I have peace and I'm a winner ... and I laugh at you and your abrahamic cousins killing each other every day.
On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 12:45:09 PM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: > > Sometimes, the truth hurts Plain Ol'. Again, get some help. You'll be > better and maybe you can find some happiness or peace within yourself. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:39 PM, plainolamerican <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > You're a typical far left lying asshole who purposely inflicts this type > of misinformation > --- > you're unable to accept the truth that come straight out of history and > Wikipedia .... cowardly, exceptionalist and zionist pig. > > On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 12:25:17 PM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: > > You're a typical far left lying asshole who purposely inflicts this type > of misinformation to cloud the facts. But most Anti-Americans are like you > and it's easily identifiable to us now. > > March on Comrade. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:35 PM, plainolamerican <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's > involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States > involvement. > --- > yeah yeah ... and Britain was also involved ... that doesn't exonerate US > actions. > > Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial > post, but it's "*Typical*": > --- > it was a good example of US involvement with Iran politics ... but since > you'll justify anything that the US does to middle east countries it > doesn't matter what you think ... interventionist warmonger. > > > On Monday, February 22, 2016 at 11:21:47 AM UTC-6, KeithInTampa wrote: > > Most Progressives like Plain Ol" conveniently "Forget" the USSR's > involvement in the region, and what was the causation of the United States > involvement. > > Not that Plain Ol's post has anything remotely to do with the initial > post, but it's "*Typical*": > > > > > https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-reagan/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war > > Both of these circumstances—Iran’s location between the USSR and the > Persian Gulf, and the presence of major oil reserves—guaranteed the > country’s importance during the Cold War. In addition, a third factor came > into play: the emergence, even before the end of World War II, of the > global military and ideological competition between the United States and > the Soviet Union. Fear of losing influence in a vital part of the world to > Soviet-led Communism motivated much of American foreign policy for the next > several decades. American sentiment about competition and democracy was > spelled out, sometimes in almost Biblical terms, in conceptual documents > like NSC-68 and in numerous policy papers over the years. > > In two key incidents in Iran from the post-war period these precepts were > plainly evident, and produced consequences for the United States that were > in some ways utterly unanticipated. At other moments later in the Cold War, > described further below, Washington’s fixation on the Soviet threat left it > unprepared to deal with crises of local origin that were equally > significant for America’s standing in the region. > > The first of these earlier episodes unfolded at the end of the Second > World War when the USSR threatened to abrogate its agreement with Britain > and Iran to remove its large troop presence from Iran’s northern province > of Azerbaijan within six months of the cessation of hostilities. Anxious to > gain an oil concession that would balance Britain’s privileged access in > the south of the country, as well as to create a buffer zone in a > vulnerable border region, Joseph Stalin planned to solidify Soviet > influence in the southern Caucasus region—perhaps even to annex part of > Azerbaijan province, according to Soviet archival records—but met > surprising resistance from President Harry Truman, who gave a range of > support to the young Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Stalin ultimately > decided to withdraw from the country in late 1946. The actions of the > United States were seen as a sign of genuine respect for the rights of > sovereign states—highly unusual for a major power—and made a powerful > impression on the Iranian people. To this day, the Azerbaijan crisis > accounts for some of the positive views many still have of the United > States. > > Less than a decade later, however, a second major incident dramatically > changed many Iranians’ opinion of the United States. In 1951, Iran’s > recently elected prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, nationalized the > country’s petroleum industry, long the domain of the British-dominated > Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The move pitted the two governments > against each other in a bitter political fight, leaving the United States > once again to play the intermediary. But while the Truman administration > had tried to work with both sides, President Dwight Eisenhower and his > advisers quickly concluded that Mosaddeq represented the problem rather > than the solution to the crisis. Based strictly on Cold War calculations, > Eisenhower authorized a preemptive covert operation to oust Mosaddeq before > Moscow might have an opportunity to do so. The coup in August 1953 was > carried out at US and British instigation but relied on a variety of > Iranian groups and individuals for its eventual success. > > The overthrow achieved the immediate objective of restoring to the throne > the Shah, who had fled the country during the turmoil, and replacing > Mosaddeq with a more amenable figure. For the next twenty-five years, > Mohammad Reza Shah remained in power and made significant contributions to > the interests of his superpower patron. But even though the coup had had > the support of significant segments of Iranian society at the time, it came > to be seen by many Iranians as a sea change in American conduct—from > munificent protector of smaller countries to archetypal great power > pursuing its own interests regardless of the wishes of local populations. > This view of the United States gained currency inside Iran over the course > of the Shah’s reign as he proceeded to exercise more and more arbitrary and > dictatorial power at the expense of his subjects with little visible effort > at restraint from Washington. In fact, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and > Johnson did press the Shah repeatedly to enact reforms, but that strategy > effectively ended with the assertion of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. > Reflecting the heavy strain on American military resources caused by the > Vietnam War, the new doctrine relied on regional powers to act as the first > line of defense against potential Soviet expansionism. For the next several > years, the Shah not only gained access to sophisticated American weaponry > he had long coveted, but also obtained tacit White House permission to > forgo any serious effort at reform. > > By the 1970s, conditions inside Iran that were purely local in origin—with > no connection to the Cold War—had begun to emerge that the United States > was ill-equipped to address. Internal resentment against the Shah’s > political and economic policies was building to a peak (and extending to > his US sponsors), but the depth of the problem escaped the notice of > American decision-makers. