On Fri, Oct 04, 2019 at 11:14:18AM +0200, Solene Rapenne wrote: > On Fri, Oct 04, 2019 at 10:00:18AM +0100, Stuart Henderson wrote: > > On 2019/10/04 09:13, Solene Rapenne wrote: > > > On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 10:54:36AM +0200, Solene Rapenne wrote: > > > > On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 11:25:59AM -0500, joshua stein wrote: > > > > > This patchset goes back to files in /etc/firefox for unveil file > > > > > lists, and goes further and moves the pledge strings to separate > > > > > files too. This should be the most secure version that is still > > > > > tweakable at runtime. > > > > > > > > > > I switched away from using Firefox's NS_LOCAL_FILE_CONTRACTID/ > > > > > NS_LOCALFILEINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID mechanisms to read a file, since > > > > > they require a lot of internal setup to be done before they can be > > > > > used (which is otherwise a good thing, because other things later in > > > > > Firefox shouldn't have raw file access). Instead of those, I'm > > > > > using the normal C++ API for reading the /etc/firefox files and this > > > > > way I have been able to move the pledge/unveil calls earlier in the > > > > > process startup. Unfortunately this also means that I can't > > > > > dynamically detect the localized ~/Downloads directory, so if you > > > > > use a different directory, you'll just need to modify the > > > > > unveil.content and unveil.main files to change it. > > > > > > > > > > I tried the $TMPDIR shenanigans with the main process mkdtemp'ing > > > > > somewhere in $TMPDIR (or /tmp), and then exporting TMPDIR as that > > > > > directory so that everything else within Firefox uses that > > > > > subdirectory as its temp directory, allowing /tmp to be removed from > > > > > the unveil lists and only that subdirectory visible. Unfortunately > > > > > the first thing to break was our own shm_open() which hard-codes > > > > > /tmp and doesn't honor $TMPDIR. So that all was ripped out and > > > > > we're back to full access to /tmp. > > > > > > > > > > If the mailing list mangles this again, it's at > > > > > https://jcs.org/patches/firefox-port-unveil8.diff > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In a very particular case, I get a > > > > firefox[4133]: pledge "inet", syscall 97 > > > > > > > > to do so, I make a ssh tunnel to a Proxmox web interface with default > > > > certificate (auto generated) > > > > > > > > ssh -L 44444:10.4.5.6:8006 some_remote_machine > > > > > > > > then, open https://localhost:44444 on firefox, and I get a pledge error > > > > with firefox showing "Gah. Your tab just crashed." > > > > > > > > Sadly, I've not been able to reproduce this with any other certificate. > > > > It may certainly not be related to ssh tunneling, but I can't try on > > > > direct lan > > > > access. > > > > > > > > > > kdump of the process (it's not the main process) when the tab crashes > > > > > > 43463 firefox CALL socket(AF_INET6,0x1<SOCK_STREAM>,0) > > > 43463 firefox PLDG socket, "inet", errno 1 Operation not permitted > > > 43463 firefox PSIG SIGABRT SIG_DFL > > > 43463 firefox NAMI "firefox.core" > > > > > > > You may be able to figure out which process type it is, by looking at > > the earlier call to pledge() and examining the string. > > > > Or if the process was already created before opening the page you may > > also be able to figure it out from the pid if you "ps wwx" first. > > > > I wonder if a process without network pledge could be trying to fetch a > > missing intermediary cert from the address in the "CA Issuers" field in > > the cert. Might get some more information if you show the connection > > and cert from "openssl s_client -connect localhost:44444".. > > > > the failing process looks like this from ps > > /usr/local/lib/firefox/firefox -contentproc -childID 1 -isForBrowser > -prefsLen 170 -prefMapSize 197941 -parentBuildID 20190925193545 -appdir > /usr/local/lib/firefox/browser 44467 tab >
I forgot to mention I've been able to try without ssh tunneling and same issue happens with same previous error seen in kdump. I wasn't sure but ssh tunneling is absolutely not related.
