border region, Joseph Stalin planned to solidify Soviet >> influence in the southern Caucasus region—perhaps even to annex part of >> Azerbaijan province, according to Soviet archival records—but met >> surprising resistance from President Harry Truman, who gave a range of >> support to the young Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Stalin ultimately >> decided to withdraw from the country in late 1946. The actions of the >> United States were seen as a sign of genuine respect for the rights of >> sovereign states—highly unusual for a major power—and made a powerful >> impression on the Iranian people. To this day, the Azerbaijan crisis >> accounts for some of the positive views many still have of the United >> States. >> >> Less than a decade later, however, a second major incident dramatically >> changed many Iranians’ opinion of the United States. In 1951, Iran’s >> recently elected prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, nationalized the >> country’s petroleum industry, long the domain of the British-dominated >> Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The move pitted the two governments >> against each other in a bitter political fight, leaving the United States >> once again to play the intermediary. But while the Truman administration >> had tried to work with both sides, President Dwight Eisenhower and his >> advisers quickly concluded that Mosaddeq represented the problem rather >> than the solution to the crisis. Based strictly on Cold War calculations, >> Eisenhower authorized a preemptive covert operation to oust Mosaddeq before >> Moscow might have an opportunity to do so. The coup in August 1953 was >> carried out at US and British instigation but relied on a variety of >> Iranian groups and individuals for its eventual success. >> >> The overthrow achieved the immediate objective of restoring to the throne >> the Shah, who had fled the country during the turmoil, and replacing >> Mosaddeq with a more amenable figure. For the next twenty-five years, >> Mohammad Reza Shah remained in power and made significant contributions to >> the interests of his superpower patron. But even though the coup had had >> the support of significant segments of Iranian society at the time, it came >> to be seen by many Iranians as a sea change in American conduct—from >> munificent protector of smaller countries to archetypal great power >> pursuing its own interests regardless of the wishes of local populations. >> This view of the United States gained currency inside Iran over the course >> of the Shah’s reign as he proceeded to exercise more and more arbitrary and >> dictatorial power at the expense of his subjects with little visible effort >> at restraint from Washington. In fact, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and >> Johnson did press the Shah repeatedly to enact reforms, but that strategy >> effectively ended with the assertion of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. >> Reflecting the heavy strain on American military resources caused by the >> Vietnam War, the new doctrine relied on regional powers to act as the first >> line of defense against potential Soviet expansionism. For the next several >> years, the Shah not only gained access to sophisticated American weaponry >> he had long coveted, but also obtained tacit White House permission to >> forgo any serious effort at reform. >> >> By the 1970s, conditions inside Iran that were purely local in >> origin—with no connection to the Cold War—had begun to emerge that the >> United States was ill-equipped to address. Internal resentment against the >> Shah’s political and economic policies was building to a peak (and >> extending to his US sponsors), but the depth of the problem escaped the >> notice of American decision-makers. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a fierce >> public critic of Iran’s reliance on American backing who had been exiled >> for years for his views, Iran’s growing anti-Shah sentiments burst into >> open revolution in 1978–1979. After Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran in >> early 1979 it was only a matter of months before the revolution gelled in >> the form of a theocratic state, not surprisingly characterized by >> significant anti-American overtones. >> >> In the context of the Cold War, the revolution appeared to many Americans >> to signify the “loss” of Iran to Soviet influence, a loss that was >> magnified by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In fact, >> Moscow was never able to gain a foothold in Iran because of the Islamic >> Republic’s deep suspicion of Russia’s history of aggressive behavior and >> the religious leadership’s antipathy for official Soviet atheism. This did >> not necessarily bode well for Washington, however. Instead, it was a sign >> of the rise of another factor in international politics that would have >> implications beyond the Cold War: Moslem fundamentalism, which not only >> incorporated the concept of national sovereignty (captured in the phrase >> “neither East nor West”) but was animated at its core by the ambition of >> creating a theocratic state and spreading Islam across the region. >> >> Hand in hand with the revolution came another event with momentous >> implications for US-Iran relations: the storming of the US embassy in >> Tehran and the seizure of American hostages in November 1979. Iranian >> accounts indicate that the country’s leadership was initially unaware of >> the student-led plan to assault the embassy (which the students claimed was >> a response to years of perceived US antagonism dating back to the 1953 >> coup), but Khomeini was quick to embrace the move for domestic political >> reasons. While it helped to consolidate radical rule over the country, >> however, the takeover also created a political crisis for Iran, landing it >> in long-term diplomatic isolation, and engendering extraordinary enmity >> from Washington. The bitterness of the hostage crisis continues to poison >> official American attitudes toward the Islamic regime. >> >> One other episode from this period was critical in forming the current >> antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States. From 1980 >> through 1988, Iran and Iraq fought a horrific war initiated by Saddam >> Hussein’s opportunism but fueled by historical animosity, among other >> factors. In retrospect the record is clear that the United States sided >> with Baghdad (as the lesser of two evils), providing political, economic, >> and even military support for Saddam’s war effort, including tacit >> acquiescence to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and missile attacks on >> Iran’s cities. Toward the end of the conflict, US forces directly engaged >> elements of Iran’s navy and Revolutionary Guards, and in July 1988 a