Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes:

> Alex, as the virtio-gpu* maintainer can you give your opinion
> on the discussion below about virtio-gpu security tagging
> vs our current security policy for "virtualization use case"
> to ack/nack the proposal.

I'm inclined to agree with Marc-Andre here - the 3D GPU attack surface
is large and for the in-QEMU handling we have a bunch of issues with GPU
context handling between threads that make it tricky. Compounding that
ruttabaga is not very well tested at all because its hard to enable
without non-distro libs (for now).

Finally virtio-gpu is Odd Fixes so it's not getting the response times
of other VirtIO stuff in terms of handling security issues.

We should encourage users to use vhost-user-gpu for 3D stuff because at
least then the rendering pipeline and processing of guest controlled
data is easier to sandbox.

So I'd say:

  - virtio-gpu for 2d - OK
  - virtio-gpu for 3d via vhost - OK
  - virtio-gpu for 3d in QEMU - Not OK
  
Alex.

>
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:33:31PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:52:27PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> > Hi
>> > 
>> > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 6:40 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> 
>> > wrote:
>> > >
>> > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:35:29PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> > > > Hi
>> > > >
>> > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 3:53 PM Thomas Huth <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > > > >
>> > > > > On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>> > > > > > These are all intended for use in a virtualization scenario and 
>> > > > > > must
>> > > > > > provide a security boundary.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
>> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
>> > > > > > ---
>> > > > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
>> > > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > I have a second thought about this, I'd like to exclude all
>> > > > gpu-accelerated paths for now. virgl/mesa/rutabaga expose a very large
>> > > > attack surface, so I'd like to drop them from the secure boundary
>> > >
>> > > Rather than repost, please see my response for patch 2:
>> > >
>> > >   https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2026-11/msg01530.html
>> > >
>> > > TL;DR: we have already promised anything virtio related is in scope
>> > > for security handling for a long time, as they are all unambiguously
>> > > "virtualization use case".
>> > >
>> > 
>> > the value of a secure policy enforcement is low if we know those
>> > devices are unsecure and don't have the resources to make them secure.
>> 
>> It isn't a great situation to be in, but we're already there for any
>> virtio devices based on our existing policies for bug handling and
>> security triage. We can't promise we'll get fixes for all CVEs quickly,
>> but we will at least assign CVEs so that users are aware when there
>> are known problems.
>> 
>> This contrasts to other devices where problems will remain largely
>> hidden for view, as we treat them as normal bugs and never call our
>> security concerns when committing changes.
>> 
>> With regards,
>> Daniel
>> -- 
>> |: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
>> |: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
>> |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
>> 
>> 
>
> With regards,
> Daniel

-- 
Alex Bennée
Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro

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