On 09/25/2016 08:12 AM, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
Chris wrote:
Especially if you did the sharing via a separate vpn or ssh tunnel. But
in general, I don't think Qubes security should be considered much if
any benefit to adjacent non-Qubes systems.
I'm curious as to why you would say this.
Any additional firewall between a Laptop and the network is a plus for
security, and with Qubes isolating the NIC in a virtual machine, its safer
from compromise than a typical firewall.
I guess I was thinking in terms of using a single NIC/netvm. Having a
second NIC/netvm only for the other laptop does offer hope that one DMA
exploit can't carry over to the other netvm (and thus the other
laptop).... but that protection is probably due not only to vt-d but to
some filtering done by an intermediate proxyvm or such.
Its quite true about Qubes' network "layering" offering both greater
simplicity and security. I think this is because potential leaks around
a tunnel are more easily dealt with in a vm that's devoted to the tunnel.
Chris
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