again gaar, you sidestep the original issue. On Fri, Apr 10, 2009 at 1:27 PM, plainolamerican <[email protected]>wrote:
> > ouch!!! > > On Apr 10, 2:09 pm, jgg1000a <[email protected]> wrote: > > Further examples as I twist the knife into your false claim's back... > > Openly ignoring ICJ judgements is relatively common starting from > > 1951.... > > > > Non-Compliance with the International Court of Justice > > > > Andrew Srulevitch > > Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations > > July 8, 2004 > > > > Tomorrow the International Court of Justice will issue its non-binding > > advisory opinion on Israel’s Security Fence. How might Israel react > > to an adverse decision? Detonate a nuclear device? Attack the > > enemy? Send 350,000 civilians into the disputed territory? > > > > So responded France, Iceland and Morocco, respectively, to ICJ > > decisions against them. Ignoring the ICJ ruling would not be original > > either. The United States, Albania, Argentina, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, > > Malaysia, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa and Thailand have all > > followed that path. > > > > If Israel does not accept the ICJ’s conclusions, Palestinians and > > their supporters will argue that the Security Council should enact > > sanctions against Israel, as it did against apartheid South Africa. > > Lawyers for the Palestinians made this argument explicitly in their > > oral presentation to the court: > > > > This is a classic case in the light of the opinion issued by the Court > > in the Namibia case. As a result of the serious breaches of > > international law by the State of Israel, other states are obliged to > > co-operate with one another and with the United Nations and other > > competent international organizations, in order to put a stop to these > > violations; not to recognize the unlawful situations arising from > > these violations; not to assist in the maintenance of these > > situations. If Israel persists in its refusal to apply the above- > > mentioned rules of international law and does not accept the > > consequences of its responsibility, the General Assembly is entitled > > to expect the Security Council to take the necessary coercive measures > > which, in the case of violations of mandatory legal rules, should not > > be amenable to the use of a veto by any member of the Council. > > > > Their argument does not stand up to scrutiny. Just as the general > > comparison between Israel and South Africa is specious, so is the > > specific linkage of the Namibia and Security Fence cases. > > > > The history of the ICJ not only contradicts the Palestinian argument, > > it leads to the opposite conclusion: states have not been subject to > > Security Council sanctions for non-compliance. The ICJ’s judges have > > issued decisions in various formats: in contentious cases between two > > states, as advisory opinions for other UN agencies, and as an > > arbitration panel. Though the circumstances of each case differ from > > Israel’s and from one another, all of the states cited above adopted > > policies of non-compliance with an ICJ ruling. > > > > Four cases – France, Iceland, Morocco and South Africa – are described > > below. The first three cases have important similarities to the > > Security Fence issue, while the South African case has important > > differences. The other cases of non-compliance are noted briefly to > > provide additional context. > > > > * * * > > > > Defying ICJ rulings on national security issues: France and Iceland > > > > On May 9, 1973, New Zealand (and Australia in a parallel case) asked > > the ICJ to order France to end atmospheric nuclear testing in the > > South Pacific. France responded that it did not consider the ICJ > > competent to hear the cases, did not accept ICJ jurisdiction, and > > would not participate in any proceedings. On June 22, the ICJ issued > > an Order, which stated that there was a prima facie basis for > > jurisdiction and, as an interim measure, “the French Government should > > avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out on > > New Zealand Territory.” > > > > France then conducted five atmospheric tests in July and August > > 1973. In a June 10, 1974 note to the New Zealand Foreign Ministry,the > French government wrote: “France, at the point which has been > > > > reached in the execution of its programme of defence by nuclear means, > > will be in a position to move to the stage of underground firings as > > soon as the test series planned for this summer is completed.” France > > then conducted seven atmospheric tests from June to September 1974. > > Both in 1973 and 1974, New Zealand reported to the ICJ that > > radioactive fall-out had been detected in their territory. Subsequent > > French tests were conducted underground, and therefore did not violate > > the Order of 22 June 1973. > > > > On an important national security issue – its nuclear weapons program > > – France was unapologetic about defying an ICJ decision. > > > > The case of Iceland has a more mundane subject – cod fish. Since > > fishing accounted for over 70% of its exports, cod was national > > security issue for Iceland. In July 1972, Iceland unilaterally > > extended its area of exclusive fishing rights from 12 miles to 50 > > miles, prompting complaints to the ICJ from the United Kingdom and > > Germany. Iceland responded that it did not accept its jurisdiction > > and would not participate in the hearings. In August 1972, the ICJ > > issued an interim Order of protective measures. The UK continued to > > send fishing boats into the zone claimed by Iceland. The Icelandic > > Coast Guard attacked the boats and cut their trawling lines. > > > > In July 1974 the ICJ ruled that Iceland’s unilateral extension of its > > exclusive fishing area was invalid and that the UK had fishing rights > > outside the 12-mile limit. Iceland still refused to comply. There > > were additional clashes between the Icelandic Coast Guard and British > > frigates that had been dispatched to protect their fishing fleet. In > > 1975, Iceland claimed an even larger exclusionary area, out to 200 > > miles and clashes continued. Shots were fired and ships rammed each > > other, though no fatalities resulted. The dispute ended in 1976 with > > an agreement that granted Iceland almost all of its demands. > > > > Iceland – a liberal democracy and advocate of international law – > > deemed the threat to its economic national security so serious that > > the ICJ decisions were simply ignored. > > > > Neither France nor Iceland was the target of international sanctions > > for their clear defiance of the ICJ. > > > > * * * > > > > Defying the ICJ in territorial disputes: Morocco and South Africa > > > > On December 13, 1974, the General Assembly asked the ICJ for an > > advisory opinion on the legal status of Western Sahara, the former > > Spanish colony known as Spanish Sahara, and the legal ties of Morocco > > and Mauritania to the area. Both countries had made claims to Western > > Sahara in the context of decolonization by Spain, while the indigenous > > Saharawi population wanted an independent state. On October 16, 1975, > > the ICJ returned its advisory opinion that both countries had some > > legal ties to Western Sahara, but they were not sufficient to claim > > sovereignty and the status of Western Sahara should be determined by > > “the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine > > expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.” > > > > King Hassan II of Morocco responded to the ICJ opinion with the Green > > March. Three hundred and fifty thousand Moroccan civilians were sent > > towards Western Sahara with the intent on settling there and doubling > > the population. > > > > Morocco then defied a series of Security Council resolutions. On > > October 22, the Security Council passed resolution 377, requesting the > > Secretary-General to start consultations and appealing to all parties > > to exercise restraint. On October 31 the Moroccan military crossed the > > border. After receiving the Secretary-General’s report on November 2, > > the Security Council passed resolution 379, again urging an end to > > “unilateral actions” that would “escalate tensions.” On November 5, > > King Hassan II ordered the 350,000 civilians to cross the border. On > > November 6 the Security Council passed resolution 380, which “deplore > > [d] the holding of the march; [and] call[ed] upon Morocco immediately > > to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants > > in the march.” > > > > In 1976 Morocco annexed the area under its administration and then > > annexed the rest in 1979 when Mauritania withdrew its claim to the > > southern region. Twenty-five years later neither annexation has been > > recognized nor have Morocco and the Saharawi reached an agreement. > > > > Though construction began six years after the ICJ opinion, it should > > be noted that Morocco built a thousand-mile security barrier through > > the middle of Western Sahara to protect against Saharawi attacks. The > > “berm,” as it is known, is a three-meter high earthen rampart, > > fortified with an estimated one to two million landmines. It divides > > the Moroccan-controlled northwestern two-thirds of Western Sahara – > > rich in oil and minerals, whose coast contains the territory’s fertile > > land and fishing industry – from the southeastern third that is mostly > > desert and controlled by the Saharawi. > > > > Despite disregarding both the ICJ opinion on Western Sahara and the > > related Security Council resolutions, Morocco has not suffered serious > > diplomatic repercussions. The UN’s latest peace plan for Western > > Sahara, the “Baker Plan II” of 2003, does not mention the ICJ > > opinion. Israel’s continued construction of the fence would pale in > > comparison to Morocco’s response to the Western Sahara advisory > > opinion. Suggestions of sanctions on Israel would be yet another case > > of the double-standard applied to Israel. > > > > South Africa’s case before the ICJ on Namibia has only a superficial > > similarity with the Security Fence case. In both instances the ICJ > > was asked for an advisory opinions on “legal consequences.” In > > substance and circumstance, the two cases have important differences > > that invalidate the comparison. > > > > South Africa was in defiance of several Security Council resolutions > > demanding their immediate withdrawal from Namibia. Resolutions 264 > > (1969), 269 (1969), ... > > > > read more » > > > -- Mark M. 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