US >> naval ship mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian jetliner, killing all >> 290 on board. Ironically, these encounters helped lead to a cease-fire by >> persuading Iran’s leaders that America would stop at nothing to defeat them. >> >> The Iran-Iraq War took place during the Cold War but it had virtually >> nothing to do with the East-West conflict; it was a local dispute sparked >> by indigenous factors. Washington’s actions, however, did grow out of the >> American mindset of that era: a desire to protect the flow of oil from the >> Persian Gulf and a determination to block the Soviets from gaining >> influence in the region. Regardless of each side’s intentions, the war >> produced a number of enduring results. One was that the leaders of Iran’s >> revolution were able to link their cause to the survival of the nation >> itself. Another was the elevation of the status of the Revolutionary >> Guards, eventually rivaling even the power of the clerical leadership. (The >> country’s current combative president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, was a member >> during the war.) Still another outcome, of direct relevance to US standing >> in the region, was the cementing of the perception among the country’s >> hardliners of Washington as an irreconcilable enemy of the Islamic Republic. >> >> Although the Cold War ostensibly came to an end twenty years ago, the >> United States still confronts circumstances in Iran that emerged during >> that crucial period. Some are unchanged—the critical need for oil, for >> example. Other challenges have been altered or eliminated, but new ones >> take their place. The Communist threat has disappeared, for instance, but >> the menace of international terrorism has strengthened. Meanwhile, certain >> US strategic concepts rooted in the ideological thinking of the Cold War >> have been temporarily revived. George W. Bush’s national security doctrine >> reasserted Washington’s Cold War–era determination not to permit the >> emergence of another rival power (like the Soviets, or in an earlier era, >> the Nazis) to threaten American interests, and echoed Eisenhower’s concept, >> employed in Iran in 1953, of preempting a perceived threat. Although >> current US strategy no longer focuses on some of these ambitious concepts, >> their impact can be seen in the history of American involvement in the >> Middle East and continues to be felt across the region. >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 10:45 AM, plainolamerican <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> The *1953 Iranian coup d'état*, known in Iran >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran> as the *28 Mordad coup*, was the >> overthrow <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat> of the Prime >> Minister <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Iran> Mohammad >> Mosaddegh <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Mosaddegh> in favour >> of strengthening the monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi> on 19 August 1953, >> orchestrated by the United States >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> (under the name >> *TPAJAX Project*).[3] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-3> >> [4] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CN-IC-01-4> >> [5] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-FP_2013-5> >> [6] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-6> >> >> Mossadegh had sought to audit the books of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> (AIOC), a >> British corporation (now BP <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BP>) and to >> change the terms of the company's access to Iranian petroleum reserves >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_reserves>. Upon the refusal of >> the AIOC to co-operate with the Iranian government, the parliament ( >> Majlis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majlis>) voted to nationalize >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalization> the assets of the >> company and expel their representatives from the country.[7] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> >> [8] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> >> [9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> Following >> the coup in 1953, a government under General Fazlollah Zahedi >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> was formed which >> allowedMohammad-Rezā >> Shāh Pahlavi <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi>, the >> Shah <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah> of Iran (Persian >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language> for king),[9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> to >> rule the country more firmly as monarch >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarch>. He relied heavily on US and UK >> support to hold on to power until his own overthrow in February 1979.[7] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> >> [8] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> >> [9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> [10] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-10> >> In >> August 2013, 60 years after the coup, the American Central Intelligence >> Agency <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency> (CIA) >> admitted that it was involved in both its planning and its execution, >> including the bribing of Iranian politicians, security and army >> high-ranking officials, as well as pro-coup propaganda.[11] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_rt-11> >> [12] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Guardian_19.8.2013-12> >> The >> CIA is quoted acknowledging the coup was carried out "under CIA direction" >> and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the >> highest levels of government."[13] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_cnn-13> >> >> Iran's oil had been discovered and later controlled by the British-owned >> AIOC.[14] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-14> >> Popular >> discontent with the AIOC began in the late 1940s: a large segment of Iran's >> public and a number of politicians saw the company as exploitative and a >> central tool of continued British imperialism >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_imperialism> in Iran.[7] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> >> [15] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Gasiorowski59-15> >> Despite >> Mosaddeq's popular support, the AIOC was unwilling to allow Iranian >> authorities to audit the company accounts or to renegotiate the terms of >> its access to Iranian petroleum <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum>. >> In 1951, Iran's petroleum industry was nationalized with near-unanimous >> support of the Majlis in a bill introduced by Mossadeq who led theIranian >> nationalist <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_nationalist> party, >> the National Front <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_(Iran)>. >> In response, Britain instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to >> pressure Iran economically.