Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes:

> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 11:16:15AM +0000, Alex Bennée wrote:
>> Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes:
>> 
>> > Alex, as the virtio-gpu* maintainer can you give your opinion
>> > on the discussion below about virtio-gpu security tagging
>> > vs our current security policy for "virtualization use case"
>> > to ack/nack the proposal.
>> 
>> I'm inclined to agree with Marc-Andre here - the 3D GPU attack surface
>> is large and for the in-QEMU handling we have a bunch of issues with GPU
>> context handling between threads that make it tricky. Compounding that
>> ruttabaga is not very well tested at all because its hard to enable
>> without non-distro libs (for now).
>> 
>> Finally virtio-gpu is Odd Fixes so it's not getting the response times
>> of other VirtIO stuff in terms of handling security issues.
>> 
>> We should encourage users to use vhost-user-gpu for 3D stuff because at
>> least then the rendering pipeline and processing of guest controlled
>> data is easier to sandbox.
>> 
>> So I'd say:
>> 
>>   - virtio-gpu for 2d - OK
>>   - virtio-gpu for 3d via vhost - OK
>>   - virtio-gpu for 3d in QEMU - Not OK
>
> So, IIUC, in terms of what -device help reports, that would mean
>
> Secure:
>
>   name "vhost-user-gpu", bus virtio-bus
>   name "vhost-user-gpu-pci", bus PCI
>   name "virtio-gpu-device", bus virtio-bus
>   name "virtio-gpu-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu"

and virtio-vga

>
> Not secure:
>
>   name "virtio-gpu-gl-device", bus virtio-bus
>   name "virtio-gpu-gl-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-gl"
>   name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-device", bus virtio-bus
>   name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-rutabaga"
>

and virtio-vga-gl


> ?

Looks good to me.

>
>>   
>> Alex.
>> 
>> >
>> > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:33:31PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>> >> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:52:27PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> >> > Hi
>> >> > 
>> >> > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 6:40 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> 
>> >> > wrote:
>> >> > >
>> >> > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:35:29PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> >> > > > Hi
>> >> > > >
>> >> > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 3:53 PM Thomas Huth <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> > > > >
>> >> > > > > On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>> >> > > > > > These are all intended for use in a virtualization scenario and 
>> >> > > > > > must
>> >> > > > > > provide a security boundary.
>> >> > > > > >
>> >> > > > > > Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
>> >> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
>> >> > > > > > ---
>> >> > > > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
>> >> > > > >
>> >> > > >
>> >> > > > I have a second thought about this, I'd like to exclude all
>> >> > > > gpu-accelerated paths for now. virgl/mesa/rutabaga expose a very 
>> >> > > > large
>> >> > > > attack surface, so I'd like to drop them from the secure boundary
>> >> > >
>> >> > > Rather than repost, please see my response for patch 2:
>> >> > >
>> >> > >   https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2026-11/msg01530.html
>> >> > >
>> >> > > TL;DR: we have already promised anything virtio related is in scope
>> >> > > for security handling for a long time, as they are all unambiguously
>> >> > > "virtualization use case".
>> >> > >
>> >> > 
>> >> > the value of a secure policy enforcement is low if we know those
>> >> > devices are unsecure and don't have the resources to make them secure.
>> >> 
>> >> It isn't a great situation to be in, but we're already there for any
>> >> virtio devices based on our existing policies for bug handling and
>> >> security triage. We can't promise we'll get fixes for all CVEs quickly,
>> >> but we will at least assign CVEs so that users are aware when there
>> >> are known problems.
>> >> 
>> >> This contrasts to other devices where problems will remain largely
>> >> hidden for view, as we treat them as normal bugs and never call our
>> >> security concerns when committing changes.
>> >> 
>> >> With regards,
>> >> Daniel
>> >> -- 
>> >> |: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
>> >> |: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
>> >> |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >
>> > With regards,
>> > Daniel
>> 
>> -- 
>> Alex Bennée
>> Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro
>> 
>
> With regards,
> Daniel

-- 
Alex Bennée
Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro

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