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a fierce public critic > of Iran’s reliance on American backing who had been exiled for years for > his views, Iran’s growing anti-Shah sentiments burst into open revolution > in 1978–1979. After Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran in early 1979 it > was only a matter of months before the revolution gelled in the form of a > theocratic state, not surprisingly characterized by significant > anti-American overtones. > > In the context of the Cold War, the revolution appeared to many Americans > to signify the “loss” of Iran to Soviet influence, a loss that was > magnified by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In fact, > Moscow was never able to gain a foothold in Iran because of the Islamic > Republic’s deep suspicion of Russia’s history of aggressive behavior and > the religious leadership’s antipathy for official Soviet atheism. This did > not necessarily bode well for Washington, however. Instead, it was a sign > of the rise of another factor in international politics that would have > implications beyond the Cold War: Moslem fundamentalism, which not only > incorporated the concept of national sovereignty (captured in the phrase > “neither East nor West”) but was animated at its core by the ambition of > creating a theocratic state and spreading Islam across the region. > > Hand in hand with the revolution came another event with momentous > implications for US-Iran relations: the storming of the US embassy in > Tehran and the seizure of American hostages in November 1979. Iranian > accounts indicate that the country’s leadership was initially unaware of > the student-led plan to assault the embassy (which the students claimed was > a response to years of perceived US antagonism dating back to the 1953 > coup), but Khomeini was quick to embrace the move for domestic political > reasons. While it helped to consolidate radical rule over the country, > however, the takeover also created a political crisis for Iran, landing it > in long-term diplomatic isolation, and engendering extraordinary enmity > from Washington. The bitterness of the hostage crisis continues to poison > official American attitudes toward the Islamic regime. > > One other episode from this period was critical in forming the current > antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States. From 1980 > through 1988, Iran and Iraq fought a horrific war initiated by Saddam > Hussein’s opportunism but fueled by historical animosity, among other > factors. In retrospect the record is clear that the United States sided > with Baghdad (as the lesser of two evils), providing political, economic, > and even military support for Saddam’s war effort, including tacit > acquiescence to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and missile attacks on > Iran’s cities. Toward the end of the conflict, US forces directly engaged > elements of Iran’s navy and Revolutionary Guards, and in July 1988 a US > naval ship mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian jetliner, killing all > 290 on board. Ironically, these encounters helped lead to a cease-fire by > persuading Iran’s leaders that America would stop at nothing to defeat them. > > The Iran-Iraq War took place during the Cold War but it had virtually > nothing to do with the East-West conflict; it was a local dispute sparked > by indigenous factors. Washington’s actions, however, did grow out of the > American mindset of that era: a desire to protect the flow of oil from the > Persian Gulf and a determination to block the Soviets from gaining > influence in the region. Regardless of each side’s intentions, the war > produced a number of enduring results. One was that the leaders of Iran’s > revolution were able to link their cause to the survival of the nation > itself. Another was the elevation of the status of the Revolutionary > Guards, eventually rivaling even the power of the clerical leadership. (The > country’s current combative president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, was a member > during the war.) Still another outcome, of direct relevance to US standing > in the region, was the cementing of the perception among the country’s > hardliners of Washington as an irreconcilable enemy of the Islamic Republic. > > Although the Cold War ostensibly came to an end twenty years ago, the > United States still confronts circumstances in Iran that emerged during > that crucial period. Some are unchanged—the critical need for oil, for > example. Other challenges have been altered or eliminated, but new ones > take their place. The Communist threat has disappeared, for instance, but > the menace of international terrorism has strengthened. Meanwhile, certain > US strategic concepts rooted in the ideological thinking of the Cold War > have been temporarily revived. George W. Bush’s national security doctrine > reasserted Washington’s Cold War–era determination not to permit the > emergence of another rival power (like the Soviets, or in an earlier era, > the Nazis) to threaten American interests, and echoed Eisenhower’s concept, > employed in Iran in 1953, of preempting a perceived threat. Although > current US strategy no longer focuses on some of these ambitious concepts, > their impact can be seen in the history of American involvement in the > Middle East and continues to be felt across the region. > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 10:45 AM, plainolamerican <[email protected]> > wrote: > > The *1953 Iranian coup d'état*, known in Iran > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran> as the *28 Mordad coup*, was the > overthrow <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat> of the Prime > Minister <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Iran> Mohammad > Mosaddegh <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Mosaddegh> in favour of > strengthening the monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi> on 19 August 1953, > orchestrated by the United States > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> (under the name > *TPAJAX Project*).[3] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-3> > [4] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CN-IC-01-4> > [5] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-FP_2013-5> > [6] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-6> > > Mossadegh had sought to audit the books of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> (AIOC), a > British corporation (now BP <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BP>) and to > change the terms of the company's access to Iranian petroleum reserves > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_reserves>. Upon the refusal of > the AIOC to co-operate with the Iranian government, the parliament (Majlis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majlis>) voted to nationalize > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalization> the assets of the company > and expel their representatives from the country.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > Following > the coup in 1953, a government under General Fazlollah Zahedi > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> was formed which > allowedMohammad-Rezā > Shāh Pahlavi <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi>, the > Shah <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah> of Iran (Persian > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language> for king),[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > to > rule the country more firmly as monarch > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarch>. He relied heavily on US and UK > support to hold on to power until his own overthrow in February 1979.