On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 11:16:15AM +0000, Alex Bennée wrote: > Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes: > > > Alex, as the virtio-gpu* maintainer can you give your opinion > > on the discussion below about virtio-gpu security tagging > > vs our current security policy for "virtualization use case" > > to ack/nack the proposal. > > I'm inclined to agree with Marc-Andre here - the 3D GPU attack surface > is large and for the in-QEMU handling we have a bunch of issues with GPU > context handling between threads that make it tricky. Compounding that > ruttabaga is not very well tested at all because its hard to enable > without non-distro libs (for now). > > Finally virtio-gpu is Odd Fixes so it's not getting the response times > of other VirtIO stuff in terms of handling security issues. > > We should encourage users to use vhost-user-gpu for 3D stuff because at > least then the rendering pipeline and processing of guest controlled > data is easier to sandbox. > > So I'd say: > > - virtio-gpu for 2d - OK > - virtio-gpu for 3d via vhost - OK > - virtio-gpu for 3d in QEMU - Not OK
So, IIUC, in terms of what -device help reports, that would mean Secure: name "vhost-user-gpu", bus virtio-bus name "vhost-user-gpu-pci", bus PCI name "virtio-gpu-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu" Not secure: name "virtio-gpu-gl-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-gl-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-gl" name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-rutabaga" ? > > Alex. > > > > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:33:31PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > >> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:52:27PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: > >> > Hi > >> > > >> > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 6:40 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> > >> > wrote: > >> > > > >> > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:35:29PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: > >> > > > Hi > >> > > > > >> > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 3:53 PM Thomas Huth <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > > > > > >> > > > > On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > >> > > > > > These are all intended for use in a virtualization scenario and > >> > > > > > must > >> > > > > > provide a security boundary. > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> > >> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> > >> > > > > > --- > >> > > > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > I have a second thought about this, I'd like to exclude all > >> > > > gpu-accelerated paths for now. virgl/mesa/rutabaga expose a very > >> > > > large > >> > > > attack surface, so I'd like to drop them from the secure boundary > >> > > > >> > > Rather than repost, please see my response for patch 2: > >> > > > >> > > https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2026-11/msg01530.html > >> > > > >> > > TL;DR: we have already promised anything virtio related is in scope > >> > > for security handling for a long time, as they are all unambiguously > >> > > "virtualization use case". > >> > > > >> > > >> > the value of a secure policy enforcement is low if we know those > >> > devices are unsecure and don't have the resources to make them secure. > >> > >> It isn't a great situation to be in, but we're already there for any > >> virtio devices based on our existing policies for bug handling and > >> security triage. We can't promise we'll get fixes for all CVEs quickly, > >> but we will at least assign CVEs so that users are aware when there > >> are known problems. > >> > >> This contrasts to other devices where problems will remain largely > >> hidden for view, as we treat them as normal bugs and never call our > >> security concerns when committing changes. > >> > >> With regards, > >> Daniel > >> -- > >> |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| > >> |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| > >> |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :| > >> > >> > > > > With regards, > > Daniel > > -- > Alex Bennée > Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro > With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
