Although I do not disagree
with the result in this case, I am troubled by the idea of judges deciding what
is or what is not science. As far as I can tell, a Kuhnian conception of
scientific change in principle supports the possibility of
intelligent design being understood as expanding the current notion of
science. ( I say "in principle" for the reason that just because a
particular conception theoretically can be advanced in a
Kuhnian fashion does not mean that the change in paradigm will be
successful). Hence, to say that intelligent design cannot be considered a
science according to our current paradigm of science can be answered by
intelligent designers with a strident "So what?"
Don't get me wrong.
According to my own understanding of the philosophy of science, I do not
see any likelihood of intelligent design providing the thrust for a paradigm
shift concerning what is or what is not science. That aside, what justifies
judicial determinations of this matter? I suppose one reply is
that the court is merely reflecting what its best understanding of the
current scientific paradigm is. Moreover, courts are forever involving in
making judgments about complex factual and conceptual matters. Still, an
opinion based solely on the EC might be more in line with the basis of a
court's authority and expertise.
Bobby
Robert Justin Lipkin Professor of Law Widener University School of Law Delaware |
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