Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes: > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 11:16:15AM +0000, Alex Bennée wrote: >> Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes: >> >> > Alex, as the virtio-gpu* maintainer can you give your opinion >> > on the discussion below about virtio-gpu security tagging >> > vs our current security policy for "virtualization use case" >> > to ack/nack the proposal. >> >> I'm inclined to agree with Marc-Andre here - the 3D GPU attack surface >> is large and for the in-QEMU handling we have a bunch of issues with GPU >> context handling between threads that make it tricky. Compounding that >> ruttabaga is not very well tested at all because its hard to enable >> without non-distro libs (for now). >> >> Finally virtio-gpu is Odd Fixes so it's not getting the response times >> of other VirtIO stuff in terms of handling security issues. >> >> We should encourage users to use vhost-user-gpu for 3D stuff because at >> least then the rendering pipeline and processing of guest controlled >> data is easier to sandbox. >> >> So I'd say: >> >> - virtio-gpu for 2d - OK >> - virtio-gpu for 3d via vhost - OK >> - virtio-gpu for 3d in QEMU - Not OK > > So, IIUC, in terms of what -device help reports, that would mean > > Secure: > > name "vhost-user-gpu", bus virtio-bus > name "vhost-user-gpu-pci", bus PCI > name "virtio-gpu-device", bus virtio-bus > name "virtio-gpu-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu"
and virtio-vga > > Not secure: > > name "virtio-gpu-gl-device", bus virtio-bus > name "virtio-gpu-gl-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-gl" > name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-device", bus virtio-bus > name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-rutabaga" > and virtio-vga-gl > ? Looks good to me. > >> >> Alex. >> >> > >> > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:33:31PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: >> >> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:52:27PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: >> >> > Hi >> >> > >> >> > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 6:40 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> >> >> > wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:35:29PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: >> >> > > > Hi >> >> > > > >> >> > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 3:53 PM Thomas Huth <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: >> >> > > > > > These are all intended for use in a virtualization scenario and >> >> > > > > > must >> >> > > > > > provide a security boundary. >> >> > > > > > >> >> > > > > > Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> >> >> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> >> >> > > > > > --- >> >> > > > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > I have a second thought about this, I'd like to exclude all >> >> > > > gpu-accelerated paths for now. virgl/mesa/rutabaga expose a very >> >> > > > large >> >> > > > attack surface, so I'd like to drop them from the secure boundary >> >> > > >> >> > > Rather than repost, please see my response for patch 2: >> >> > > >> >> > > https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2026-11/msg01530.html >> >> > > >> >> > > TL;DR: we have already promised anything virtio related is in scope >> >> > > for security handling for a long time, as they are all unambiguously >> >> > > "virtualization use case". >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > the value of a secure policy enforcement is low if we know those >> >> > devices are unsecure and don't have the resources to make them secure. >> >> >> >> It isn't a great situation to be in, but we're already there for any >> >> virtio devices based on our existing policies for bug handling and >> >> security triage. We can't promise we'll get fixes for all CVEs quickly, >> >> but we will at least assign CVEs so that users are aware when there >> >> are known problems. >> >> >> >> This contrasts to other devices where problems will remain largely >> >> hidden for view, as we treat them as normal bugs and never call our >> >> security concerns when committing changes. >> >> >> >> With regards, >> >> Daniel >> >> -- >> >> |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| >> >> |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| >> >> |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :| >> >> >> >> >> > >> > With regards, >> > Daniel >> >> -- >> Alex Bennée >> Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro >> > > With regards, > Daniel -- Alex Bennée Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro
