On Saturday, May 13, 2017 at 3:50:36 PM UTC-4, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2017-05-09 14:54, cooloutac wrote: > > On Tuesday, May 9, 2017 at 1:40:03 AM UTC-4, Andrew David Wong > > wrote: On 2017-05-08 23:47, cooloutac wrote: > >>>> On Tuesday, May 9, 2017 at 12:47:11 AM UTC-4, cooloutac > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> On Sunday, May 7, 2017 at 12:33:54 PM UTC-4, > >>>>> nick...@kulinacs.com wrote: > >>>>>> On May 7, 2017 10:39:22 AM CDT, Andrew David Wong > >>>>>> <a...@qubes-os.org> wrote: > >>>> On 2017-05-07 10:32, nickl...@kulinacs.com wrote: > >>>>>>>>> On May 7, 2017 10:23:54 AM CDT, Andrew David Wong > >>>>>>>>> <a...@qubes-os.org> wrote: On 2017-05-07 10:10, > >>>>>>>>> nickl...@kulinacs.com wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> What benefit does this have over simply > >>>>>>>>>>>> ysing qubes-split-gpg-client-wrapper, like > >>>>>>>>>>>> done here: > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/kulinacs/pass-qubes It > >>>>>>>>>>>> seems like a lot of overhead for not a lot of > >>>>>>>>>>>> gain. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On May 7, 2017 9:50:26 AM CDT, "Manuel Amador > >>>>>>>>>>>> (Rudd-O)" <rud...@rudd-o.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Building on the excellent pass > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (https://passwordstore.org), it gives me > >>>>>>>>>>>>> great pleasure to announce the initial > >>>>>>>>>>>>> release of qubes-pass — an inter-VM > >>>>>>>>>>>>> password manager and store for Qubes OS. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Check it out here! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/Rudd-O/qubes-pass > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> What are the advantages of either of these over the > >>>>>>>>> traditional Qubes model of having a normal password > >>>>>>>>> manager in a vault VM and using the inter-VM > >>>>>>>>> clipboard to copy/paste passwords out of it? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I prefer Pass because it uses GPG for encryption, > >>>>>>>>> meaning I can manage fewer secrets over all (as it > >>>>>>>>> backends into my normal GPG key) and then track my > >>>>>>>>> password files in git. To do this with the > >>>>>>>>> traditional Keepass method, you either need to > >>>>>>>>> back up the password database somewhere secure or > >>>>>>>>> remember another password for it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> Why not just back up the entire vault with qvm-backup? > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Git has less storage overhead (as you're backing up a > >>>>>> bunch of text files, not an entire VM), allows proper > >>>>>> versioning, so it is trivial to see your passwords at a > >>>>>> point in time, and can be used cross platform if you > >>>>>> chose to keep your GPG key on another system. > >>>>> > >>>>> I just back up the database file. its encrypted. > >>>> > >>>> I don't think backing up the whole vault is a good idea if > >>>> you don't have to. > >>>> > > > > Why? No need to encrypt the database file if the whole VM is > > encrypted. Also, if your database file doesn't use authenticated > > encryption, that's another thing to worry about. You may also worry > > about file-level metadata leakage. > > > > > > the database file is automatically encrypted. I just feel like > > vault more likely compromised then the file if something is. but > > I could be wrong. plus way less space. > > > > I don't see any basis for that reasoning. The files in an AppVM are > only as safe as the AppVM itself, unless the VM is used only for > storage or something. > > If the vault VM is compromised, then the encrypted database file in > the vault is only safe as long as it remains encrypted. An attacker > who can compromise your vault can set a trigger that waits for you to > decrypt the database the next time you want to use it, then grab the > passphrase, decryption key, or the whole decrypted database. > > > I think when we have paranoid mode it will be better. > > > > - -- > Andrew David Wong (Axon) > Community Manager, Qubes OS > https://www.qubes-os.org > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJZF2N9AAoJENtN07w5UDAw8goP/itJWd/QiGchOPYmavzXB+AS > HKycQy2y4lvqHjl1cltPXP0unThvoK8BSgCWdm2wRbj7T/Lc5EG7mtCScXyZP6uc > ouFTMPjyjYECmINWaU/rNEOJRy5XR6q3AcVeObBRZxdst59g9GNtCXAgu47U7WjJ > 8u+9wqEO1PD7Oo+ZlFZ971JMsYluU7uxHwqDYqFabPc+FvkD5hEIBM3tfXvmbJuo > qlhpQpVyudYcgCs8Xtt6e1P1GcSc0pXT03nd7mw8QeMsZq3Ua6x8tOEtAnl93pba > LXWoHEmLGg5BbYbkbXMeZYYTyM+e5f4MN78DkolaqzwD73IVITg+8ctJD+rNSgIB > dJhNeAVtsddyQ+7+3IHxsOSgVvnBANoC2e7iBLkVxd0zqKnT6hdbSNQPfrftIQzV > uATOBVgCy16/xjgOeqPENAbT9ElZfgIyEhN3HPQsOPhM0ASSdSgx+fHNH9RY/dZ7 > aoWbILGJRL52J1R4koumXvbaWSHLo2HAIv1xljstedltDt4jyjDQtRfJ2Zbf7jK1 > hGXZcsUtyZHyZklHyYb8ZiQa6gbGj3KBHQaz91TznTdgIV/G42iL+GFb1jej8TIS > 2mBALx5WL82jo5Nmb/4GJ/5nb3ShBAeOm9YkfctQX0fXd3lweZ7h9i79rAocIrZ9 > o87ju6uck1ri3q3q01Pt > =oKxB > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Because more attack vector. Seems like common sense for me. The whole point of paranoid mode isn't it? As for attacker getting the key to the database file thats fine, in other words you also assume like I would that they are not turning it into malware itself. Even if they got the key thats fine if you are just using it to change your passwords using a new database and new key. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/3b875337-3555-43fc-a118-65634fa3cc3c%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