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > [10] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-10> > In > August 2013, 60 years after the coup, the American Central Intelligence > Agency <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency> (CIA) > admitted that it was involved in both its planning and its execution, > including the bribing of Iranian politicians, security and army > high-ranking officials, as well as pro-coup propaganda.[11] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_rt-11> > [12] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Guardian_19.8.2013-12> > The > CIA is quoted acknowledging the coup was carried out "under CIA direction" > and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the > highest levels of government."[13] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-CIA19532013admission_cnn-13> > > Iran's oil had been discovered and later controlled by the British-owned > AIOC.[14] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-14> > Popular > discontent with the AIOC began in the late 1940s: a large segment of Iran's > public and a number of politicians saw the company as exploitative and a > central tool of continued British imperialism > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_imperialism> in Iran.[7] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Kressin-7> > [15] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Gasiorowski59-15> > Despite > Mosaddeq's popular support, the AIOC was unwilling to allow Iranian > authorities to audit the company accounts or to renegotiate the terms of > its access to Iranian petroleum <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum>. > In 1951, Iran's petroleum industry was nationalized with near-unanimous > support of the Majlis in a bill introduced by Mossadeq who led theIranian > nationalist <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_nationalist> party, > the National Front <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_(Iran)>. > In response, Britain instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to > pressure Iran economically.[16] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-16> > Initially, > Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the British-built Abadan > oil refinery <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Refinery>, then the > world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Attlee> opted instead to tighten > the economic boycott[17] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-17> > while > using Iranian agents to undermine Mosaddeq's government.[18] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-18> > With > a change to more conservative governments in both Britain and the United > States, Winston Churchill > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill> and the Eisenhower > administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenhower_administration> > decided > to overthrow Iran's government, though the predecessorTruman > administration <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truman_administration> had > opposed a coup.[19] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-19> > Classified > documents show that British intelligence officials played a pivotal role in > initiating and planning the coup, and that the AIOC contributed $25,000 > towards the expense of bribing officials.[20] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-NYTIntro-20> > > Britain and the US selected General Zahedi to be the prime minister of a > government that was to replace Mosaddegh's. Subsequently, a royal decree > dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi was drawn up by the coup > plotters and signed by the Shah. The CIA had successfully pressured the > weak monarch to participate in the coup, while bribing street thugs, > clergy, politicians and Iranian army > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Iran> officers to take > part in a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh and his government.[21] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-21> > At > first the coup appeared to be a failure when, on the night of 15–16 August, > Imperial > Guard <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Guard_(Iran)> Colonel > Nematollah > Nassiri <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nematollah_Nassiri> was arrested > while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next > day. On 19 August, a pro-Shah mob paid by the CIA marched on Mosaddegh's > residence.[22] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-22> > According > to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared > mobsters in Tehran <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran> were hired by > the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on 19 August. Other CIA-paid men were > brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the > city.[23] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-23> > Between > 300[1] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Ward2009-1> > and > 800 people were killed because of the conflict.[2] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-systemicpeace-2> > Mosaddegh > was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. > On 21 December 1953, he was sentenced to three years in jail, then placed > under house arrest for the remainder of his life.[24] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-24> > [25] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-25> > [26] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-26>Other > > Mosaddegh supporters were imprisoned, and several received the death > penalty.[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > > After the coup, the Shah ruled as a monarch for the next 26 years[8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > while > modernizing the country using oil revenues, until he was overthrown in the > Iranian > Revolution <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution> in 1979.[8] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Persians-8> > [9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > [27] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-27> > The > tangible benefits the United States reaped from overthrowing Iran's elected > government included a share of Iran's oil wealth[28] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-28> > [*clarification needed > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify>*] and ensuring > the Iranian nation remained under the control of an ally. Washington > continually supplied arms to the Shah and the CIA-trained SAVAK > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAVAK>, his secret police force;[9] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Milani_Shah-9> > however > by the 1979 revolution, his increasingly independent policies resulted in > his effective abandonment by his American allies, hastening his downfall. > [29] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-Cooper-29> > The > coup is widely believed to have significantly contributed to anti-American > and anti-British sentiment in Iran and in the Middle East > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-American_sentiment#Contemporary_regional_attitudes>. > > The 1979 revolution deposed the Shah and replaced the pro-Western monarchy > with a largely anti-Western > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Western_sentiment> authoritarian > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarian> theocracy > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theocracy>. > > ... -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. 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