[16] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-16> >> Initially, >> Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the British-built Abadan >> oil refinery <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Refinery>, then the >> world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Attlee> opted instead to tighten >> the economic boycott[17] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-17> >> while >> using Iranian agents to undermine Mosaddeq's government.[18] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-18> >> With >> a change to more conservative governments in both Britain and the United >> States, Winston Churchill >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill> and the Eisenhower >> administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenhower_administration> >> decided >> to overthrow Iran's government, though the predecessorTruman >> administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truman_administration> had >> opposed a coup.[19] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-19> >> Classified >> documents show that British intelligence officials played a pivotal role in >> initiating and planning the coup, and that the AIOC contributed $25,000 >> towards the expense of bribing officials.[20] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-NYTIntro-20> >> >> Britain and the US selected General Zahedi to be the prime minister of a >> government that was to replace Mosaddegh's. Subsequently, a royal decree >> dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi was drawn up by the coup >> plotters and signed by the Shah. The CIA had successfully pressured the >> weak monarch to participate in the coup, while bribing street thugs, >> clergy, politicians and Iranian army >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Iran> officers to >> take part in a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh and his government. >> [21] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-21> >> At >> first the coup appeared to be a failure when, on the night of 15–16 August, >> Imperial >> Guard <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Guard_(Iran)> Colonel >> Nematollah >> Nassiri <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nematollah_Nassiri> was arrested >> while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next >> day. On 19 August, a pro-Shah mob paid by the CIA marched on Mosaddegh's >> residence.[22] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-22> >> According >> to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared >> mobsters in Tehran <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran> were hired by >> the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on 19 August. Other CIA-paid men were >> brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the >> city.[23] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-23> >> Between >> 300[1] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Ward2009-1> >> and >> 800 people were killed because of the conflict.[2] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-systemicpeace-2> >> Mosaddegh >> was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. >> On 21 December 1953, he was sentenced to three years in jail, then placed >> under house arrest for the remainder of his life.[24] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-24> >> [25] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-25> >> [26] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-26>Other >> Mosaddegh supporters were imprisoned, and several received the death >> penalty.[9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> >> After the coup, the Shah ruled as a monarch for the next 26 years[8] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> >> [9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> while >> modernizing the country using oil revenues, until he was overthrown in the >> Iranian >> Revolution <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution> in 1979.[8] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> >> [9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> [27] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-27> >> The >> tangible benefits the United States reaped from overthrowing Iran's elected >> government included a share of Iran's oil wealth[28] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-28> >> [*clarification needed >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify>*] and ensuring >> the Iranian nation remained under the control of an ally. Washington >> continually supplied arms to the Shah and the CIA-trained SAVAK >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAVAK>, his secret police force;[9] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> >> however >> by the 1979 revolution, his increasingly independent policies resulted in >> his effective abandonment by his American allies, hastening his downfall. >> [29] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Cooper-29> >> The >> coup is widely believed to have significantly contributed to anti-American >> and anti-British sentiment in Iran and in the Middle East >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-American_sentiment#Contemporary_regional_attitudes>. >> The 1979 revolution deposed the Shah and replaced the pro-Western monarchy >> with a largely anti-Western >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Western_sentiment> authoritarian >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarian> theocracy >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theocracy>.[30] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Iran:_A_Brief_Study-30> >> [31] >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Middle_East_Studies_1987.2C_p._261-31> >> >> Contents [hide >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#>] >> >> ... > > -- > -- > Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. > For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum > > * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ > * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. > * Read the latest breaking news, and more. > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "PoliticalForum" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. * Read the latest breaking news, and more. --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "PoliticalForum" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
