On 07/12/2016 03:44 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:
> On 07/12/2016 09:23 AM, neilhard...@gmail.com wrote:
>> I have a question about the security of Whonix, which is used as
>> the Tor VM in QUBES 3.2.
>> 
>> My question is... we know that the Tor Browser can be hacked,
>> mainly based on Firefox exploits.
>> 
>> So it's very possible that when I'm using Whonix, the Tor Firefox 
>> browser gets hacked.
>> 
>> So when this happens, and I restart the Whonix VM... is the hack
>> now gone, or is it persistent..?
>> 
>> In other words, does the App VM load the browser itself from the 
>> Whonix template...?
>> 
>> Or, does the browser itself reside in the App VM..?
>> 
>> Presumably, if the browser is in the App VM, then the hack is 
>> persistent, and I would have to create the App VM all over again
>> in order to clean it up.
>> 
>> But if it's in the template VM, then it's wiped clean whenever you 
>> restart the App VM.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> 
> 
> Malware can persist in a Qubes appvm (although its a bit less likely 
> because template can't be changed). This is why disposable vms have
> been proposed for whonix templates.
> 
> If this is a big concern, you can remove and re-create the whonix
> appvm for each session or when you feel its needed. You could also
> setup an appvm the way you like it (with bookmarks, etc) then clone
> it as needed instead of using it directly.
+1 for using a dispVM for addressing these concerns (malware that
persists as browser addon)

Thinking about it, if you are trying to be anonymous you are not going
to want to use bookmarks/saved passwords/accounts, so there should be
nothing worth keeping in the AppVM anyway.

-- 
Alex

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